Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the BOP and Warden Quay in an action alleging that defendants' curtailment of inmate-attorney visits at the MDC in early 2019 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's APA claim by failing to consider applicable BOP regulations in its zone-of-interests analysis. Furthermore, the district court misconstrued plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim. Plaintiff brought this claim under the federal courts' inherent equitable powers, but the district court treated the claim as purporting to arise directly under the Sixth Amendment. The court thought it was prudent to defer ruling on the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim because plaintiff raised novel questions of constitutional law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and directed the district court to consider appointing a master to mediate the parties' differences at the earliest possible time to ensure that plaintiff has meaningful, continuous access to clients. View "Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on five counts related to sex trafficiking. The court held that the fact that there has been no suggestion that defendant's false testimony warrants a sentencing guidelines adjustment does not impede the court's consideration of that false testimony in determining an appropriate sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable and the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction on one count. View "United States v. Almonte" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and obstructing justice. The court held that defendant's prior conviction for New York first degree robbery was a violent felony as defined in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the forcible‐takings element common to New York robbery in every degree requires the use or threatened use of physical force as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, and Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544.The court explained that Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause definition of violent felony as unconstitutionally vague, does not undermine this court's precedents, both before and after Samuel Johnson, recognizing attempted drug sales or attempted drug possession with intent to sell in violation of New York law as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Finally, the court held that the district court correctly followed controlling precedent in identifying defendant's two prior New York State drug convictions, one for attempted drug sale and the other for attempted drug possession with intent to sell, as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. View "United States v. Ojeda" on Justia Law

Nikolla and two codefendants were charged in connection with the extortion of restaurant proprietors and other businesses in and around Astoria, Queens in 2012-2013. A third superseding indictment specifically charged the defendants with threatening physical violence. Nikolla pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), one count of threatening physical violence in furtherance of an extortion plan, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and one count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, or in furtherance of, a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Nikolla was sentenced principally to 216 months; the “brandishing” count increased the mandatory penalty from five years to seven years of imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nikolla’s challenge to his section 924(c) conviction. The predicate offense for that conviction — Hobbs Act threat of violence in furtherance of extortion under 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) — does qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Elements Clause of section 924(c). The court noted that Nikolla conceded in the district court that this offense constituted a “crime of violence” under section 924(c). View "United States v. Nikolla" on Justia Law

Defendant's prior convictions for attempted assault in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law 120.05(2) and federal narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846 constitute predicate offenses for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.1. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court's application of the career offender sentencing enhancement was appropriate. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that the New York conviction constituted a predicate "crime of violence" and that the federal conviction constituted a predicate "controlled substances offense." View "United States v. Tabb" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's term of supervised release after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release by committing a state crime.The court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation of federal supervised release proceedings. The court explained that the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule are significantly outweighed by the costs involved in applying the rule in this context. The court also held that defendant's remaining argument, that the district court erred in refusing to give him access to grand jury minutes, was without merit because he impermissibly seeks to attack his underlying conviction. View "United States v. Hightower" on Justia Law

The denial of a motion to file a habeas petition under a pseudonym is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The Second Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's denial of defendant's motion to file a habeas petition through the use of a pseudonym. The court joined several of its sister circuits in holding that such denials were appealable under the collateral order doctrine. In this case, the district court's decision conclusively determined the issue of whether defendant could proceed under a pseudonym; the issue was completely separate from the merits of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion; and it will be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment on his section 2255 motion.On the merits, the court held that the magistrate judge considered the proper legal principles governing the motion, including a presumption in favor of public access to court proceedings and records, and the exceptions to that presumption. The court held that the district court properly held that the magistrate judge's order did not rest on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding; the conclusion was within the range of permissible decisions; the circumstances identified by defendant were insufficient to support an exception; and there was no error, clear or otherwise, in the magistrate judge's decision. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the denial of the motion. View "United States v. Pilcher" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 70-month sentence for tax offenses. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his post‐trial request for a competency hearing based chiefly on his adherence to the Sovereign Citizen movement. The court held that the record supported the district court's conclusion that defendant's words and actions reflected his anti‐government political views and legal theories rather than an inability to understand the proceedings against him.The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to give no weight to the report of defendant's expert, because the report was based on insufficient facts and data, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the expert employed unreliable principles and methods. Finally, even if the court were to conclude that the district court improperly relied on another expert's testimony without explicitly ruling on its admissibility or reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the error would be harmless. View "United States v. DiMartino" on Justia Law

A district court is not required to complete a written statement of reasons form for a sentence upon violation of supervised release because neither the Judicial Conference nor the Sentencing Commission has issued a form for that purpose.The Second Circuit held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court articulated its reasons for imposing the above-Guidelines sentence, focusing on defendant's possession and use of a firearm. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court acknowledged the various mitigating factors, and the two-year sentence did not shock the conscience or constitute a manifest injustice. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant, the former Speaker of the New York State Assembly, was convicted of two counts each of honest services mail fraud, honest services wire fraud, and Hobbs Act extortion, and one count of money laundering.The Second Circuit held that extortion under color of right and honest services fraud require that the official reasonably believe, at the time the promise is made, that the payment is made in return for a commitment to perform some official action. However, neither crime requires that the official and payor share a common criminal intent or purpose. The court also held that both offenses require that the official understand—at the time he accepted the payment—the particular question or matter to be influenced.In this case, the district court's instructions failed to convey this limitation on the "as the opportunities arise" theory, and the error was not harmless with respect to defendant's convictions under three counts. Furthermore, the evidence as to the same three counts was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a guilty verdict, and thus the court remanded with directions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice as to them. The court found the error was harmless as to Counts 3s, 4s, and 6s, and affirmed defendant's conviction on those counts. Finally, the court affirmed defendant's conviction under Count 7s for money laundering, because that crime does not require the defendant to be convicted of the underlying criminal offenses, nor does it require the underlying offense to take place within the limitations period. View "United States v. Silver" on Justia Law