Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's judgment granting in part and denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. The district court granted defendant's motion with respect to his conviction on Count One, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, but denied the motion with respect to his conviction on Count Two, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack cocaine.The Second Circuit concluded that, although defendant has been released from custody, his appeal is not moot. The court explained that if Count Two were a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, defendant would be eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release on that count. Furthermore, there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court on remand would grant such relief, and that possibility is enough to create a live controversy.On the merits, the court concluded that a conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) is not a "covered offense" within the meaning of the First Step Act. Therefore, defendant is ineligible for a reduction in his sentence on Count Two under the First Step Act. The court rejected defendant's alternative argument, concluding that a court may not alter a sentence imposed on any count of conviction without express statutory authority to do so. Finally, the district court provided no explanation for why it left defendant's term of supervised release on Count One intact despite its decision to reduce his prison sentence on that count to time served. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's term of supervised release on Count One and remanded. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court held that defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction because his offense of conviction, drug-related murder in violation of 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act. In this case, defendant was involved in the torture and killing of the victim, a rival drug dealer who robbed defendant about two weeks before his death. View "United States v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

Defendants McCoy and Nix appealed their convictions for charges related to their involvement in a series of home invasions in the Rochester, New York area in September and October 2014. In this case, defendants and others unlawfully conspired and attempted to rob other persons of commodities that had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, such as diamonds, watches, United States currency, and narcotics, and conspired to traffic in the stolen narcotics.Defendants principally contend (a) that they were entitled to a new trial on the ground that the juror's false voir dire responses violated their rights to be tried before a fair and impartial jury; (b) that their firearm-brandishing convictions should be reversed on the ground that none of their Hobbs Act offenses are predicate crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); (c) that in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the section 922(g)(1) charges of being felons in possession of firearms; and (d) that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.The Second Circuit found merit in defendants' contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a section 924(c) crime of violence in light of United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019). Therefore, the court reversed defendants' section 924(c) convictions on Count 2 for brandishing firearms predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. The court affirmed defendants' convictions on all other counts, as well as the denial of their motions for a new trial. The court remanded for resentencing, and for consideration by the district court of what relief, if any, may be appropriate under the First Step Act. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order removing him on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). In this case, petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault meets section 16(a)'s physical force requirement because NYPL 120.05(1) requires that a defendant (1) cause a serious physical injury to another (2) with the intent to do so. The court explained that a person who causes serious physical injury with the intent to do so, in violation of NYPL 120.05(1), necessarily uses physical force. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that NYPL 120.05(1) is overbroad. View "Thompson v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's amended judgment following defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, one count of securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1348 and 2, and six counts of insider trading in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 and 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. 2.In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court concluded that defendant's execution of confidentiality agreements with a company whose acquisition he was exploring was sufficient to subject him to prohibitions against insider trading. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant signed two nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with the company; that in both NDAs, each party agreed not to disclose any confidential or proprietary information of the other; and that the fact that the parties' exploration and evaluation of the potential acquisition of the company was explicitly classified as "Proprietary Information" that was to remain "Confidential." Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support inferences that defendant knowingly and intentionally breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing material nonpublic information as to the prospects for a merger agreement between the company and his fund, intending for the third party to make trades based on that information. Furthermore, defendant's challenges to his convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit such fraud also fail. Finally, venue was proper in the Southern District of New York. View "United States v. Chow" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for various crimes stemming from his role in two schemes to automatically subscribe consumers, without their knowledge or consent, to premium SMS text messaging services. Counts One and Five charged defendant with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; Counts Two and Six charged defendant with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2; Counts Three and Seven charged defendant with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A; and Counts Four and Eight charged defendant with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h).The court held that the district court's conduct did not create an appearance of partiality warranting recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a); the district court properly instructed the jury on conscious avoidance because sufficient trial evidence supported that theory of criminal liability; and defendant's conduct, as pled and as proven at trial, fit squarely within the scope of the aggravated identity theft statute. The court explained that, by participating in a scheme that employed victims' cell phone numbers to sign them up for paid text message services without their knowledge or consent by means of an auto-subscribing computer program, defendant used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person within the meaning of section 1028A. View "United States v. Wedd" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of carjacking resulting in death, multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery, and related firearms offenses. The court concluded that defendant's challenges to the district court's instructions on the mens rea and causation elements of carjacking resulting in death, both fail because these claims lack merit and the purported errors were in any event harmless. The court also concluded that defendant's evidentiary challenges fail because the district court acted within its discretion in making each of the rulings at issue. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's challenge to his firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) fail because the predicate crimes on which these convictions are based, Hobbs Act robbery, and federal carjacking, are categorical crimes of violence. View "United States v. Felder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the denial of his right to a fair trial. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Civil on his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, asserting errors in the jury instructions, both with respect to his fair trial claim.Although the district court erred by relying on a credibility determination, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the detective on the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. In this case, the summary judgment record before the district court was sufficient to establish probable cause without relying on the detective's familiarity with plaintiff's possessions and hence on his credibility. Furthermore, the facts that support probable cause to arrest here were sufficient to "lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty," as required for probable cause to prosecute a claim. As to the fair trial claim, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the detective and remanded for a new trial because the jury instructions contained prejudicial error. View "Ashley v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that defendant does not qualify for relief afforded by Section 401(a) of the First Step Act. Defendant was convicted in 2007 of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 812, 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count One), among other offenses, and sentenced principally to a 300-month term of imprisonment. The district court reduced his term of imprisonment to 215 months in 2020.The court concluded that the plain text of Section 401(c) limits the retroactive effect of Section 401(a), making its relief available to defendants who committed offenses before the First Step Act became law but only if they have not yet had a sentence imposed as of the date of enactment. The court also concluded that Section 404(b) of the First Step Act does not require a district court to engage in "plenary resentencing" or "recalculate an eligible defendant's Guidelines range, except for those changes that flow from Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act," United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2020). In this case, because defendant's original sentence on Count One was imposed in 2007—long before the date of the enactment of the First Step Act—he is precluded by Section 401(c) from benefiting from Section 401(a)'s changes to the sentencing enhancement of Section 841(b)(1)(A), which are unrelated to Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's 2020 order. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for asylum fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and (3), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated identity theft, even under the narrow view of the aggravated identity theft statute promoted by defendant. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement for the involvement of 100 or more documents in the relevant offense. View "United States v. Dumitru" on Justia Law