Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for administering a fatal dose of prescription medication to her son. The courtroom was closed to spectators for fifteen minutes, during which the prosecutor addressed a website and an email detailing complaint by Petitioner that her trial was unfair. Petitioner moved to set aside her conviction on the ground that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. The district court, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluded that the Appellate Division had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Petitioner’s writ and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny the petition. The court held that the ruling of the New York Appellate Division was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  The court reasoned that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") claims are "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Further, a writ cannot be granted "simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." The court concluded that based on the relevant Supreme Court decisions, there are at least reasonable arguments supporting the Appellate Division's ruling, which is enough to preclude habeas relief. View "Jordan v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment entered in district court following a jury trial, convicting him of conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to consider his proffered evidence that the illegal trading activity lacked anticompetitive effects and had procompetitive benefits and by refusing to conduct a pre-trial assessment as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies. He further contended that the district court abused its discretion in precluding his competitive effects evidence from admission at trial and in conducting only a limited post-trial inquiry into juror misconduct.   The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, concluding that the district court was not required to make a threshold pre-trial determination as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies to the alleged misconduct in this case. The court reasoned that the grand jury indicted Defendant for a per se antitrust violation and the government was entitled to present its case to the jury. The district court properly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence of the alleged per se violation and the sufficiency decision upholding the verdict is not challenged on appeal. In addition, the district court acted within its broad discretion in strictly limiting the admission of Defendant’s competitive effects evidence at trial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ending its post-trial investigation into alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Aiyer" on Justia Law

Defendants appeal from judgments of the district court convicting them of crimes arising from their participation in a street gang known as the Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation. All three were convicted of violating the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count One), of conspiring to violate RICO (Count Two), and of unlawful use of firearms “during and in 12 relation to a crime of violence . . . .” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) (Count 13 Three). In addition Defendant 1 was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering 14 (Count Four), Defendant 2 was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering (Count Six) as well as additional violations of Sec 924(c) 16 (Counts Seven and Ten), and both Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 were convicted of Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy (Counts Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve).   While this appeal was pending, the Second Circuit Court concluded that RICO conspiracy could not be a crime of violence for purposes of Sec. 924(c). The court then vacated Defendant 3’s Count Three conviction, reasoning that the court could not be confident that the jury’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on a valid predicate. Further, the court reversed Defendant 2’s Count Ten conviction with prejudice, because Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy cannot be a crime of violence under Sec. 924(c). Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ other 26 challenges. View "United States v. Laurent" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and other offenses in New York state court. During jury selection, Petitioner’s lawyer exercised peremptory strikes against two male jurors, but the prosecutor raised a “reverse-Batson” challenge; which is a claim that the defendant (rather than the prosecution) was using strikes in a discriminatory manner. The state court disallowed the two strikes, and Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner petitioned unsuccessfully for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 in the United States District Court. On appeal, Petitioner renews his challenge to the state court’s reverse-Batson ruling.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that it need not determine whether the state court properly applied Batson or erred in disallowing the two peremptory strikes because those claims are not cognizable under Section 2254. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has held that a state defendant has no freestanding federal constitutional right to peremptory strikes, and so a state court’s mistaken disallowance of such a strike does not, standing alone, form a basis for federal habeas relief. Thus,  any procedural error by the state court in following the three-step Batson framework would not, without more, constitute a violation of a federal constitutional right. View "Murray v. Noeth" on Justia Law

The court addressed Defendants' appeal of the District Court’s Rule 33 Order. On appeal, the court addressed the district court’s ruling that the information withheld by the prosecution was neither “suppressed” within the meaning of Brady, nor prejudicial, and therefore denied Defendants’ motions. Defendants argue that the withheld information would have supplied impeachment evidence against the government’s witness.The Second Circuit rejected Defendant's claim, finding that there was significant additional evidence against both Defendants, such that simply impeaching the government's witness would not have sufficed to upset the trial verdict. Further, the court found that impeachment based on the withheld information would have been cumulative, and thus non-prejudicial. The court reasoned that “strictly speaking, there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.”The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ Rule 33 motions for a new trial. View "U.S. v. Hunter et al." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendants for various offenses for their role in a crime syndicate. The court sentenced each defendant to 198 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendants raised various arguments including challenges to the admissibility of certain trial testimony, the correctness of the jury charge, the sufficiency of the Government’s proof, and the lawfulness of their sentences.The court found that the district court did not clearly err in permitting a witness to identify one of the defendants at trial nor did it abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. Further, the court declined to address the defendant’s double jeopardy claim. Moreover, the court affirmed the defendants’ RICO convictions and RICO conspiracy convictions. The court further affirmed defendants’ arson and conspiracy to commit arson convictions. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the defendants' sentences. In sum, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Gershman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding Defendant Ayfer has not yet satisfied her restitution obligation to W.A-M. The court also concluded that district courts may employ the hybrid approach to craft restitution orders that both apportion liability among multiple defendants according to the loss caused by each defendant and hold defendants jointly and severally liable for some portion of the amounts owed to their victim or victims. The court explained that such hybrid restitution obligations are ordinarily not satisfied until either a defendant has paid as much as she has been ordered to pay or the victim has been made whole. The court finally concluded that Defendant Hakan lacks standing to challenge the district court's orders as to Ayfer's rights and obligations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order in appeal No. 20-2144-cr and dismissed the consolidated appeals in Nos. 20-1540-cr and 20-1542-cr for lack of standing. View "United States v. Yalincak" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit concluded that, under its precedents, there can be no doubt that a Notice to Appear that omits information regarding the time and date of the initial removal hearing is nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction in the Immigration Court, so long as a notice specifying this information is later sent to the alien. The court also concluded that using a false document in connection with petitioner's application for a U.S. passport, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a), requires that an offender make a material misrepresentation with the intent to impair the efficiency and lawful functioning of the government, and thus it is a crime involving moral turpitude that renders petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate removal proceedings and his application for cancellation of removal. View "Cupete v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2016, Clenista, then on supervised release for another federal methamphetamine-distribution conviction pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum term of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. Clenista moved for compassionate release in 2020, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1).The district court denied Clenista's motion. The court assumed that Clenista had shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances, but ultimately determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors weighed against granting compassionate release. The Second Circuit affirmed. While defendants who received a mandatory minimum sentence are eligible for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(1), the district court did not abuse its discretion when it placed weight on the need to recognize the seriousness of Clenista's offense, to provide a just punishment, to protect the public from further such activity and Clenista’s characteristics, rather than on changed circumstances, such as Clenista’s age and health and the pandemic. View "United States v. Clenista" on Justia Law

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires defendants convicted of certain crimes to reimburse their victims for “lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The Second Circuit previously held that “other expenses” could include attorneys’ fees incurred by victims while helping the government investigate and prosecute the defendant and costs incurred while privately investigating the defendant. The Supreme Court subsequently held that “the words ‘investigation’ and ‘proceedings’ are limited to government investigations and criminal proceedings.”Afriyie was convicted of securities fraud after trading on inside information he misappropriated from his employer, MSD. The district court entered the restitution order, covering the fees MSD paid its law firm to guide MSD’s compliance with investigations by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the SEC; to help prepare four MSD witnesses to testify at Afriyie’s criminal trial; and to represent MSD during the post-verdict restitution proceedings.The Second Circuit held that attorneys’ fees can sometimes be “other expenses” but a victim cannot recover expenses incurred while participating in an SEC investigation. Restitution is appropriate only for expenses associated with criminal matters; civil matters, including SEC investigations, even if closely related to a criminal case do not qualify. View "United States v. Afriyie" on Justia Law