Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant was convicted of raping another member of his platoon in violation of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, after he was discharged from military service, he was designated as a Level Two sex offender.The court held that 34 U.S.C. 20911(5)(A)(iv)'s delegation to the Secretary of Defense to designate which military offenses constitute "sex offenses" under the statute does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. The court also held that the Secretary of Defense did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act in designating military offenses as sex offenses under SORNA. View "United States v. Mingo" on Justia Law

In petition No. 18-834, petitioner contends principally that the BIA erred (a) in rejecting his challenge to the IJ's ruling that he failed to carry his burden of showing his procedurally regular admission to the United States, (b) in rejecting his contention that he was denied due process by the IJ's evidentiary rulings minimizing or curtailing evidence to show his procedurally regular admission, and (c) in denying his motion to reopen the proceeding to present newly discovered evidence. In petition No. 19-737, petitioner contends that the BIA erred in rejecting his contention that intervening legal authority requires the conclusion that criminal possession of stolen property was not a crime involving moral turpitude at the time of his conviction.The Second Circuit denied so much of Petition No 18-834 as contends that petitioner was denied due process. The court dismissed the remainder of that petition for lack of jurisdiction. In regard to Petition No. 19-737, the court held that there was no error in the Board's determination that petitioner's conviction for criminal possession of stolen property was a crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the Board did not err by rejecting petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings based on petitioner's claim of an intervening change in the law. Therefore, the court denied the petition in No. 19-737. View "Ottey v. Barr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims of deliberate indifference by prison officials to his medical conditions while he was incarcerated in a New York state prison. At the time of trial, plaintiff was on parole and asked the district court to order the New York Board of Parole to allow him to attend his trial in Buffalo and for the district court to pay for his travel.The Second Circuit held that although a parolee has no constitutional right to attend his own civil trial, a district court does have the authority to compel a parolee's attendance by issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(5). The court explained that plaintiff did not seek such a writ from the district court and the relief he did request differed significantly from that provided by the writ. Therefore, the court reviewed only for plain error and held that the district court did not plainly err in not issuing the writ. The court also held that, even if plaintiff's request were construed as a petition for the writ, the court would still affirm because plaintiff did not not demonstrate that issuing the writ would be "necessary" as required by section 2241(c)(5). Furthermore, even if the district court should have issued the writ, the court held that the failure to do so was harmless because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had been physically present. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Davidson v. Desai" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting Defendants Mattis and Rahman's release on bail pending trial. Amidst city and nationwide protests against police brutality, defendants were arrested after an incident in which Rahman allegedly threw a Molotov cocktail into an unoccupied police vehicle and Mattis allegedly acted as the getaway driver.The court cannot say that it is left with a "definite and firm conviction" that the district court erred in determining that the conditions imposed are adequate to reasonably assure that defendants do not constitute a danger to the community. The court noted that defendants' actions were undertaken during a massive public protest, in which emotions ran high. Furthermore, there is no indication that defendants are likely to engage in similar acts outside of the context of that particular night. In this case, neither defendant had a prior criminal record, both had engaged in responsible careers and are dedicated to caring for their families, both demonstrated they had deep ties to the community, and both had friends and family explain that they were willing to post $250,000 bonds as bail. The court held that the conditions of release contain provisions that impede defendants' ability to engage in criminal activity, and the evidence to which the government points the court and which the court has otherwise gleaned from the record is inadequate to leave it with a firm conviction that the district court erred in finding those conditions sufficient to assure public safety. Accordingly, the court vacated the stay previously entered in this matter. View "United States v. Mattis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the DOC incarcerated within Garner Correctional Institution, filed a putative class action alleging that they were exposed involuntarily to indoor radon gas, a recognized human carcinogen, far in excess of any published safe level while incarcerated at Garner.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment to the extent that it determined that defendants violated clearly established law as of the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 29 (1993). In Helling, the Supreme Court held that an inmate can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of environmental tobacco smoke that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health. Therefore, as of the date of the Supreme Court's decision in Helling, the court held that reasonable officials would recognize that a failure to take any reasonable steps to abate the risk of excessive radon exposure, of which risk they were actually aware, would constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need that violated inmates' clearly established Eighth Amendment rights. The court affirmed in part to the extent that the judgment denied defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' federal claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; reversed in part to the extent that the judgment denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state-law claims for prospective relief against the official-capacity defendants; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vega v. Semple" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Napout and Marin's convictions for multiple counts of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. Defendants were former officials of the global soccer organization Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).The court held that defendants' convictions rest upon permissible domestic applications of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Furthermore, the court cannot conclude in light of binding precedent that the district court committed plain error with respect to the issue of whether the honest services wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1346, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendants. The court also held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to affirm the district court's judgment of conviction; and that the challenged evidentiary rulings of the district court were not error. Finally, the court held that defendants' remaining arguments are without merit. View "United States v. Napout" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for bank robbery, entering a bank with the intent to commit larceny, and bank larceny.The court held that, in the circumstances presented, dismissal of criminal charges is not the appropriate remedy for a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(c) and the magistrate judge's failure to sign the affidavit attached to the criminal complaint did not render the complaint invalid. Rather, the appropriate remedy for a violation of Rule 5(c)(2) is suppression of any post-arrest evidence illegally obtained as a result of the violation of the rule's requirement. In this case, defendant failed to show that his transfer for an initial appearance in violation of Rule 5(c)(2) caused him any prejudice. Furthermore, even though the magistrate judge failed to sign the jurat on the last page of the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint, the magistrate judge signed the jurat on the complaint itself, to which the affidavit was attached. Finally, the court held that defendant's remaining evidentiary challenges do not warrant vacatur of his conviction. View "United States v. Peeples" on Justia Law

Plaintiff pro se, a New York State prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against correctional facility officials for failure to clear snow and ice from outdoor exercise yards for an entire winter, thereby allegedly violating plaintiff's rights under the Eighth Amendment by denying him physical exercise for four months, and causing him to be injured in a slip-and-fall accident.The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the Eighth Amendment claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because the complaint states cognizable Eighth Amendment claims for damages with regard to the denial of physical exercise. The court noted that the district court properly dismissed as moot plaintiff's requests for injunctive or declaratory relief against officials at Green Haven. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.The court upheld the district court's dismissal of the slip and fall claims where the complaint did not make any claims of exceptional circumstances that would elevate the Green Haven yard conditions beyond the typical level of danger presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor. Finally, the contention that defendants failed to comply with a consent decree is not pleaded in the complaint and was not raised in the district court. Therefore, the court declined to address this argument. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "McCray v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals: 1) Whether a stock conversion option that permits a lender, in its sole discretion, to convert any outstanding balance to shares of stock at a fixed discount should be treated as interest for the purpose of determining whether the transaction violates N.Y. Penal Law 190.40, the criminal usury law. 2) If the interest charged on a loan is determined to be criminally usurious under N.Y. Penal Law 190.40, whether the contract is void ab initio pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-511. View "Adar Bays, LLC v. GeneSYS ID, Inc." on Justia Law

A district court has the power to deny a government motion under USSG 3E1.1(b). The Second Circuit held that the district court committed procedural error in sentencing defendant after she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute narcotics. In this case, the district court erred as a matter of law in denying the government's motion to accord defendant an additional one-level downward adjustment for timely acceptance of responsibility under USSG 3E1.1(b). Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Vargas" on Justia Law