Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for (1) conspiring to submit false voter registrations and buying voter registrations in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 52 U.S.C. 10307(c) and (2) conspiring to violate the Travel Act by paying bribes for voter registrations and votes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 1952. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a criminal voting scheme to further a real estate development project.The court held that 52 U.S.C. 10307(c) applied to defendant's conduct because it exposed future federal elections to corruption. In this case, the prohibitions in section 10307(c) apply to any voter registration practices that expose federal elections – present or future – to corruption, regardless of whether any federal candidate is on the immediate ballot. The court explained that New York's registration process is unitary and thus defendant's fraudulent conduct has the potential to affect future federal elections.The court also held that defendant's payment to influence voter conduct fits within the generic definition of bribery and thus violated the Travel Act. The court explained that, because Travel Act bribery is construed broadly, the lack of a precise fit between New York Election Law 17-142 and the New York bribery statute does not matter. View "United States v. Smilowitz" on Justia Law

After the district court granted defendant's motion for resentencing under the First Step Act, it vacated its order and denied his motion as moot when the district court learned that defendant had completed serving his term of imprisonment for his 2005 drug offense and remained imprisoned only because he continued to serve two consecutive sentences imposed for offenses committed while in prison that he did not mention in his original application for re-sentencing.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that sentences are imposed separately for convictions on specific violations of criminal statutes and are aggregated only for administrative purposes. The court explained that, because sentences within judgments of conviction are otherwise final orders, they are modifiable only in limited circumstances. The court stated that the First Step Act permits such modification—a district court may "impose a reduced sentence" for a "covered offense." However, where an inmate, such as defendant in this case, has already served the term of imprisonment imposed for a "covered offense," the court held that the statute no longer permits relief. Therefore, defendant's motion is moot because the relief authorized by the First Step Act is no longer possible. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant, while still in custody for possession of child pornography, challenges a condition of his supervised release requiring that he submit to verification testing designed to ensure that he is complying with the other conditions of his term of supervision. Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the probation officer to test him using computerized voice stress analysis – a technology that defendant claims is unreliable – and by giving the probation officer unwarranted discretion over which verification testing device to employ.The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's challenge to the computerized voice stress analysis, holding that the challenge is unripe because it turns on a speculative assessment of what the contested technology will look like in six years when he is released from his term of custody. The court affirmed the delegation of discretion to the probation officer, finding that permitting the probation officer to choose among verification testing tools is no more significant than allowing probation to select among different outpatient therapy options. The court dismissed defendant's challenges to other conditions of his supervised release in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Villafane-Lozada" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions, after pleading guilty, of conspiring to engage in drug trafficking activity in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Defendants challenged the adequacy of their unconditional guilty pleas.The court held that the government has met its evidentiary burden in establishing that defendants' boat was a stateless vessel and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; Section 70506(b) of the MDLEA encompasses land-based conspiratorial conduct, which Congress is authorized to proscribe under the Necessary and Proper Clause; although due process requires a sufficient nexus with the United States for those not on board a stateless vessel to be prosecuted under the MDLEA, in this instance, defendants' prosecutions satisfy due process; and Congress did not exceed its legislative authority in enacting the MDLEA pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause. View "United States v. Alarcon Sanchez" on Justia Law

Defendant, who is serving a 24 month sentence for possession of child pornography, challenges three conditions of his supervised release, including a verification testing condition that permits the use of a computerized voice stress analyzer to assess his compliance with the terms of his supervised release.The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's challenge to the computerized voice stress analyzer, holding that the challenge is not ripe for review because the efficacy of computerized voice stress analyzers in promoting sentencing goals is subject to change with technological advances. Furthermore, the notification of risk condition is also not ripe because any allegedly improper delegation is conditioned on the district court finding, during defendant's term of supervised release, that he poses a risk of committing further crimes against another person -- a contingency that may never occur. The court held that defendant's challenges to the remaining conditions of supervised release are foreclosed by court precedent and affirmed as to the remainder of the district court's sentence and judgment. View "United States v. Birkedahl" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for eight counts related to his possession of child pornography. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress fruits of the Network Investigative Technique (NIT) warrant based on the court's opinion in United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 2019), where the court concluded that suppression of the evidence derived from an NIT warrant was not required; the warrant at issue was supported by probable cause; even assuming that the government had improperly suggested that the Playpen site was a "hidden" website and could not be accessed without prior knowledge, multiple additional pieces of evidence supported the issuance of the warrant; and the description of the site's logo was support for the probable cause determination, not the triggering event.The court also held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected defendant's contention that the government's operation of the Playpen site was outrageous government conduct. Finally, the court held that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 90 months in prison and 20 year term of supervised release was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Caraher" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of racketeering conspiracy (RICO conspiracy count) and two counts of murder in aid of racketeering (VCAR murder counts) based on his involvement with the 10th Street Gang in Buffalo, New York and his role in the 2006 murders of two individuals. The jury also found that defendant was guilty of two special factors that, as part of the RICO conspiracy count, charged defendant with intentionally causing the deaths of the two individuals in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25(1) and 20.00.The Second Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of aiding and abetting the two murders. However, the court held that the government adequately proved defendant's knowing agreement to participate in a racketeering enterprise; there was no error in the district court's Batson ruling; and there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's RICO conspiracy count; reversed the VCAR murder counts and the murder enhancements of the RICO conspiracy count; and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Anastasio" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner removable as an aggravated felon for having been convicted of fraud involving a loss to the victims exceeding $10,000 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Defendant was convicted of insurance fraud and grand larceny, and was ordered to pay $77,199 in restitution without any indication as to whether the restitution order was for the benefit of victims of the insurance fraud, the grand larceny, or both.The court held that the BIA relied on inadequate analysis in concluding that the $77,199 restitution order, on its own, showed that petitioner's insurance fraud caused more than $10,000 in victim losses. In this case, where petitioner was convicted of two separate crimes and ordered to pay an overarching restitution amount without indication of what part, if any, was for the insurance fraud, the court held that the restitution order, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate that more than $10,000 in losses were caused by the insurance fraud count as distinct from the larceny count. Furthermore, the BIA gave no explanation why it concluded that more than $10,000 of the restitution award was attributable to losses caused by the insurance fraud. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rampersaud v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as narcotics-conspiracy and firearm-possession charges related to his membership in the 10th Street Gang of Buffalo, New York. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, participated in a double murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's challenges to the introduction into evidence of a gun seized from his home; the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on a Bruton violation; the denial of his Batson challenges, and the denial of his requests for certain jury charges. However, the court held that the district court imposed defendant's sentence without explicitly considering his age at the time of the double murders, and thus violated the principle recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Miller stated that those under the age of eighteen are different because the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing in light of Miller. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.The court held that petitioner's conviction for two counts of felony possession of narcotics with intent to sell, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 21a5 277(a)(1), qualify as CIMTs. Although the court acknowledged that Connecticut's legislature has broadly defined "sale" to encompass exchanges, gifts, and offers of a narcotic substance even for no consideration, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute encompasses every instance in which a defendant offers to, or does in fact, "barter, exchange or gift" narcotics to another. The court explained that the fact that the statute may cover scenarios in which a defendant "offered," "exchanged," or "gifted" a narcotic substance, even a small amount, to a friend for no or little renumeration does not foreclose its conclusion under the categorical approach. View "Mota v. Barr" on Justia Law