Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2016, Clenista, then on supervised release for another federal methamphetamine-distribution conviction pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Clenista moved for compassionate release in 2020, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Clenista's motion. The court assumed that Clenista had shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances, but ultimately determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against granting compassionate release. The Second Circuit affirmed. While defendants who received a mandatory minimum sentence are eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1), the district court did not abuse its discretion when it placed weight on the need to recognize the seriousness of Clenista's offense, to provide a just punishment, to protect the public from further such activity and Clenista’s characteristics, rather than on changed circumstances, such as Clenista’s age and health and the pandemic. View "United States v. Clenista" on Justia Law

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires defendants convicted of certain crimes to reimburse their victims for “lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The Second Circuit previously held that “other expenses” could include attorneys’ fees incurred by victims while helping the government investigate and prosecute the defendant and costs incurred while privately investigating the defendant. The Supreme Court subsequently held that “the words ‘investigation’ and ‘proceedings’ are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings.”Afriyie was convicted of securities fraud after trading on inside information he misappropriated from his employer, MSD. The district court entered the restitution order, covering the fees MSD paid its law firm to guide MSD’s compliance with investigations by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the SEC; to help prepare four MSD witnesses to testify at Afriyie’s criminal trial; and to represent MSD during the post-verdict restitution proceedings.The Second Circuit held that attorneys’ fees can sometimes be “other expenses” but a victim cannot recover expenses incurred while participating in an SEC investigation. Restitution is appropriate only for expenses associated with criminal matters; civil matters, including SEC investigations, even if closely related to a criminal case do not qualify. View "United States v. Afriyie" on Justia Law

In connection with his leading role in a Chinese construction company in 2010-2016, Zhong was convicted of forced-labor conspiracy 18 U.S.C. 1594(b); forced labor, section 1589(a) and (b); concealing passports and immigration documents in connection with forced labor, section 1592(a); alien smuggling conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); and visa fraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371.The Second Circuit vacated in part. The district court committed evidentiary errors that may have affected the jury’s decision to convict Zhong on the three forced-labor counts. The court allowed testimony about 2001-2002 preindictment conduct, preventing Zhong’s attempts to impeach a witness by offering evidence of the witness’s reputation for truthfulness, and permitting expert witness testimony that exceeded its proper scope. .Those errors were unconnected to Zhong’s other two counts. The government presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to convict him on the alien smuggling and visa fraud counts. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give an “adverse but legitimate consequences” jury instruction regarding threats made to the workers. View "United States v. Zhong" on Justia Law

At a gas station, police detained the vehicle that Patterson was driving because it fit the description of a car whose occupants had reportedly menaced a woman with a firearm in a nearby supermarket parking lot. They discovered a gun. Patterson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The district court granted Patterson’s motion to suppress the firearm, stating that the degree of force used in detaining Patterson’s vehicle and its occupants—pointing firearms at, shouting orders toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle—exceeded that permissible for a reasonable investigatory stop and had to be viewed as a de facto arrest; the arrest was unlawful because, when first effected, it was not supported by probable cause; and the firearm seized from the car’s glove compartment after Patterson fled the scene had to be suppressed as a fruit of the unlawful arrest.The Second Circuit reversed. Patterson’s initial detention in the vehicle was not an arrest but an investigatory stop supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. Pointing firearms at, shouting toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle driven by Patterson, were reasonable safety precautions given that the officers were investigating a report of menacing with a firearm. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The court held that acceptance of a guilty plea must be reviewed de novo. The court also concluded that although the district court's use of the term "provisional" was imprecise, the totality of the record reflects that the district court did accept defendant's guilty plea prior to his motion to withdraw that plea. Therefore, the district court correctly applied the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2) standard in considering defendant's motion to withdraw his plea after determining that he had not established a Brady violation, and the district court committed no error in denying the motion to withdraw. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's ineffective assistance claim, based on counsel's failure to adequately address the issues that defendant now raises, fails for lack of prejudice. View "United States v. Overton" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen and resident of France charged with violating the Commodity Exchange Act, appealed the district court's memorandum order applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and denying her motions to dismiss the indictment on grounds of extraterritoriality and due process.After determining that it has jurisdiction to review the order disentitling defendant, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to consider or reconsider the merits of her motions to dismiss. The court agreed with defendant that it has jurisdiction to review the fugitive disentitlement ruling pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. The court held that defendant is not a fugitive, and that, even if she were, the district court abused its discretion in concluding that disentitlement was justified. The court explained that fugitivity implies some action by defendant to distance herself from the United States or frustrate arrest, but she took no such action. The court concluded, however, that it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the extraterritoriality and due process challenges and dismissed the appeal to that extent. View "United States v. Sindzingre" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals issues arising from his 2017 amended judgment of conviction for Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses in the Southern District of New York.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment as to two issues and addressed the remaining arguments in a separate summary order filed concurrently with this opinion. The court concluded that the order of forfeiture entered against him should be vacated because the district court failed to enter a preliminary order prior to sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B). The court also concluded that defendant was improperly convicted of possessing firearms as a felon, Counts Twelve through Fourteen, because the government did not prove that he knew that he was a felon. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed defendants' convictions for wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349, in connection with the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendants caused DB to make LIBOR submissions that were false or deceptive, i.e., to prove that they engaged in conduct that was within the scope of section 1343. In this case, the government failed to produce any evidence that any DB LIBOR submissions that were influenced by the bank's derivatives traders were not rates at which DB could request, receive offers, and accept loans in DB's typical loan amounts. Therefore, the government failed to show that any of the trader-influenced submissions were false, fraudulent, or misleading. Furthermore, the government's failure to prove that the LIBOR submissions did not comply with the BBA LIBOR Instruction and were false or misleading means it failed to prove conduct that was within the scope of the statute prohibiting wire fraud schemes. The court need not reach defendants' other contentions and the government's cross-appeals as to sentencing are moot. View "United States v. Connolly" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment convicting defendant, known as "El Chapo," of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), drug trafficking conspiracies, unlawful use of a firearm, and a money laundering conspiracy. Defendant is the former leader of a Mexican drug trafficking organization known as the Sinaloa Cartel.The court concluded that because defendant lacks standing to challenge his trial on the basis of the extradition treaty, his specialty claim was properly rejected; defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense and to have the effective assistance of counsel were not unconstitutionally restricted; defendant's motion to dismiss Violation 27, one of the offenses within the CCE offense charged in Count I, was properly denied; the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress; claims of evidentiary errors lacked merit; there was no per se conflict of interest regarding defendant's counsel; defendant was not deprived of a complete defense in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; the jury instruction on unanimity was entirely correct; the district court did not exceed its discretion in denying defendant an evidentiary hearing or a new trial, and neither is warranted now; and the district court and the government did not engage in improper ex parte communications. View "United States v. Beltran-Leyva (Guzman Loera)" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's second or successive petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court concluded that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), as well as United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 32, bars petitioner from raising his claim arguing that his consecutive ten-year sentence is invalid because attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. Applying the deferential clear standard of review, the court also concluded that the district court did not reversibly err in dismissing the petition and rejected petitioner's contention that his fifteen-year sentence as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act is invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). View "Savoca v. United States" on Justia Law