Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a disturbance at a hospital, two New York City police officers arrested Plaintiff and transported her to another hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff asserted false arrest claims, alleging that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest her for a mental health examination. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a misdemeanor trespass, her false arrest claim was precluded. The district court did not reach the issue of the existence of probable cause for a mental health arrest. The district court also held, in the alternative, that the officers were protected by qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to make a mental health arrest.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that while the district court erred in its probable cause analysis, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. The court explained that even where actual probable cause does not exist, police officers may be entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if their actions did not violate "clearly established" rights or if "arguable probable cause" existed at the time of the arrest.   Here, the parties disagree as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest her for an emergency mental health evaluation. The court held that the existence of probable cause to arrest an individual for a criminal violation does not preclude a false arrest claim based on a wrongful arrest for a mental health evaluation. However, nonetheless, the officers here are protected by qualified immunity. View "Guan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant filed his compassionate release motion after exhausting his administrative remedies. The Government conceded that Defendant’s medical conditions arguably met the threshold requirement of an extraordinary and compelling reason but opposed the motion on the grounds that the Section 3553(a) factors weighed against release. Defendant contended primarily that the district court erred in denying his motion pursuant to Section  3582 by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.  The court concluded that when considering a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court does not have the discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 or Section 2241. The court affirmed the finding that the district court properly refused to consider such evidence here as to the Section 3553(a) factors and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "United States v. Orena" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).  The charge was based on his membership in the Syracuse-based 110 Gang and, more specifically, his distribution, in five separate transactions, of a total of 42.2 grams of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”). Defendant apparently received less than $2500 for these sales, which ultimately resulted in a sentence of ninety-two months’ imprisonment—the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines ranges the district judge calculated.   On appeal, Defendant challenged two factors upon which his sentence was based: (1) the district judge’s decision to apply a two-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with narcotics distribution, see U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), and (2) the district judge’s refusal to apply a mitigating role adjustment.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that Defendant’s conviction and sentence stem from his role in furthering the 110 Gang’s violent and extensive criminal enterprise. Yet the district judge failed to analyze Defendant’s criminal conduct against the backdrop of the criminal conduct of other 110 Gang members even though such an analysis might well have qualified Defendant for a mitigating role adjustment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including racketeering conspiracy, in violation of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d) and conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering and attempted murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (“VICAR”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a)(5). Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that to determine whether Defendant’s section 924(c) charge is properly based on a crime of violence, it must determine whether any one of section 924(c) predicate offenses listed in his indictment – racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and murder-for-hire conspiracy – “categorically involve[s] the use of force.” Further, because second-degree murder under New York law is a crime of violence, there can be no doubt that attempt to commit second-degree murder under New York law is itself categorically a crime of violence. This conviction for attempted murder in aid of racketeering serves as one of the predicate offenses underlying Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction. View "United States v. Pastore" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to a 40- month term of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). In calculating Defendant's advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court concluded that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 120.06 and 110.00 was a qualifying “crime of violence” for which his base offense level would be raised from 14 to 20. On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction is not a crime of violence under the categorical approach because New York courts have deemed attempted second-degree gang assault a legal impossibility.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held (1) Defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault is not a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s force clause. Further, the court could discern no coherent element that constitutes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (2) Defendant’s intent to have the presence and aid of others actually present does not categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (3) Defendant’s conviction does not fall within the definition of “attempt[]” as that term is used in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. Section  4B1.2. (4) Attempted second-degree gang assault is not enumerated as “aggravated assault” as that phrase is used in U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s enumerated offenses clause. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Petitioner participated in the bombings of American embassies in Africa. The attacks killed 224 people. In 2001, he was convicted of 266 counts and sentenced to 264 concurrent life terms of imprisonment, to be followed by a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment, in turn, to be followed by a consecutive 30-year term of imprisonment. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his conviction for using an explosive device during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). That conviction yielded the 30-year sentence that is to follow his other terms of imprisonment. Petitioner argues that the conviction’s predicate offense no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and declined to consider Petitioner’s claim. The court held that the concurrent sentence doctrine allows a court to decline to review a challenged sentence when another is valid and carries the same or greater duration of punishment, such that the overall sentence would not change even if the challenge were successful. Here, the doctrine applies because he is challenging a conviction and resulting sentence that runs consecutively to one or more unchallenged life sentences. View "Al-'Owhali v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for various federal crimes based on his participation in a global crime ring. Before his sentencing hearing, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the United States, closing down courts. Eventually, and with Defendant's and his attorney's consent, the district court sentenced defendant via video. On appeal, defendant claims that the district court's procedures under the CARES Act was insufficient to find he waived his right to an in-person sentencing.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's claims on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43 generally compels the defendant’s physical presence in the courtroom and a defendant can waive this right under only very limited circumstances. However, the CARES Act permits a district court to hold a felony sentencing hearing by videoconference if all conditions are met. See United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022).Here, defendant orally consented to the hearing after being told by the court that his sentencing may be delayed if he insisted on an in-person hearing. The district court's decision that immediate video sentencing was in defendant's best interest was reasonable because defendant was asking for a time-served sentence, and an immediate sentence would allow him to more quickly appeal an adverse sentence. View "United States v. Leroux" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a total term of 28 months imprisonment for violations of multiple conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged his revocation on Specification Four, which alleged that, on May 12, 2019, Defendant committed the state crime of second-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Section 120.05(2) by striking his ex-girlfriend (“J.D.”) with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument—namely, a glass bottle.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant committed Specification Four by a preponderance of the evidence or by finding good cause to admit the out-of-court statement under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(c). In addition, the majority disagreed with the dissent’s conclusion that because the charged supervised release violations subjected Defendant to imprisonment for more than one year based on new conduct for which he was never federally indicted, the violation proceedings constitute a new prosecution that violated Defendant Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Finally, as to Specification Nine, the court agreed with the parties that the written judgment conflicted with the district court’s oral ruling that the alleged violation had been proven, and that the oral ruling controls. View "United States v. Peguero" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for administering a fatal dose of prescription medication to her son. The courtroom was closed to spectators for fifteen minutes, during which the prosecutor addressed a website and an email detailing complaint by Petitioner that her trial was unfair. Petitioner moved to set aside her conviction on the ground that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. The district court, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluded that the Appellate Division had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Petitioner’s writ and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny the petition. The court held that the ruling of the New York Appellate Division was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  The court reasoned that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") claims are "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Further, a writ cannot be granted "simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." The court concluded that based on the relevant Supreme Court decisions, there are at least reasonable arguments supporting the Appellate Division's ruling, which is enough to preclude habeas relief. View "Jordan v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment entered in district court following a jury trial, convicting him of conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to consider his proffered evidence that the illegal trading activity lacked anticompetitive effects and had procompetitive benefits and by refusing to conduct a pre-trial assessment as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies. He further contended that the district court abused its discretion in precluding his competitive effects evidence from admission at trial and in conducting only a limited post-trial inquiry into juror misconduct.   The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, concluding that the district court was not required to make a threshold pre-trial determination as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies to the alleged misconduct in this case. The court reasoned that the grand jury indicted Defendant for a per se antitrust violation and the government was entitled to present its case to the jury. The district court properly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence of the alleged per se violation and the sufficiency decision upholding the verdict is not challenged on appeal. In addition, the district court acted within its broad discretion in strictly limiting the admission of Defendant’s competitive effects evidence at trial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ending its post-trial investigation into alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Aiyer" on Justia Law