Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement under Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which applies when a defendant has “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The principal question is whether the enhancement applies to defendants who use their residence to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that here, Defendant maintained an apartment where he had at one point lived for the purpose of distributing controlled substances. The court reasoned that the commentary in the Guidelines manual confirms that the district court properly applied the drug-distribution premises enhancement using a “totality of the circumstances” test, which is appropriate given the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. Further, Defendant challenged the district court’s failure to consider a downward departure from the Guidelines sentence in order to give effect to the parties’ plea bargain. He claimed that the court misunderstood its authority to do so under United States v. Fernandez. However, the court wrote that a district court’s silence concerning its refusal to depart downward generally does not support an inference that the district court misapprehended its scope of authority. The court, therefore, rejected Defendant’s argument that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable on this ground. View "United States v. Vinales" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from their judgments of conviction. Following a five-week jury trial, Defendants-Appellants were convicted on counts of conspiracy to tamper with witnesses and obstruct an official proceeding, substantive witness tampering and obstruction of an official proceeding, obstruction of justice, and being accessories after the fact to the deprivation of the civil rights of a victim. The district court sentenced Defendants, principally, to five years’ imprisonment each. On appeal, Defendants raised challenges to the district court’s admission of certain testimony at trial—in particular, testimony about subordinates’ fear of retaliation and testimony about bad acts that formed the basis for that fear of retaliation. Defendants also challenge the district court’s denial of their application to admit the government’s bill of particulars, and Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for an evidentiary hearing and new trial.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the government specifically mentioned the demotion and the retirement party only once each, as examples of retaliation by the co-conspirator against an enemy. Discussion of the tasks performed by the detectives was similarly brief. These remarks by the government could have been made based only on the properly admitted testimony from other high-ranking members of the SCPD and, accordingly, could not have misled the jury. As a result, the court concluded that although the admission of cumulative evidence regarding the demotion and retirement party, and the tasks performed for the co-conspirator, was in error, it was ultimately harmless. View "United States v. McPartland, Spota" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, kidnapping and kidnapping conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1201. Defendant argued on appeal that the victim’s detention was too brief to constitute kidnapping under section 1201 because Defendant lacked the intent required to violate section 1201 and because the district court violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from cross-examining the victim about any connections that the victim’s family may have had to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with Defendant that not all detentions satisfy section 1201(a)’s second element. However, the court explained that Defendant’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, Rodriguez does not compel the conclusion that the victim’s detention was not a kidnapping. The court concluded that Defendant’s conduct satisfied the federal kidnapping statute’s second element. While the victim’s 30-minute detention may be characterized as relatively brief, it was nonetheless “appreciable.” As noted, Defendant forced the victim into the vehicle under threat of violence, physically restrained the victim before walking him to a more secluded location, threatened the victim with a knife, beat the victim repeatedly, and included the victim’s family in their threats. The perilous nature of these conditions weighs heavily in favor of concluding that the victim’s detention was appreciable. View "United States v. Krivoi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Douglas Horn appealed the district court’s order of the granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argues that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO 11 standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit agreed and vacated the order granting summary judgment to Appellees on Appellant’s civil RICO claim and remanded to the district court. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to 14 “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition to vacate his 2006 guilty plea, conviction, and sentence. Defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not warn him of the risks of denaturalization and possible subsequent deportation arising from his guilty plea.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Effective assistance includes warning defendants of the “direct” consequences of pleading guilty, such as the offense’s maximum prison term and the likely sentence as set forth in a plea agreement. However, the court explained that it has long held that an attorney need not warn of every possible “collateral consequence of conviction. And such collateral consequences are “categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment.” Thus, a defendant can only establish an ineffective assistance claim as to a collateral consequence if his attorney affirmatively misadvises him. Failing to warn of the collateral risk alone is not enough. The court explained that the instant appeal is resolved by the straightforward application of this direct/collateral framework. Accordingly, the court held that the distinction remains valid, that it applies to civil denaturalization, and that such denaturalization is a collateral consequence of the conviction, and so is not covered by the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel. View "Farhane v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his original, three-year term of supervised release and sentencing him to three months imprisonment followed by a new, one-year term of supervised release for violating certain conditions of his supervised release. Defendant contends that the district court erred in finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by possessing marijuana on January 27, 2021, in violation of New York Penal Law Section 221.05. First, Defendant argued that the offense defined by Section 221.05 was simply a state “violation,” not a state “crime,” and therefore, his offense did not violate the mandatory condition of supervised release that he “not commit another federal, state or local crime.” Second, Defendant argued that even if the offense, as defined by Section 221.05, constituted a “crime” for purposes of a violation of supervised release, New York’s March 31, 2021 repeal of the statute operated retroactively, such that his pre-repeal conduct in contravention of it cannot serve as the basis for a violation of supervised release.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Defendant violated a condition of his supervised release based on his possession of marijuana. The court explained that irrespective of New York’s classification of the offense, Defendant’s underlying conduct constituted a “crime” under federal law. Because this holding disposes of Defendant’s appeal in its entirety, the court did not reach Defendant’s retroactivity argument. View "United States v. Francis" on Justia Law

