Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana. The district court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), which specified a mandatory minimum of 10 years' imprisonment for defendants with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense.The court held that the district court erred in treating defendant's prior N.Y. Penal Law section 220.31 conviction as a predicate felony drug offense under the categorical approach because section 220.31 criminalized conduct beyond the scope of the federal analog. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Defendant was sentenced in August 2009 after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine.The court held that Section 404 eligibility depends on the statutory offense for which a defendant was sentenced, not the particulars of any given defendant’s underlying conduct. In this case, because Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 modified the statutory penalties for the offense for which defendant was sentenced, the court held that defendant was eligible for Section 404 relief. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for being in possession of a firearm. The court held that the general unanimity charge delivered by the district court was correct and adequate. Even if there was error, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant possessed the firearm.The court also held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable and there was no error nor abuse of discretion in applying the USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. Furthermore, defendant's 100-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence that was well within the district court's discretion. View "United States v. Estevez" on Justia Law

Respondent challenged the district court's orders denying his motion to quash various grand jury subpoenas and directing him to comply with the subpoenas on pain of coercive monetary sanctions. The subpoenas related to respondent's conduct with respect to the public disclosure of sealed information about an undercover government witness.The Second Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena issued without a sitting grand jury; the district court retained jurisdiction to oversee a subpoena involving the same subject matter that was subsequently issued by a newly impaneled grand jury; and the district court ceased to have jurisdiction to enforce the validly issued subpoena after the issuing grand jury's term expired. Nevertheless, because yet another grand jury has been impaneled and has issued an identical subpoena, the court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of respondent's motion to quash the subpoena and found that the subpoena was neither overbroad nor issued with an improper purpose, and that it did not infringe upon respondent's First or Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Oberlander v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based upon Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines for drug offenses. The court held that the plain language of the statute, and its incorporated Guidelines provisions, preclude a district court from reducing a sentence, pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), below the amended Guidelines range based on a section 5G1.3(b) adjustment at the original sentencing. View "United States v. Zapatero" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions on fourteen counts including collection of unlawful usurious debt, and conspiracy to do so, wire fraud, and money laundering, arising out of defendants' operation of a payday lending business. The court held that, even assuming that the charge with respect to Counts 2-4 was erroneous, the error did not affect the verdict, and thus defendants have not satisfied the requirements of plain error; the jury necessarily found in rendering a guilty verdict on Count 1, for which an undisputedly correct willfulness instruction was given as to the conspiracy element, that defendants were aware of the unlawfulness of their making loans with interest rates that exceeded the limits permitted by the usury laws; and the evidence of defendants' willfulness was overwhelming.The court also held that defendants' other contentions are without merit. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant Tucker's application to stay the execution of the forfeiture order entered against him following his conviction. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Sexual assault in the third degree under CGS 53a-72a(a)(1) necessarily includes as an element the use or threatened use of violent force and thus categorically constitutes a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a).The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court declined to remand for the agency to consider in the first instance whether petitioner's conviction of Connecticut third-degree sexual assault is a crime of violence under the alternative definition in 18 U.S.C. 16(a), but rather considered that legal question de novo and held that it categorically satisfies that definition. The court vacated the petition and denied the pending motion for stay of removal as moot. View "Kondjoua v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision ordering petitioner removed based on his 2016 Connecticut state conviction for carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 29-35(a).The court held that Section 29-35(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes is not a categorical match for the generic federal firearms offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). The court held that the Connecticut statute criminalizes conduct involving "antique firearms" that the INA firearms offense definition does not, precluding petitioner's removal on the basis of the state conviction. The court also held that, under Hylton v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2018), the realistic probability test has no bearing here, where the text of the state statute gives it a broader reach than the federal definition. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of removal and remanded with directions to terminate the removal proceedings. View "Williams v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The court found no plain error with respect to the plea agreement, but held that the limited facts relied upon by the district court were insufficient to support application of a three-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), and a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), in calculating defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range. View "United States v. Oneal" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm with "an altered or obliterated serial number," under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).Consistent with its sister circuits, the court held that the enhancement applies if a single iteration of a serial number has been altered or obliterated, notwithstanding whether another may be legible. Moreover, the court held that "altered" means illegible to the naked eye. In this case, the court held that the district court did not err by applying the enhancement by assessing the iteration of the serial number that was most badly scored and finding as fact that it was illegible to the naked eye. View "United States v. St. Hilaire" on Justia Law