Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court held that petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(D). The court also held that the IJ's reliance on the forfeiture order was appropriate, and the IJ did not commit clear error in finding that the government established that petitioner laundered more than $10,000 by clear and convincing evidence. View "Barikyan v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to three counts of federal bank robbery. The court held that federal bank robbery by intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) was a crime of violence under the 2015 version of the Career Offender Guidelines, USSG 4B1.1–2, because it was specifically enumerated in the commentary clause and conformed to the definition of generic robbery. The court also held that New York third‐degree robbery in violation of New York Penal Law 160.05 was a crime of violence under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court appropriately applied the 2015 (pre-amendment) Career Offender Guidelines' sentencing enhancement in this case. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Although the court agreed with the district court that the state courts properly rejected petitioner's Brady claim, the court held that the state courts unreasonably determined the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding when it rejected petitioner's fair trial claim. In this case, there was more than a reasonable likelihood that the government's knowing offer of perjured testimony influenced the jury. View "Fernandez v. Capra" on Justia Law

Dhinsa is serving six life sentences for multiple convictions concerning his leadership role in a racketeering enterprise. Dhinsa’s habeas corpus petition challenged two convictions, on counts of murdering a potential witness (18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(1)(C). The Second Circuit vacated the denial of relief. Although habeas relief would not affect the length of his incarceration, Dhinsa had standing based the $100 special assessment that attached to each conviction--a concrete, redressable injury. Dhinsa did not, however, satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for a 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition under section 2255(e)'s savings clause, which is available if “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Dhinsa asserted his innocence under the Supreme Court’s 2011 “Fowler” decision, which requires the government to show in a section 1512(a)(1)(C) prosecution that the murder victim was “reasonably likely” to have communicated with a federal official had he not been murdered. Dhinsa’s extensive racketeering enterprise represents a type of criminal activity that is commonly investigated and prosecuted by federal officials. A juror could reasonably find that each of Dhinsa’s victims was “reasonably likely” to have communicated with federal officials. Because this test is jurisdictional, however, the court erred in denying the petition on the merits and should have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Dhinsa v. Krueger" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after he pleaded guilty to an information charging securities fraud, mail fraud, and obstruction and impeding the Internal Revenue Laws. Defendant, a former registered investment broker, perpetrated fraud on the clients of ELIV Group, an unregistered investment and consulting group that he owned and operated.The Second Circuit vacated in part the district court's sentence of incarceration as procedurally unreasonable because of an incorrect criminal history finding. Accordingly, the court remanded as to this issue. The court affirmed the district court's imposition of the amended restitution order where the district court corrected the restitution amount during resentencing. View "United States v. Valente" on Justia Law

In this redacted case, petitioner appealed the district court's judgment after filing a petition of error coram nobis seeking to vacate his earlier conviction. Petitioner argued that defense counsel was ineffective in affirmatively assuring him that there should be no immigration consequences for pleading guilty when, in fact, the crime to which he pleaded was an aggravated felony resulting in mandatory removal.The Second Circuit held that the district court improperly denied petitioner's coram nobis petition and reversed its judgment. Because the district court neither employed the correct legal standard nor examined whether petitioner was prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington, the court analyzed the question itself. In this case, the government conceded that counsel's actions were objectively unreasonable. The court held that petitioner showed that counsel's immigration misadvice was prejudicial because he had a reasonable probability either of negotiating a different plea of going to trial or litigating the loss amount. Furthermore, petitioner provided sufficient reasons to justify his delay in seeking to vacate his conviction. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to grant the writ, vacate petitioner's plea and conviction, and transfer the case. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. The court held that, notwithstanding a limiting instruction by the trial court, a detective's testimony that an accomplice had stated that petitioner paid him to commit the murder violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, the state court's ruling to the contrary constituted an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The court remanded with instructions to grant the petition. View "Orlando v. Nassau County District Attorney's Office" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the district court's revocation of his supervised release, principally arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and admitting evidence of postarrest statements. The Second Circuit found no merit in defendant's Fourth Amendment challenges to the stop and search of the vehicle.However, the court held that evidence of statements by the driver that incriminated defendant without incriminating the driver did not fall within the hearsay exception provided by Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence for statements against the interest of the declarant, and that the district court did not perform the analyses required under Rule 804(b)(3)(B) or under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order to determine the admissibility of the declarant's other statements. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ojudun" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition to reduce defendant's sentence. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that defendant's prior convictions for the New York offenses of robbery in the third degree and attempted robbery in the third degree did not qualify as predicate "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to reinstate defendant's original sentence. View "United States v. Thrower" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for possessing child pornography. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence where, even assuming the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the good faith exception applied; the court rejected defendant's claim with respect to the interstate or foreign commerce element of the crime of conviction; and the district court properly recognized that the mandatory minimum of ten years applied to defendant.However, the court agreed with defendant that his "risk" condition of supervised release was vague and afforded too much discretion to the probation officer. The court affirmed the polygraph special condition and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering polygraph examinations as part of defendant's sex offender treatment following his most recent conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in all respects except that the court vacated the "risk" condition of supervised release and remanded for clarification. View "United States v. Boles" on Justia Law