Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In No. 20-1762, the Second Circuit denied the government's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal from the district court's denial of his motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to correct errors in his judgment of conviction (First Order). The court concluded that because the district court entered the Second Order while defendant's appeal challenging the First Order was pending, the district court lacked authority to enter the Second Order.In Nos. 20-3286 and 20-3276, which have been consolidated with No. 20-1762, defendant appeals from the Second Order (No. 20-3286) and appeals from an order denying his motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act (No. 20-3276). Because the Second Order indicates the district court's desire to correct the judgment of conviction, in Nos. 20-1762 and 20-3286 the court vacated the First Order and the Second Order, respectively; and remanded to the district court, restoring its authority to enter whatever amended judgment it finds appropriate to correct the operative judgment's clerical errors.The court directed the Clerk of Court to unconsolidate No. 20-3276, which challenges the denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release, and to recalendar that appeal for a merits panel or a motions panel, as appropriate, for resolution in the ordinary course, and to consider consolidating No. 20-3276 with a new First Step Act appeal filed by defendant, No. 21-1277. View "United States v. Jacques" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants' Khalupsky and Korchevsky convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and computer intrusions, securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their use of information from stolen, pre-publication press releases to execute advantageous securities trades. Defendants used intermediaries to pay hackers for the stolen press releases.The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish Korchevsky's conspiracy with Khalupsky, as well as sufficient evidence to support the securities fraud convictions; venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York for the securities fraud counts where it was foreseeable that defendants' actions constituting securities fraud would take place there; there was no constructive amendment or prejudicial variance of the superseding indictment; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to a jury request during deliberations. The court also concluded that there is no merit to defendants' challenge to the district court's decision to charge the jury that conscious avoidance can satisfy the knowledge requirement. Nor is there merit to their claim challenging the particular instruction given. View "United States v. Korchevsky" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of marijuana conspiracy but acquitted of cocaine and cocaine base conspiracy and a related firearms charge. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the charge of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). After a second jury trial, defendant was convicted of the RICO conspiracy count and sentenced by the district court principally to 360 months' imprisonment for both the marijuana conspiracy and RICO conspiracy counts of conviction.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court's decision to admit evidence of defendant's involvement in cocaine or cocaine base trafficking during his retrial on the RICO conspiracy charge did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to disqualify his codefendant's counsel and instead severe defendant's trial. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and concluded that they lacked merit. View "United States v. Hicks" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for multiple drug- and gun-related counts, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions. The court rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary errors. However, the court vacated Defendant Willis's sentence because the district court clearly erred in its factfinding regarding jointly undertaken criminal activity and failed to rule whether his sentence would run concurrently to an undischarged state sentence. The court remanded for resentencing and clarification. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for multiple bribery charges and obstruction of justice. Defendant was a self-styled Brooklyn "liaison" to the NYPD, selling preferred outcomes to encounters with law enforcement.The court rejected defendant's contentions that: (1) evidence collected from his electronic devices should have been suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the district court prejudiced him by correcting a misstatement of law made by co-defendant Grant’s attorney; (3) evidence of uncharged conduct should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial; (4) the government disclosed certain documents in an untimely fashion, prejudicing his defense; (5) the temporary admission of a phone call (GX-300A) against his co-defendant generated spillover prejudice against him; (6) the admission of his non-testifying co-defendant’s statements against that co-defendant violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights; (7) the district court abused its discretion in excluding two proposed expert witnesses for the defense; (8) the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing to investigate his attorney's potential conflict of interest; (9) the jury was wrongly instructed on the relevant law; and (10) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The court concluded that all of defendant's arguments are without merit. View "United States v. Reichberg" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant was sentenced to 360 months in prison based on his conviction on charges including conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, more than 50 grams of cocaine base.The court concluded that district courts are not required to consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court found unpersuasive the reasoning of sister circuits that have adopted a differing view. The court explained that relief under the First Step Act is discretionary and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce defendant's terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The court rejected defendant's assertion that the emphasis on his career-offender status, combined with the boilerplate language on Form AO 247 (referencing factors irrelevant to First Step Act motions), reflects that the district court misapprehended its authority to grant a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Rather, the court concluded that the district court did not misconstrue eligibility as depending on career-offender status; the form is titled "Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant To First Step Act And 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2);" and, although the form contains boilerplate that is irrelevant to defendant, the written decision makes clear that the district court used the proper framework. View "United States v. Moyhernandez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in defendant's appeal from the district court's final order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Because a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel on a compassionate release motion or an appeal from the denial of such a motion, the court held that an attorney seeking to be relieved before it in that context need not file a motion and brief that comply with the requirements of Anders. Instead, counsel's motion to be relieved must adhere to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27.1 by stating with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief requested, and the legal argument supporting that request, as well as attaching an affidavit indicating that counsel has advised the defendant of the process for obtaining court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Counsel in this case complied with the requirements of Rule 27. The court also denied the government's motion for summary affirmance of the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his house. Defendant was on parole at the time of the search where parole officers were tipped by an anonymous informant that defendant may have been in possession of guns. During the search, the officers found multiple firearms, a box of ammunition, and illegal narcotics. The district court concluded that the search violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because it was executed without reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that, under the Special Needs Doctrine jurisprudence, the parole search was proper because it was reasonably related to the parole officers' duties. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Braggs" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the discretionary concurrent sentence doctrine continues to apply when a defendant collaterally attacks one of his convictions, and exercised its discretion to decline review in this case. Petitioner is currently serving numerous concurrent sentences, including two life terms in prison. Petitioner challenges one of his convictions under Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). The court concluded that, no matter the outcome of his claim, petitioner will remain in prison for the rest of his life on other counts of conviction, and a favorable decision would not shorten the amount of time he will spend incarcerated. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment without prejudice to petitioner renewing the claim if the validity of his life sentences changes in the future. View "Kassir v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (Count One); conspiring to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (Count Two); and possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of either the racketeering conspiracy or the narcotics conspiracy charged in the prior two counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count Three). The jury specially found that the pattern of racketeering activity charged in Count One encompassed both narcotics and murder conspiracy conduct. The jury also found that a firearm relevant to Count Three was discharged in furtherance of the Count One racketeering conspiracy but was not discharged in furtherance of the separate Count Two narcotics conspiracy. The district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment for Count Three, to be served consecutive to his concurrent 120-month sentences for Counts One and Two.The Second Circuit concluded that its recent decisions in the wake of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), preclude section 924(c) from being applied to a murder conspiracy. Therefore, given the possibility that defendant's section 924(c) conviction was based on murder conspiracy conduct rather than on a qualifying drug-trafficking offense, the court held that his conviction on Count Three is invalid. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's section 924(c) conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on the racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy charges. View "United States v. Heyward" on Justia Law