Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 20-year sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to participating in the affairs of a criminal enterprise, specifically, the "MS-13" street gang, through a pattern of racketeering consisting of, among other crimes, murder and a separate count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant relied on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); and United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), arguing for the first time on appeal that neither of the charged racketeering offenses are violent crimes and that his firearm conviction is therefore legally invalid.The court concluded that defendant failed to show plain error because Davis's effect on the court's decision in United States v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2009), which held that a RICO offense based on two violent racketeering predicates is a violent crime for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), is unclear. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court specifically considered defendant's effort to cooperate with the authorities and his personal characteristics. Furthermore, the sentence that was imposed was hardly excessive for such a crime, and was in line with defense counsel's request. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) as moot. While this appeal was pending, defendant completed his federal prison sentence. The court explained that, although defendant is now on supervised release, he has neither requested that the district court reduce his term of supervision nor advanced any arguments to suggest that such a reduction is warranted. The court noted that dismissal will not result in hardship to defendant. If defendant believes that the arguments that he marshaled in favor of compassionate release would also merit a reduction in his term of supervised release, the court concluded that he is free to make such a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c). View "United States v. Chestnut" on Justia Law

The United States appeals from the district court's amended judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, vacating defendant's 22-year sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and related firearms crimes and resentencing him to time served. The district court concluded that it had mistakenly applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Career Offender Guideline, USSG 4B1.1, in determining defendant's initial sentence because two prior convictions relied on as predicates for those enhancements were for New York first-degree manslaughter, which the district court ruled is not a categorical "violent felony" (ACCA) or "crime of violence" (Guideline).The Second Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, agreed with the United States that first-degree manslaughter is a categorical violent felony/crime of violence because a person can be guilty of that crime—whether by commission or omission—only if he (a) causes death, while (b) intending to cause at least serious bodily injury, and the Supreme Court, in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 169 (2014), stated that "the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force." Accordingly, the court vacated the panel decision, reversed the district court's grant of the section 2255 motion, and remanded with directions to reinstate defendant's original sentence and judgment. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, seeking vacatur of his 1998 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). After holding the decision in this case pending disposition of other cases presenting related questions, the court concluded that attempted federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), which requires that the attempt be made "by force and violence, or by intimidation," is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c)(1) pursuant to United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 870 (2020).Furthermore, in light of the court's recent decision in Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465, 471 (2d Cir. 2020), the court found untimely and declined to reach the merits of defendant's additional arguments related to his sentencing under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. In Nunez, the court held that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), did not recognize a constitutional right not to be sentenced under the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's petition is untimely insofar as it challenges his sentence under that pre-Booker Guideline: the right he now asserts has not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court. The court explained that no decision newly announced and now made retroactive excuses him from meeting the one-year time limitation set out in section 2255(f). View "Collier v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Dean and Adam Skelos' convictions on multiple public corruption charges. Dean was a Republican senator from Nassau County, and was the Majority Leader of the New York State Senate. Defendants, father and son, were convicted in 2015 of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right; extortion under color of official right; conspiracy to commit honest services fraud; and solicitation and acceptance of bribes and gratuities. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in the Glenwood, AbTech, and PRI schemes.In 2016, while defendants' appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States, which narrowed the definition of the "official act" that a public official must exchange for benefits in order to be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion or honest services fraud, where those crimes have been defined by reference to the term "official act" in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201. In 2018, a second jury convicted defendants on all counts.The court concluded that any error in the jury instructions in the wake of McDonnell were harmless; the language in the indictment was sufficient where the language in an indictment is not required to be as precise as the attendant jury charge, nor is it required to delineate how the government will prove the elements set forth in the indictment; the district court empaneled a fair and impartial jury, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue; there is no basis to vacate defendants' conviction under 18 U.S.C. 666 where a special verdict form specified that the jury found each defendant guilty under section 666 on both the gratuity theory and the unchallenged bribery theory; the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to quash certain subpoenas and there was no infringement of defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the district court's denial of requests for documents that were irrelevant, inadmissible, obtainable by other means, or part of discovery fishing expeditions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the court rejected Adam's evidentiary challenges and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Skelos" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 210 months' imprisonment for obstruction of justice based on destruction of evidence. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not make the findings of fact required under United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), before imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 relating to defendant's trial testimony. The court remanded in part for further proceedings. The court disposed of defendant's remaining claims in a separate summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. Defendant was one of the leaders of a Norwalk, Connecticut-based organization that trafficked powder and crack cocaine. In 2003, defendant was convicted of multiple drug- and racketeering-related crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.The court agreed with the district court that defendant is ineligible for First Step Act relief because his existing sentence was imposed in accordance with the relevant terms of the Act. In this case, defendant's 2015 plenary resentence, the operative sentence in this appeal, was imposed after the effective date of the crack cocaine provisions in section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and the district court sentenced defendant in accordance with these provisions at the 2015 hearing. View "United States v. Burden" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying as untimely petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner contends that this circuit's recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), created a newly discovered fact that extended his filing deadline under section 2255(f)(4).The court concluded that an intervening development in case law does not constitute a newly discovered "fact" within the meaning of section 2255(f)(4). In this case, a decision issued after a conviction but before the filing of a motion under section 2255 is not a newly discovered "fact" pursuant to section 2255(f)(4). Therefore, Townsend, in pronouncing a new rule of law, gave rise to no new facts and thus did not extend the limitations period for petitioner's section 2255 motion. View "McCloud v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and sentencing him principally to 24-months in prison. The court concluded that, even though the procedures used to obtain the victim's two out-of-court identifications were unduly suggestive, both identifications were nonetheless reliable. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by admitting them. Furthermore, because the victim testified at the supervised release hearing, the district court was not required to find good cause before admitting his hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court also concluded that, although the district court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements without first finding good cause, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendants Stillwell, Samia, and Hunter appealed their convictions for murder-for-hire and related crimes. Long after defendants filed their appeals, the NDDS filed a notice in the Second Circuit, advising the court that the district court had entered a sealed protective order upon the filing of an ex parte motion by the NDDS, which barred prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and defense counsel from reviewing certain documents. The court later vacated the protective order and ordered disclosure of the material to the U.S. Attorney and then to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related authorities.In this appeal, defendants claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. The court declined to consider, let alone resolve, defendants' Brady claims, which are raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the claims in the first instance. View "United States v. Stillwell" on Justia Law