Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Mohamed Musaid was arrested for the murder of a relative and confessed to the crime. However, his trial was delayed for over eight years due to repeated findings of incompetence to stand trial, attributed to his long history of mental illness. Musaid was found incompetent on ten occasions and competent on five, with his competency dependent on his compliance with antipsychotic medication. Each time he was found competent and transferred to Rikers Island, he would refuse medication and regress to incompetence.The trial court eventually allowed Musaid's trial to proceed nearly ten months after a final finding of competency, without re-evaluating his mental state. During the trial, Musaid exhibited erratic behavior, raising questions about his competency. Despite this, the trial court did not conduct a further inquiry into his mental state. Musaid was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life for second-degree murder and five years for criminal possession of a weapon.Musaid appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to reassess his competency before trial violated his due process rights. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, stating there was no indication that Musaid was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. Musaid then sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the trial court's failure to conduct a minimal inquiry into Musaid's competency just before trial was objectively unreasonable, given his history of mental illness and the time elapsed since the last competency evaluation. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, allowing the state courts to determine whether it is possible to reconstruct Musaid's competency at the time of trial based on evidence proximate to the trial. View "Musaid v. Kirkpatrick" on Justia Law

In November 2005, Derrek Pannell and accomplices robbed a United States Post Office in Brooklyn, New York. Pannell, an employee of the Post Office, used his knowledge of the keypad lock to gain entry. The robbers restrained five employees and held them at gunpoint while demanding money from a safe. They fled with over $65,000 and assaulted a supervisor outside. Pannell was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, aggravated robbery, and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.Following his conviction, Pannell's direct appeal was unsuccessful. He then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his conviction for aggravated postal robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied his motion, concluding that both the base and aggravated offenses of § 2114(a) robbery qualified as crimes of violence. Pannell appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Pannell argued that his § 924(c) conviction was invalid because aggravated postal robbery under § 2114(a) is not a crime of violence, especially when based on a Pinkerton theory of liability. The court rejected this argument, citing precedent that a conviction under a Pinkerton theory does not alter the nature of the substantive offense. The court also held that the base offense of § 2114(a) robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, and thus, the aggravated offense does as well. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Pannell's § 2255 motion. View "Pannell v. United States" on Justia Law

Samuel Boima, a native of Sierra Leone, was charged with assaulting federal officers at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility while awaiting deportation. The incident involved Boima spitting a mixture of saliva and blood on the officers. Following his arrest, Boima exhibited uncooperative and erratic behavior, leading to a court-ordered psychological evaluation. Dr. Kari Schlessinger diagnosed Boima with a psychotic disorder, concluding he was incompetent to stand trial. Boima was subsequently committed to the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, for further evaluation.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York found Boima incompetent to stand trial and ordered his hospitalization. Dr. Kristina P. Lloyd and Dr. Charles Cloutier at FMC Butner diagnosed Boima with schizophrenia and recommended antipsychotic medication to restore his competency. The government moved for a Sell hearing to authorize involuntary medication. The district court granted the motion but did not address whether the government had an important interest in prosecuting Boima, a necessary finding under Sell v. United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing forced medication, noting the lower court's failure to consider whether important governmental interests were at stake, as required by Sell. The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the government’s interest in prosecuting Boima justified involuntary medication, considering factors such as the seriousness of the crime, potential civil commitment, and the time Boima had already spent in custody. View "United States v. Boima" on Justia Law

Victor Rivera participated in a robbery crew responsible for over a dozen robberies of jewelers and luxury watch owners between October 2019 and November 2020. The crew identified victims on social media and ambushed them, often at gunpoint. Rivera was arrested and indicted on 18 counts. He pled guilty to one count of participating in a Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy under a plea agreement with a stipulated Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York accepted Rivera's plea agreement. However, the Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed additional convictions in Puerto Rico, increasing Rivera's criminal history points from three to ten, placing him in Criminal History Category V. The Government, agreeing with the PSR, advocated for a revised Guidelines range of 235 to 240 months. Rivera's defense argued that the Government should have reviewed his criminal history more thoroughly before the plea agreement. The district court sentenced Rivera to 235 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. Rivera argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by advocating for a higher Guidelines range based on information available at the time of the plea and by describing him as a leader in the conspiracy. The court found that the Government breached the plea agreement by relying on Rivera’s Puerto Rico convictions, which were available at the time of the plea. However, this breach did not amount to a "plain" error. The court also found no error in the Government's description of Rivera as a leader, as it was relevant to the sentencing factors. Rivera's procedural and substantive challenges to his sentence were rejected, and his request for resentencing due to a recent amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines was denied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

In 2013, the petitioner was convicted in Monroe County, New York, of engaging in a course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimony of the child victim, who described years of sexual abuse by the petitioner. A medical expert for the prosecution testified that the child's normal physical examination was consistent with past sexual abuse, as any injuries would have healed over time. The defense did not call a medical expert but cross-examined the prosecution's expert to elicit that normal findings could also indicate no abuse.The petitioner challenged his conviction in state court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to consult or call a medical expert. The Appellate Division rejected this claim, stating that the petitioner had not shown that such testimony was available, would have assisted the jury, or that he was prejudiced by its absence. The New York Court of Appeals denied further review. The petitioner then filed a motion under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10, which was also denied without a hearing. The state court found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the absence of a defense expert, as the prosecution's expert's key conclusions were not seriously challenged.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York denied the petitioner's habeas corpus petition, ruling that the state courts had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in rejecting the ineffective-assistance claim. The petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington in concluding that the petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to consult or call a medical expert. The court noted that the defense counsel effectively neutralized the prosecution's expert through cross-examination, and the petitioner failed to show that expert testimony would have likely changed the trial's outcome. View "Englert v. Lowerre" on Justia Law

