Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Empire a distributor of alcoholic beverages, is New York State’s exclusive distributor for popular brands like Johnnie Walker, Grey Goose, and Seagram’s Gin. Empire alleges that from 2008-2014, Reliable and (non‐party) RNDC, among Maryland’s largest liquor distributors, conspired with retail liquor stores in Cecil County, Maryland and New York City to smuggle liquor from Maryland to New York, in violation of New York liquor law. Empire sued Reliable and several Cecil County and New York retailers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, alleging that their bootlegging directly harmed Empire “because every case of alcohol smuggled into New York from Maryland was a lost sale by New York’s authorized distributors.” The defendants argued that the smuggling operation did not directly cause Empire to lose sales and that Empire had not adequately alleged proximate cause under RICO. The district court dismissed the case. The Second Circuit affirmed. Empire failed to allege proximate cause adequately. Empire adequately alleged a smuggling scheme, satisfying the first element of wire fraud and satisfied the third element of wire fraud, alleging “dozens of specific wire communications allegedly made by defendants.” The Supreme Court, however, has suggested the need for skepticism “to claims brought by economic competitors” and New York State was a more direct victim of the smuggling operation. View "Empire Merchants, LLC v. Reliable Churchill, LLLP" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 and related statutes for ordering the lethal toxin ricin over the internet for the stated purpose of facilitating murder. The court held that defendant did not stand convicted of purely local conduct so as to require construction of the Act according to principles of federalism. The court also held that defendant's conduct fell within the Act even when construed according to principles of federalism. In this case, defendant's conduct -- attempting to acquire ricin over the internet and using a false identity to have the Postal Service deliver the toxin to him -- manifests no purely local crime as in Bond v. United States, but conduct of primarily federal concern. Furthermore, Congress's enactment of the Act fell within its Commerce Clause authority and defendant's constitutional challenges failed. Finally, the court declined to review defendant's ineffective assistance claim in this appeal. View "United States v. Le" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute heroin, oxycodone, and cocaine, and distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The court held that the police officer conducting the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop when defendant and the driver appeared nervous and were unable to provide information about where they were coming from; the stop did not ripen into a de facto arrest because the police officer used reasonable methods and intrusions to confirm or dispel his suspicions; and, although certain evidence was improperly seized during a frisk, the physical evidence would have inevitably been discovered and thus suppression was not warranted. The court also held that accompanying statements should have been suppressed but the error was harmless. The court found no merit in defendant's remaining challenges. View "United States v. Santillan" on Justia Law

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) defines precisely the categories of persons who may be charged for violating its provisions and states clearly the extent of its extraterritorial application. In this case, the Second Circuit held that the FCPA's carefully-drawn limitations did not comport with the government's use of the complicity or conspiracy statutes. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to bar the government from bringing the charge at issue. The court reversed the district court's holding on the Second Object of the Conspiracy because the government's intention to prove that defendant was an agent of a domestic concern placed him squarely within the terms of the statute and took the provision outside the court's analysis on the other counts. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Miller and Jenkins entered into a civil union in Vermont in 2000. In 2002, Miller gave birth to IMJ. Miller took IMJ to Virginia. Jenkins remained in Vermont. In 2003, a Vermont court dissolved the union and awarded custody to Miller. Miller repeatedly refused to respect Jenkins’ visitation rights. Following several contempt citations, the Vermont court awarded sole custody to Jenkins in 2009. While the litigation was pending, Miller kidnapped IMJ, fleeing to Nicaragua. The government issued subpoenas under the Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2), rather than a court‐approved warrant, to a cell phone company, seeking billing records spanning 28 months and other information. As confirmed by Zodhiates’ cell phone and email records, which were introduced at trial, Zodhiates drove Miller and IMJ from Virginia to Buffalo, where they crossed into Ontario. Miller remains a fugitive. Zodhiates coordinated delivery of Miller's personal items to Nicaragua. Zodhiates was convicted of conspiring with and aiding and abetting Miller to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights, International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1204, and 2. The district court declined to suppress inculpatory location information garnered from his cell phone records. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Fourth Amendment and that the charge to the jury, referring to Vermont family law, denied Zodhiates a fair trial. The court noted that in 2011 a warrant was not required for cell records so the government acted in good faith. View "United States v. Zodhiates" on Justia Law

Lloyd pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), based on the “Pinkerton” theory of co-conspirator liability. The court sentenced Lloyd to 25 years in prison, the mandatory minimum term for these offenses. Lloyd argued that the court failed to satisfy requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 that a district judge accepting a plea personally inform the defendant of the “nature of each charge” as to which the defendant is pleading guilty, and determine “that there is a factual basis for the plea. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court erred by failing to ensure that Lloyd understood “the nature of each charge,” but the record does not establish that but for this Rule 11 violation Lloyd would not have pleaded guilty; Lloyd has not demonstrated that his substantial rights were violated. The court adequately “determine[d] that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Lloyd’s substantive arguments regarding Pinkerton liability were barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. The court declined to consider the ineffective assistance claim; Lloyd may pursue it in habeas corpus proceedings. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and a quantity of MDMA, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of that drug trafficking offense. The court held that the evidence at trial was sufficient to convict defendant of conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine; the trial record offered ample evidence from which a jury could infer that defendant carried his service weapon not because he was obligated to do so, but for the purpose of protecting a coconspirator during drug transactions; and the coconspirator's testimony was sufficient for the jury to find the requisite nexus between defendant's possession of the shotgun and cocaine distribution activities. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial based on the coconspirator's allegedly false testimony and on newly discovered evidence regarding the coconspirator's post-trial misconduct in prison. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Alston" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute drugs. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant conspired to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's request to conduct post-trial interviews of jurors approximately five weeks after the jury verdict. In this case, Juror No. 10's allegation that an unnamed juror said, "he knew the defendant was guilty the first time he saw him," without more, did not constitute clear, strong, and incontrovertible evidence that this juror was animated by racial bias or hostility, providing reasonable grounds for further inquiry. Furthermore, Juror No. 10's email did not provide sufficient evidence to trigger mandatory post‐trial juror interviews because Juror No. 10's email did not constitute clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, non‐speculative impropriety had occurred. View "United States v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss two counts of an indictment charging him with federal-program embezzlement. Defendant, a former New York State Senator, allegedly embezzled funds from escrow accounts that he oversaw in his capacity as a referee for foreclosure actions. The court agreed with the government that the district court erred by concluding pretrial, as a matter of law, that defendant necessarily formed the fraudulent intent required for the charged embezzlements -- and thus completed those embezzlements -- once he failed to remit the funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court made a premature factual determination regarding the time at which defendant, if guilty, formed the requisite fraudulent intent. The court reinstated the two federal-program embezzlement counts and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Sampson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice and making false statements to federal agents. Defendant, a former New York State Senator, was convicted of crimes related to his efforts to use his position in the Senate to provide a local businessman with special favors. Defendant provided the businessman with these favors in exchange for a loan that was given to defendant to reimburse funds that he had embezzled, but that he could not repay.The court held that United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1984), and United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991), barred the government from prosecuting an individual under 18 U.S.C. 1503(a) for intimidating and threatening witnesses or corruptly persuading witnesses to recant their testimony. However, these cases did not bar the government from prosecuting an individual under section 1503(a) for an inchoate endeavor to witness tamper. The court also held that the district court did effectively instruct the jury on whether defendant willfully caused an obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. 2; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant for making a false statement; the district court district court did not abuse its discretion—or violate the Confrontation Clause—in either of defendant's challenged evidentiary rulings; and defendant's sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Sampson" on Justia Law