Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of restitution, imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of wire fraud in 2018 for submitting false expense-reimbursement forms to the Department of Labor. The court held that the restitution order was proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because all of the losses resulted from the same "scheme," even though some occurred outside the limitations period for the underlying crime. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to pay $72,207.16 in restitution. View "United States v. Parnell" on Justia Law

After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment.Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate. View "United States v. Mladen" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.1 because defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in USSG 4B1.2(b). The court also held that the district court did not substantively err in sentencing defendant, because it properly considered his criminal history and accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed a $200 mandatory special assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3013, as well as a $10,000 assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3014.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and his sentence was substantively reasonable. The court held that the text of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. 3014, taken as a whole and in its context, is straightforwardly meant to be applied on a per-offender, not a per-count, basis. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the special assessment on a per-count, rather than per-offender, basis. Finally, the court held that the computer monitoring condition in question was reasonably related to the nature of defendant's offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Haverkamp" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder through use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during a murder-for-hire conspiracy. Defendant owned Czar Entertainment, a music management company that represented hip-hop, rap and R&B artists such as Jayceon Taylor, also known as "The Game." Taylor was a member of G-Unit, a rap group run by Curtis Jackson, also known as "50 Cent." Defendant's crimes stemmed from a rivalry with Violator Records, the company that managed G-Unit.The court rejected defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective because he conceded that defendant paid for the victim to be shot, even though he told counsel not to make this concession. The court held that defendant failed to show that this was objectively unreasonable or that he would have been found not guilty had a different argument been advanced. In this case, there was ample evidence supporting counsel's strategy to concede that defendant ordered a shooting where, among other things, the government's key witness, who participated in the conspiracy and lured the victim to be shot, testified that defendant agreed to pay the shooter. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting prior bad-act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). View "United States v. Rosemond" on Justia Law

Holloway sought reduction of his 168-month prison sentence and 10-year term of supervised release under Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court applied the framework of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), including U.S.S.G. 1B1.10. Because Holloway was sentenced as a career offender, the district court concluded that his Guidelines range after application of the First Step Act was equivalent to his original Guidelines range, so that Holloway was ineligible for a reduction of his term of imprisonment. The district court did not address supervised release. While his appeal was pending, Holloway completed his prison term and was released from custody.The Second Circuit vacated, holding that Holloway’s appeal was not mooted by his release. Holloway remains eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release and was eligible for relief under the plain language of the Act: The court had previously sentenced him for an offense covered by the Act, and Holloway was not otherwise barred from relief under the Act’s limitations; 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), rather than section 3582(c)(2), provides the correct framework for consideration of a motion for a reduction of a term of imprisonment under the First Step Act; so U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 does not prevent a district court from considering a First Step Act motion made by a defendant whose new Sentencing Guidelines range is equivalent to his original range. View "United States v. Holloway" on Justia Law

A conviction for retaliating against a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1513 does not require that the Government prove that defendant had knowledge of the federal nature of the proceeding. The Second Circuit rejected defendant's arguments to the contrary and affirmed his conviction for retaliating against a witness. The court remanded for revision of the provision of the sentence relating to the substance abuse treatment condition of supervised release; instructed the district court to consider on remand whether the court's forthcoming order in United States v. Traficante, No. 18-1962 (2d Cir., submitted Oct. 25, 2019) requires modification of the risk notification provision of supervised release; and granted the parties leave to reinstate this appeal to permit review of the district court's decision on remand as to the risk notification provision. View "United States v. Cotto" on Justia Law

Where a district court offers no explanation for its sentence, and where neither the adopted presentence report nor the statement of reasons adequately demonstrates the court's reasoning, the court has committed plain error in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3553(c).The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court held that the district court failed to state its reasons for sentencing defendant as required under section 3553(c); the error is clear or obvious; and the error affected defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Rosa" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for using explosives, conspiring to murder U.S. nationals, conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction, conspiring to bomb a U.S. government facility, and providing material support to terrorists.The court held that a district court does not abuse its discretion where it denies a defense counsel with the appropriate security clearance access to motions filed by the Government ex parte pursuant to section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA); a custodial interrogation that takes place overseas over a period of several weeks and involves the display of hundreds of photographs as part of a foreign country's counterterrorism investigation is not unduly suggestive, thereby rendering inadmissible an out-of-court photo identification of the defendant; and a district court does not abuse its discretion when it limits the cross-examination of a fingerprint examiner to preclude references to a fingerprint misidentification in a wholly unrelated case. Under the circumstances in this case, the court held that the district court did not err in adjudicating the Government's CIPA motions ex parte and in camera, admitting the out-of-court photo identification of defendant, and limiting the cross-examination of the Government's fingerprint examiner. View "United States v. Al Farekh" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, defendant argued that the government failed to prove that the protective order to which he was subject—the basis for the charged false statement on the Form 4473—meets the requirements of an order defined in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8).The court held that there was insufficient evidence that defendant had been issued a protective order "after a hearing" in which he had "an opportunity to participate," as required by section 922(g)(8)(A), and thus no rational trier of fact could find that when defendant submitted an application to purchase a firearm he violated section 922(a)(6) by knowingly lying about whether he was subject to such an order. View "United States v. Bramer" on Justia Law