Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that defendant received ineffective assistance because his lawyers did almost nothing to challenge the eyewitness identification testimony that formed the core of the Government's case, even though the identifications bore glaring indicia of unreliability. Furthermore, defendant received ineffective assistance because his counsel did not seek to exclude or object to the admission of a highly prejudicial and dubiously relevant photo of defendant posing with what appears to be a handgun. Because defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the court vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Nolan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition based on the grounds that it became moot when petitioner was conditionally released from confinement in a state psychiatric institution as a person with a "dangerous mental disorder." The court held that the conditional release did not render the petition moot, because petitioner remains subject to an "order of conditions" that leaves him vulnerable to recommitment, and the imposition of this order was a mandatory consequence of the confinement orders that his petition challenges. View "Janakievski v. Executive Director, Rochester Psychiatric Center" on Justia Law

United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), did not undermine, let alone overrule, the Second Circuit's precedent on the validity of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Haymond held that judicial factfinding authorized by a different supervised-release provision, section 3583(k), violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial. The court held that judicial factfinding authorized under section 3583(e)(3) remains lawful. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of revocation following defendant's three violations of supervised release. View "United States v. Doka" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for various tax offenses, including making and subscribing to a false tax return, tax evasion, and attempting to interfere with the administration of the internal revenue laws. Defendant's charges stemmed from his efforts, over the course of 14 years, to engage in a concerted campaign to obstruct the IRS's efforts to collect his delinquent tax payments and to secure overdue tax returns.The Second Circuit held that the district court lacked authority to require restitution payments to begin immediately following defendant's sentencing. However, the court held that, in assessing tax loss under USSG 2T1.1 application note 1, the district court was permitted to rely on uncharged relevant conduct constituting "willful evasion of payment" in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201 and "willful failure to pay" in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7203. The court held that defendant's remaining claims were unavailing and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit witness tampering related to the death of one individual, conspiracy to commit tampering by planning to murder of another individual, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.The court held that the district court's erroneous jury instructions did not rise to the level of reversible plain error; assuming that the district court committed evidentiary error by admitting hearsay declarations under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), the error was harmless; there was no error in admitting a summary chart under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, and had there been error, it was harmless; the district court did not err in determining that it was required to sentence defendant to the statutory minimum of life imprisonment; and defendant's remaining challenges to his sentence were without merit. View "United States v. Mack" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied defendant's motion to stay issuance of the judgment mandate pending his filing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Defendant was convicted of two counts each of honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion, and one count of money laundering. The court held that defendant presented no substantial questions raising either a reasonable probability that four justices will vote to grant certiorari, or a fair prospect that five justices will vote to reverse this court's judgment. The court also held that defendant failed to show good cause for issuing the stay. View "United States v. Silver" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for deferral or removal under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner contended that, if he was removed to Jamaica, he would be killed in retaliation for his earlier cooperation with law enforcement.The court held that the jurisdictional provision in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits this court's jurisdiction, applies only to cases where the IJ has found a petitioner removable based on covered criminal activity, and that it does not apply where a petitioner's order of removal is based solely on unlawful presence. The court also held that the IJ and BIA discounted petitioner's credible testimony without proper explanation, failed to consider substantial and material evidence that petitioner is likely to be killed if removed to Jamaica, and erroneously placed a burden on petitioner to prove he could not internally relocate in order to avoid torture. Accordingly, the court remanded petitioner's application for deferral of removal for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of defendant's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act and the district court's decision to resentence defendant to time served.The court held that the district court properly concluded that New York first-degree manslaughter is not a predicate crime of violence because it can be committed by omission and therefore without the use of force, as defined in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The court also held that New York first-degree manslaughter does not match any of the generic offenses enumerated in the Career Offender Guideline. Therefore, defendant did not have the requisite predicate offenses and could not be sentenced under the Career Offender Guidelines. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely. The district court held that petitioner could not show that his motion was timely under section 2255(f)(3) because the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), did not recognize a retroactive right not to be sentenced based upon the residual clause in the Career Offender Guideline of the pre-Booker Sentencing Guidelines.The court held that Johnson did not itself render the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline unconstitutionally vague and thus did not recognize the right petitioner asserted. Therefore, the district court properly denied the petition. View "Nunez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a legal permanent resident, sought review of an agency order of removal based on a finding that he committed an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Under section 1101(a)(43)(G), to establish an aggravated felony, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen committed a "theft offense" that resulted in a term of imprisonment of "at least one year." Petitioner was a member of the U.S. Army when he pleaded guilty to four violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), one of which was larceny of military property. Under the military's customary practice of unitary sentencing at the time, the military judge issued a general sentence that imposed a punishment for all four of petitioner's convictions for 30 months' confinement.The Second Circuit held that, under the military's traditional unitary sentencing scheme, a military judgment in which a single sentence of confinement is imposed in connection with multiple counts of conviction may not be presumed to be equivalent to equal, full‐term, concurrent sentences as to each count of conviction. Because the government has not carried its burden, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Persad v. Barr" on Justia Law