Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Requena and Raymond's conviction for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance analogue. Defendants were convicted under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, which provides that substances with chemical and pharmacological properties "substantially similar" to those of substances listed on schedule I or II are treated for the purposes of federal law as controlled substances.The court held that the Analogue Act's instruction to treat a substance with chemical and pharmacological properties “substantially similar” to those of a scheduled substance as a controlled substance in schedule I is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, certain Supreme Court decisions notwithstanding. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government's expert to testify; the district court correctly instructed the jury that it need not unanimously agree on which of the six synthetic cannabinoids charged in the indictment meet the statutory definition of a controlled substance analogue; the district court made all of the factual findings necessary to calculate defendants' base offense level at sentencing; and, because defendants are entitled to no relief in connection with their drug conviction, their money laundering conviction likewise stands. View "United States v. Requena" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for charges related to his operation of an illegal payday-loan scheme. The jury found that defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and federal wire fraud and identity theft statutes from 2004 through 2014.As to the RICO counts, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury that, as to his business's loans to New York borrowers, New York usury laws governed the transaction rather than the laws of the jurisdictions specified in the loan agreements, which set no interest rate caps. Rather, the court ruled that New York law applies and that the district court was correct when it so instructed the jury. As to the TILA conviction, the court rejected defendant's contention that his loan agreements disclosed the "total of payments" borrowers would make, as TILA requires, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that these disclosures were inaccurate. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict under TILA. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, finding them unpersuasive. View "United States v. Moseley" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for creating a "loud or unusual noise or a nuisance" in the courthouse, in violation of 41 C.F.R. 102-74.390(a) (the "Noise Regulation"). Defendant's conviction stemmed from her engagement in a loud argument with a court security officer in the lobby of the Binghamton courthouse.The court concluded that defendant forfeited her challenge to the conspicuous posting of the Noise Regulation by not raising the argument on appeal to the district court. The court also concluded that, under United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2001), the Noise Regulation carries only a general intent requirement, and that the evidence supports that defendant acted with this mens rea. Finally, the court determined that the Noise Regulation is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. View "United States v. Wasylyshyn" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of bank fraud based on a conditional guilty plea. Defendant argued that the 11-year delay between his 2007 indictment and 2018 arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.The court applied the Barker factors and held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the delay was attributable to defendant fleeing to Brazil in 2006 to avoid prosecution; the government exercised reasonable diligence in determining whether defendant returned to the United States despite its failure to detect his periodic travel into and out of the United States from 2012 until his arrest in 2018, and defendant has shown no prejudice from the delay. Furthermore, the district court properly balanced the Barker factors in concluding that the delay, though lengthy, did not violate the Sixth Amendment. View "United States v. Debarros Cabral" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts of receipt of child pornography, one count of possession of child pornography, and two counts of transportation of child pornography. The court held that the evidence showed that defendant downloaded child pornography files on a peer-to-peer file sharing network, thus making those files available to be downloaded by other users on the network, and that government agents downloaded two video files from his computer. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. Furthermore, even assuming a violation of defendant's entitlement to discovery, defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice.The court also held that defendant's 120 month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court affirmed the monetary fines imposed on defendant for costs incurred because defendant failed to show up for the first day of trial, for an assessment, for a penalty under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and for a special assessment. View "United States v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief to defendant under the First Step Act. The court held that, under the First Step Act, a district court has the authority to lower a sentence only if that sentence could have been lower had the Fair Sentencing Act applied. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to an information that charged, in its first count, that defendant committed three offenses—distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute, crack cocaine, cocaine, and heroin. The court explained that, because the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the mandatory minimum sentences triggered by the quantities of heroin and cocaine charged in count one of the information, defendant's sentence could not have been lower than 120 months. Therefore, because defendant's sentence could not have been lower even if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to reduce defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Echeverry" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to petitioner, who was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention of noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings. The habeas petition challenged the procedures employed in petitioner's bond hearings, which required him to prove, to the satisfaction of an immigration judge, that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.The court held that the district court correctly granted the petition where petitioner was denied due process because he was incarcerated for fifteen months (with no end in sight) while the Government at no point justified his incarceration. The district court also provided the correct remedy by ordering a new bond hearing in which the Government bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was either a danger or a flight risk. View "Velasco Lopez v. Decker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, following defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud. The court clarified that the preponderates heavily standard requires that the district court determine whether all the evidence at trial, taken as a whole, preponderated heavily against the verdict. It does not, however, permit the district court to elect its own theory of the case and view the evidence through that lens. The court held that the weight of the evidence at trial did not preponderate heavily against the jury's verdict, and thus the district court abused its discretion in vacating the judgment and granting a new trial. The court reinstated the conviction and remanded to the district court for sentencing. View "United States v. Archer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of accepting bribes and three counts of tax evasion in connection with a bribery scheme that he and others perpetrated while he was an employee of Con Edison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in its restitution order by incorrectly determining that his bribery conduct was "an offense against property" under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) and incorrectly calculating the loss to Con Edison caused by the scheme.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA does not support the restitution order to Con Edison. As urged by the government, however, the court vacated the restitution order insofar as it covers investigative costs incurred by Con Edison and remanded to the district court to allow that court to address the effect of Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018), on its calculation of the restitution amount. View "United States v. Razzouk" on Justia Law

Absent updated guidance from the Sentencing Commission, the First Step Act freed district courts to consider any potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons that a defendant might raise for compassionate release.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of compassionate release to defendant and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, the district court erroneously concluded that, despite the First Step Act's changes to compassionate release, the previously enacted USSG 1B1.13, Application Note 1(D) remained good law and limited the applicable circumstances the court could consider, without input from the Bureau of Prisons, to matters of poor health, old age, and family care needs. Rather, the court held that Application Note 1(D) does not apply to compassionate release motions brought directly to the district court by a defendant under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Zullo" on Justia Law