Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that her pretrial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to transmit a plea offer from the government to Defendant before it expired, thereby depriving her of the chance to plead guilty under the terms of the offer.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court concluded that Defendant has waived any claim that the alleged error violated her Sixth Amendment rights. Unlike the defendant in Frye, Defendant learned of her expired plea offer and received new court-appointed counsel two months before trial. She nonetheless chose to go to trial rather than to plead guilty or to petition the court for reinstatement of the offer. This knowing and the voluntary choice was inconsistent with seeking the benefit of the expired plea offer and thus constitutes waiver.
The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other fraudulent activity that was similar and/or related to the charged conduct; the court did not err by allowing the government to introduce certain “red flag” emails from an outside attorney for the limited purpose of proving her knowledge, and the court’s decision to instruct the jury on conscious avoidance was proper. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to one count of transmitting a threat in interstate commerce, one count of threatening to assault a federal law officer, and one count of obstruction of justice. At a sentencing proceeding conducted by videoconference and under seal, the district court sentenced Defendant principally to eighty-four months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the government breached the plea agreement, (2) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, and (3) the district court erred in conducting his sentencing by videoconference.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) the plea agreement expressly provided for the government to take the very actions Defendant now characterizes as breaches of that agreement, (2) the district court provided adequate notice and factual support for the sentencing variances and enhancements it applied, and (3) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be physically present at sentencing. The court also held as a matter of first impression – that sealed sentencings conducted by videoconference do not implicate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53’s prohibition on “the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom” or the procedural requirements associated with the CARES Act’s exception to Rule 53. View "United States v. Sealed Defendant One" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed dismissing his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an order denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner challenged his conviction on the ground that the state court erroneously denied his motion to suppress a gun seized during an allegedly unlawful search. Without giving Petitioner prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, the district court dismissed the petition sua sponte, concluding that his Fourth Amendment claim could not provide a basis for habeas relief under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.   At issue is (1) whether a district court may dismiss a petition sua sponte under Stone without providing a petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard; and (2) if such notice and an opportunity to be heard are required. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment. The court held that although a district court has the authority to raise the Stone issue sua sponte, a habeas petitioner is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a petition is dismissed under Stone. The court further concluded that, in this case, the district court did not comply with that procedure, and the denial of a post-judgment motion for reconsideration, which objects to the sua sponte dismissal under Stone, is not an adequate substitute for that requirement. View "Ethridge v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the narcotics conspiracy count on the grounds that the classification of marijuana under Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act violates their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. They argued that marijuana's scheduling has no rational basis because it does not meet the statutory criteria for inclusion on Schedule I. The district court denied their motion to dismiss, concluding that they incorrectly sought to tether the rational basis inquiry to the statutory criteria   The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the Act's scheduling criteria are largely irrelevant to our constitutional review because the rational basis test asks only whether Congress could have any conceivable basis for including marijuana on the strictest schedule. Because there are other plausible considerations that could have motivated Congress's scheduling of marijuana, the court concluded that its classification does not violate Defendants’ due process or equal protection rights. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2252A(a)(2)(B), (b)(1), and 2, and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and 2.  The district court applied sentencing enhancements under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2), which increase the mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward. Defendant was previously convicted in New York for attempted sodomy in the first degree against an eight-year-old victim.   Defendant argues that the federal sentencing enhancements are inapplicable because the New York law does not qualify as a predicate offense under the modified categorical approach. Defendant further argues that the sentencing enhancements, as interpreted by the district court, are unconstitutionally vague.   The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that Defendant’s prior conviction categorically “relates to” the sexual abuse of a minor, and we conclude that the sentencing enhancements in 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2) are not unconstitutionally vague. Further, the court explained that even if Defendant’s vagueness challenge were not subject to such a high standard of review, however, it would still fail on the merits. An ordinary person could certainly understand that engaging in sexual conduct “consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, or the mouth and the vulva” with a child under the age of eleven "relates to" the sexual abuse of a minor. View "United States v. Ragonese" on Justia Law

Defendant contends primarily that the district court erred in denying his motion pursuant to Section 3582 by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that when considering a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court does not have discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 or Section 2241. Here, because the district court properly refused to consider such evidence here as to the Sections 3553(a) factors and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release, the court affirmed. View "United States v. Orena" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted the Government’s application for writs of garnishment seeking access to Defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. Defendant appealed. 
 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes garnishment of Defendant’s 401(k) retirement funds. The court remanded to the district court, however, to determine whether the ten-percent early withdrawal tax will be imposed upon garnishment, limiting the Government’s access to Defendant’s retirement funds. The court also held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25-percent cap on garnishments does not apply to limit the Government’s garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, following his conviction in New York state court for first-degree rape. Petitioner argued principally that the state trial court violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause by denying him full access to the victim-witness’s mental health records.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition. The court held the New York Court of Appeals’ application of Brady and its progeny was not unreasonable and that there is no binding Supreme Court precedent stating that a defendant’s right to confrontation extends to pretrial discovery. The court explained that Petitioner was given a wealth of information in pretrial disclosures; the victim testified about her various mental health issues in open court; and the victim was cross-examined vigorously on her mental illness, her erratic behavior, and – by extension – her reliability. The jury nonetheless credited her testimony and convicted Petitioner. Based on the entire record, the court could not say that no fair-minded jurists would agree with the New York Court of Appeals that Petitioner received a fair trial.   Further, the court concluded that the New York Court of Appeals’ decision concerning Petitioner’s confrontation rights was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1). View "McCray v. Capra" on Justia Law

The American subsidiary of Alstom Power, Inc. (“API”), a global power and transportation services company, hired two consultants to bribe Indonesian officials to help secure a $118 million power contract. Defendant, who worked in Paris for API’s United Kingdom subsidiary, was allegedly responsible for approving the selection of the consultants and authorizing payments to them. For his role in the alleged bribery scheme, Defendant was charged in an American court with (among other things) violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  (“FCPA”), which makes it unlawful for officers, directors, and agents “of a domestic concern” to use interstate commerce corruptly to bribe or attempt to bribe foreign officials. Defendant appealed. Defendant moved for acquittal, arguing he was not an agent within the meaning of the FCPA. The district court granted that motion; the government appealed and Defendant cross-appealed.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that the district court properly acquitted Defendant under Rule 29 because there was no agency or employee relationship between Defendant and API. The court also affirmed on the cross‐appeal, finding no error in either the district court’s speedy trial analysis or its jury instructions.     The court explained that while there is some evidence that Defendant supported API in his working relationship with the corporation, it is not sufficient to establish that API exercised control over the scope and duration of its relationship with Defendant. Further, the district court’s analysis of the Barker factors and dismissal of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim falls “within the range of permissible decisions. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery; armed bank robbery; and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 219 months in prison. Defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on his counsel’s purported ineffective assistance in (a) failing to move to suppress Defendant’s pre-Miranda statement to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and (b) conceding to the jury that Defendant was outside the bank when it was robbed. Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to move for suppression of his pre-Miranda statement to the FBI, where he made a similar post-Miranda statement that was undisputedly admissible. Further, that Defendant’s counsel did not provide objectively deficient performance when he conceded before the jury that Defendant was outside the bank on the day it was robbed, in light of Defendant’s post-Miranda admission, and abundant witness testimony placing Defendant outside the bank as a lookout. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions and his sentence was procedurally reasonable. The district court did not clearly err in applying sentencing enhancements based on its conclusion that, given the circumstances in this case, it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s co-conspirators would use physical restraints and body armor. View "United States v. Sainfil" on Justia Law