Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a civilly confined person under Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of aspects of his Article 10 proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint because he filed his claims after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. During the pendency of his appeal, the Second Circuit has deducted court fees from plaintiff's institutional account at the Central New York Psychiatric Center pursuant to the filing fee requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that applies to a "prisoner" proceeding in forma pauperis. Plaintiff now moves for restoration of those fees.The Second Circuit granted plaintiff's motion for restoration of fees deducted from his patient account and directed the Clerk of Court to refund those fees and to cease further collections. The court concluded that plaintiff, as a civil detainee who completed his criminal sentence, was no longer a "prisoner" under the PLRA when he filed his lawsuit. Therefore, he is not subject to the fee provisions under the PLRA. View "Jones v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a petition for habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted by a jury in state court of first degree manslaughter. The court concluded that the admission of the autopsy report at petitioner's trial through a surrogate witness was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011). Furthermore, the unreasonably erroneous admission of the autopsy report was not harmless where the report was the strongest evidence in the State's case and was not cumulative of other inculpatory evidence connecting petitioner to the victim's death. View "Garlick v. Lee" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's final order finding that petitioner was removable as a non-citizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude based on its determination that New York petit larceny constitutes such a crime.The Second Circuit certified the following question to the New York State Court of Appeals: Does an intent to "appropriate" property under New York Penal Law 155.00(4)(b) require an intent to deprive the owner of his or her property either permanently or under circumstances where the owner's property rights are substantially eroded? View "Ferreiras Veloz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit followed the logical course charted by longstanding precedent to reach two conclusions with respect to 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2): first, the "agent" of a federally funded organization need not have control over the federal funds, and the agent need not work in a specific program within the organization that uses those federal dollars; and second, the "business" of a federally funded organization need not be commercial in nature.The court affirmed Defendants Dawkins and Code's conviction for conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 666(a)(2), as well as Dawkins's conviction of substantive bribery in violation of section 666(a)(2). Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in a scheme to bribe basketball coaches at NCAA Division I universities in exchange for the coaches' agreement to steer their student-athletes toward Dawkins's sports management company after leaving college and becoming professional basketball players.In this case, the court concluded that the superseding indictment properly alleged a violation of section 666(a)(2); the Government proved a violation of section 666(a)(2) where section 666(a)(2) does not require a nexus between the "agent" of a federally funded organization and the federal funds the organization receives, and the bribes paid by defendants to the university basketball coaches in exchange for influence exerted over student-athletes were "in connection" with a university's "business;" the statute is constitutional as applied to defendants; the district court did not abuse its discretion when making the challenged evidentiary rulings; and the district court made no reversible errors in providing the challenged jury instructions. View "United States v. Dawkins" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and concluded that the Government's refusal to make a 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) motion based on its valuation of defendant's cooperation was not an unconstitutional act. The court held that section 3553(e) gives the Government a power, not a duty, to permit a district court to depart from a mandatory minimum based on a defendant's substantial assistance. Absent some other showing of unconstitutionality, it is not unconstitutional for the government to conclude that a defendant's assistance is worthy of a USSG 5K1.1 motion but no more based on its internal assessment of the costs and benefits of a further departure.The court also held that the Government did not act in bad faith. Where an agreement reserves to the Government the sole discretion to determine whether and how to value the cooperation of the defendant, the Government need not express dissatisfaction with the defendant's assistance to conclude that a section 5K1.1 motion but not a section 3553(e) motion is appropriate based on the Government's good faith valuation of the defendant's cooperation. The court remanded for resentencing with instructions that the case be reassigned. View "United States v. Trimm" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 20-year term of supervised release imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to child pornography charges. The court found no procedural error in the district court's failure to separately explain the basis for the term of supervised release after discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in imposing a term of imprisonment. The court explained that nothing in section 3553(c) or its caselaw requires a district court to undertake a separate recitation of the basis for each part of the sentence imposed. Where, as here, the district court explains the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment, the court concluded that it need not repeat the process in imposing a term of supervised release. The court also concluded that defendant's term of supervised release was substantively reasonable in light of the obvious ongoing risk defendant poses to children. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to threatening a federal official and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's charges stemmed from calls he made to the office of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar in which he made threatening statements. Defendant was sentenced to a year and a day in prison and three years of supervised release, as well as a special condition which required defendant to participate in a program known as the Partners in Restorative Initiatives.The Second Circuit vacated the special condition, concluding that it is too vague and impermissibly delegates authority to the probation officer. The court explained that the condition is vague because it would leave a reasonable person guessing as to what the requirements of the Program might be and it fails to put defendant on notice as to what conduct could trigger a charge of violating the condition. Furthermore, the Program has not been approved by the United States Probation Office. The court further explained that the Program is sufficiently ill-defined so that, in supervising defendant, the Probation Office would need to fill in too many blanks. View "United States v. Carlineo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of one count of attempted child enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could not convict him unless the evidence showed that he attempted to transform or overcome the will of his intended victim. Rather, the court held that section 2422(b) imposes no requirement that an individual endeavor to "transform or overcome" the will of his intended victim. Although the court did not undertake to require any specific formulation for jury instructions in section 2422(b) cases, the court repeated its prior observation that the statutory verbs are ones of common usage; in most cases, it will suffice to instruct jurors to apply the plain and ordinary meanings of those words, as the district court instructed the jury to do in this case. View "United States v. Waqar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's judgment granting in part and denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. The district court granted defendant's motion with respect to his conviction on Count One, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, but denied the motion with respect to his conviction on Count Two, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack cocaine.The Second Circuit concluded that, although defendant has been released from custody, his appeal is not moot. The court explained that if Count Two were a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, defendant would be eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release on that count. Furthermore, there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court on remand would grant such relief, and that possibility is enough to create a live controversy.On the merits, the court concluded that a conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) is not a "covered offense" within the meaning of the First Step Act. Therefore, defendant is ineligible for a reduction in his sentence on Count Two under the First Step Act. The court rejected defendant's alternative argument, concluding that a court may not alter a sentence imposed on any count of conviction without express statutory authority to do so. Finally, the district court provided no explanation for why it left defendant's term of supervised release on Count One intact despite its decision to reduce his prison sentence on that count to time served. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's term of supervised release on Count One and remanded. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court held that defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction because his offense of conviction, drug-related murder in violation of 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act. In this case, defendant was involved in the torture and killing of the victim, a rival drug dealer who robbed defendant about two weeks before his death. View "United States v. Gilliam" on Justia Law