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Appellant’s home carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, K.B. The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Appellant filed a claim to the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in district court.  She failed to timely oppose the ensuing judicial proceeding, and the clerk of court entered default against the funds. Appellant, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized assets. The district court held that Appellant had not shown excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered final default judgment against the seized assets.
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of the motion to strike and the entry of default judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting default judgment to the government. Appellant’s letters are properly viewed as seeking both to lift the entry of default and to be granted leave to file an untimely claim to the assets. So understood, Appellant’s motion should have been assessed under the more permissive good cause standard, as is any other motion to lift entry of default in a civil suit. View "U.S. v. Starling" on Justia Law

Defendant was twice sentenced for violating conditions of supervised release. The first time, he was sentenced to six months in prison plus four years of supervised release. The second time, he was sentenced to three years in prison plus five years of supervised release. The parties agreed that this most recent sentence of supervised release was longer than allowed by statute. The district court was authorized to impose a term of supervised release of no more than the statutory maximum of five years for the underlying offense, minus the aggregate amount of prison time imposed for violations of supervised release. The parties disagree on the remedy. Defendant sought de novo resentencing, but the government seeks only a limited remand to reduce the term of supervised release to eighteen months.   The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. The court concluded that the district court should be afforded the opportunity to exercise its discretion as to how much time Defendant should spend in prison and how much time on supervised release. The court explained that under Section 3583(h), the maximum allowable term of supervised release upon revocation decreased in direct proportion to the term of imprisonment imposed. With a three-year prison sentence, Defendant faced at most eighteen months of supervised release. For every month above an eighteen-month term of supervised release, the court would have needed to shave a month off the three-year prison term. The court concluded that the sentencing calculation is best left to the informed discretion of the district court, so that it may decide in the first instance how to strike the right balance. View "United States v. Gaye" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. Defendant’s underlying criminal conduct included facilitating a bribe that resulted in the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (“COBA”), investing $20 million with Platinum Partners (“Platinum”), a hedge fund that ultimately declared bankruptcy amid government investigations into fraud. Following his guilty plea, Defendant’s case was reassigned to another district judge for sentencing. After his sentencing hearing but prior to his final restitution determination, Defendant moved to have his case reassigned to another district judge. His motion was premised on the recently discovered personal relationship between the district judge in his case and a defendant and a cooperating witness in the ongoing prosecutions against those involved in the Platinum fraud. The district court denied that motion and ordered Defendant to pay restitution to COBA for all of its remaining losses. On appeal, Defendant argued that his case should have been reassigned for resentencing or, in the alternative, that the district court erred in imposing restitution for all of COBA’s losses.   The Second Circuit remanded the case for reassignment to a different district judge and for plenary resentencing. The court held that the district judge erred in not recusing himself under Section 455(a). The judge not only had a close, near-paternal relationship with the witness, but he also advised the witness on how to proceed in his pending criminal case arising from the Platinum fraud. The judge’s relationship with the witness was sufficiently close, and his case was sufficiently related to Defendant’s case that a reasonable person would have questioned the district court’s impartiality. View "United States of America v. Rechnitz" on Justia Law

Appellant motioned the Second Circuit to consider his pro se filing in addition to his counseled brief and to supplement the record. Appellant’s underlying appeal arises from the government’s dismissal, on May 8, 2019, of several indictments against him. Those indictments had been pending since 1999 when Appellant was charged for his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.   The Second Circuit denied Appellant’s motion for the court to consider his supplemental pro se brief and his motion to supplement the record. Further, the court granted the government’s motion or an extension of time to file its brief to a date three weeks after the date of resolution of Appellant’s motion. The court explained that Appellant’s motion to supplement the record does not explain why he did not submit them to the district court. Appellant asked the Court to draw factual inferences from the letter and the declaration—inferences the government contests—but a motion to supplement the record “is not a device for presenting evidence to this Court that was not before the trial judge.” View "United States v. Hage (Mamdouh Mahmud Salim)" on Justia Law