In 2021, Ellva Slaughter was charged with illegally possessing a firearm while knowing he had previously been convicted of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Slaughter moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the jury selection plan of the Southern District of New York (SDNY) systematically underrepresented Black and Hispanic or Latino people, violating his Sixth Amendment right and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA). The district court assumed the underrepresentation was significant but denied the motion, finding Slaughter failed to prove systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Slaughter's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court assumed without deciding that there was significant underrepresentation of Black and Hispanic or Latino people but concluded that Slaughter did not establish that this underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide evidence that the identified practices caused the disparities and noted that many of the challenged practices were authorized by the Second Circuit. The court also found that any disparities were due to external factors outside the SDNY's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court applied the framework from Duren v. Missouri, assuming without deciding that the underrepresentation was significant. However, it concluded that Slaughter did not meet his burden of proving systematic exclusion. The court found that Slaughter's expert did not provide sufficient evidence that the SDNY's practices caused the underrepresentation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that Slaughter failed to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment and the JSSA. View "United States v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

Enock Mensah, a social worker, was convicted of theft of public funds and health care fraud for billing publicly funded agencies for over 1,600 treatment sessions that never occurred. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to forty-two months of imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $177,345 in restitution.Mensah appealed, arguing that the district court erred in three ways: (1) failing to excuse or further examine a juror who knew a government witness, (2) denying his post-trial motion for a new trial based on a prosecutor's comment that suggested Mensah had the ability to testify, and (3) applying a ten-level enhancement based on the loss amount in calculating the United States Sentencing Guidelines advisory range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the juror to remain, as the connection was too attenuated to presume bias. The voir dire was deemed adequate in screening for actual bias. Regarding the prosecutor's comment, the court held that any potential prejudice was moot since Mensah chose to testify, and there was no evidence that the comment compelled him to do so. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court's calculation of the loss amount, which was based on substantial evidence, including video surveillance, license-plate reading technology, and cellphone records.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Mensah's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Mensah" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in a fraudulent slip-and-fall scheme in which they recruited poor and homeless individuals to stage accidents and seek unnecessary medical treatment. The scheme involved doctors and lawyers who would then sue property owners or their insurance companies for damages, with the proceeds being divided among the conspirators. The recruits received minimal compensation compared to the organizers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The jury found them guilty, and the court sentenced them based on the guidelines calculations, including enhancements for the number of victims and the amount of loss. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing various errors in the trial and sentencing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no persuasive arguments to overturn them. However, it remanded for factfinding regarding the number of fraudulent accidents orchestrated by the conspiracy during the defendants' involvement to accurately compute the loss enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. The court vacated and remanded Duncan’s forfeiture order, concluding it was based on government allegations without factual support. The restitution order for Rainford and Locust was affirmed but modified by $120,000. Rainford’s sentence was affirmed but remanded for reconsideration in the interest of justice.The main holdings were: affirming the convictions, remanding for factfinding on the loss enhancement, vacating and remanding Duncan’s forfeiture order, modifying the restitution order, and remanding Rainford’s sentence for reconsideration. View "United States v. Rainford" on Justia Law

Carlos Martinez, a former federal prison guard, was convicted of multiple charges related to the repeated rape of an inmate, referred to as "Maria," at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Maria testified that Martinez raped her on five occasions, using both physical force and threats to coerce her. The jury found Martinez guilty of several counts, including sexual abuse by threats or fear, deprivation of civil rights, and aggravated sexual abuse for one of the rapes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced Martinez to ten years in prison. Martinez challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for two counts, arguing that the jury's acquittals on other counts indicated they did not believe Maria's testimony. The government cross-appealed, arguing that the ten-year sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Martinez's sufficiency challenge, affirming that the jury was entitled to credit Maria's testimony that Martinez physically restrained her during one of the rapes. The court also noted that inconsistent verdicts do not undermine a conviction.The court found the district court's sentence procedurally unreasonable due to several errors: relying on clearly erroneous factual findings, misapprehending the law, and failing to sentence Martinez based on all his convictions. The district court had improperly treated the convictions for sexual abuse by threats or fear as equivalent to sexual abuse of a ward, and it had given undue weight to its doubts about the jury's guilty verdicts.The Second Circuit held that the ten-year sentence was also substantively unreasonable because it did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Martinez's offenses. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction, ordered that a specific paragraph in the Presentence Investigation Report be stricken, and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In December 2020, Steve Rosado was arrested after attempting to meet with a woman he believed to be the mother of two young girls, with the intent to engage in illegal sexual activity. The woman was actually an undercover law enforcement agent. Rosado, a registered sex offender with prior convictions involving minors, was charged with attempted enticement of a minor and attempted receipt of child pornography. He pled guilty to both charges.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced Rosado to 240 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. During sentencing, the court orally pronounced several conditions of supervised release. However, the written judgment included additional conditions that were not mentioned during the oral pronouncement. Rosado appealed, arguing that these additional conditions should have been pronounced at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had failed to pronounce the seven additional conditions at sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a). The appellate court held that the oral pronouncement of the sentence controls over the written judgment. Consequently, the court vacated the written judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remove the unpronounced conditions from the written judgment. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment on other challenges raised by Rosado in a concurrently issued summary order. View "United States of America v. Rosado" on Justia Law