Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order of removal on the ground that petitioner had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court held that petitioner's prior conviction for second degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a), because it requires that defendant cause a serious physical injury to another with the intent to do so. Therefore, the conviction met section 16(a)'s physical force requirement. View "Thompson v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's order of removal based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy in the second degree to commit a felony -- murder in the second degree in this case -- under New York law was an aggravated felony. The court applied the categorical approach and held that second degree murder is clearly an aggravated felony within the federal definition. View "Santana-Felix v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order resentencing him to 180 months in prison after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and after the grant of his habeas petition on the ground that his original sentence was rendered retroactively invalid under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015).The Second Circuit affirmed and held that defendant's prior conviction for second degree burglary under North Carolina law qualifies categorically as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "enumerated clause." The court also held that defendant's prior conviction for federal bank robbery qualifies categorically as a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause. Therefore, the district court did not err by determining that defendant was subject to the ACCA's mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 180 months. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for rehearing of its prior decision concluding that petitioner's prior convictions for robbery under Con. Gen. Stat. 53a‐133 qualified as predicates under the Force Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), and reinstating his original ACCA sentence.The court held that petitioner misread Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018). While petitioner was correct that in Villanueva the court remanded for resentencing, rather than direct the district court to reimpose the original sentence that had impermissibly relied on the ACCA's now‐defunct residual clause, the court neither ruled nor suggested that the latter course would have been impermissible, much less ruled that future courts in similar circumstances should follow the same course. Therefore, the decision to remand for resentencing was discretionary. The court also held that petitioner misconstrued Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), nor was petitioner correct that a sentencing court's reliance on the ACCA's residual clause, later determined to be unconstitutional, would be a structural error not susceptible to harmless error analysis. Petitioner's remaining arguments were unpersuasive. View "Shabazz v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction on five counts related to his participation in attacks on United States and coalition forces in Afghanistan while a member of al‐Qaeda. The court held that it was not error to deny a defendant's purported waiver of the right to counsel if, like defendant here, the defendant prevented the court from fulfilling its obligation to ensure that a Sixth Amendment waiver was knowing and intelligent. Furthermore, even if a waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent, a trial court may deny the right to act pro se where the defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct, or is not able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. In this case, defendant's obstruction was independent support for the denial of his purported waiver of counsel where the misconduct was egregious and intolerable by any measure: he hummed and screamed, and rambled incoherently; he cursed at the judge, declared him an enemy and threatened to kill him.The court also held that defendant's claim that 18 U.S.C. 2332(b)(2), conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, was rendered domestic by its incorporation of 18 U.S.C. 1111, which penalized murder within the jurisdiction of the Unites States, and that the evidence at trial proved a conspiracy to murder American soldiers only in Afghanistan, was without merit. View "United States v. Hausa" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for credit union robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. The court held that federal credit union robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), is categorically a "crime of violence" for the purposes of a conviction for using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); although the district court abused its discretion in admitting the customer service representative's testimony regarding the robbery's impact on her in the aftermath of the crime, the error was harmless in light of the totality of circumstances presented in this record; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony from other victims of the robbery; the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a photograph of a third party that defendant claimed actually committed the robbery; and the district court did not err, much less plainly err, by sentencing defendant as a career offender under the residual clause of the 2014 edition of United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Hendricks" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 60 months in prison for cyberstalking and making hoax threats. The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2A6.2(b)(1)(A) for violation of a court protection order. In light of the new requirements Amendment 805 imposed, the district court erred by asking only whether, under New York law, defendant was on notice of the issuance and contents of the order. The court held that defendant did not receive service of the disputed ex parte order in accordance with New York law and thus, that the issuing court ever exercised personal jurisdiction over defendant. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's 360 month sentence and five year term of supervised release for a single count of conspiring to distribute at least 200 grams of crack cocaine. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in return for an estimated sentence of 108 to 135 months in prison.The court held that the government breached defendant's plea agreement when the government, based on information that it knew at the time of the plea, sought a substantially higher sentence than that estimated in defendant's plea deal. In this case, defendant could not have reasonably expected that the government would change its position in such a manner when he consented to the Pimentel estimate in his plea bargain. Accordingly, the court remanded to a different district court judge for resentencing. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant Lyle and Van Praagh's conviction for charges related to the distribution of methamphetamine. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support defendants' convictions; the challenged searches and seizures did not violate the Fourth Amendment; the admission of Lyle's statements did not violate the Fifth Amendment; and Van Praagh's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Lyle" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendants' convictions for marriage fraud and immigration fraud. The court held that the trial judge's ex parte meeting with the jurors and his instruction about assessing the credibility of a testifying defendant were sufficiently sharp departures from the law of this circuit as to undermine the court's confidence in the fairness of the trial. In this case, during the course of the trial, the judge met with jurors ex parte to discuss the jurors' concerns about two defendants' out-of-court behavior. The judge also instructed the jurors that they could consider defendants' self-interest in the outcome of the case when analyzing their trial testimony. View "United States v. Mehta" on Justia Law