Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of production of child pornography and four counts of possession of child pornography. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior conviction for Criminal Sexual Act in the First Degree; and defendant's sentence of 360 months in prison and fifteen years of supervised release was substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Spoor" on Justia Law

Defendant, a union local president, appealed his conviction of racketeering conspiracy and Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy for his efforts to force non‐union contractors to hire union members. The Second Circuit reversed the count of conviction for Hobbs Act conspiracy, affirmed the count of conviction for racketeering conspiracy, and remanded for resentencing. The court held that an an Enmons‐like exception did not apply to New York Penal Law extortion; the wages defendant attempted to extort were "property" capable of being extorted; the district court's threat instruction was correct with respect to New York Penal Law extortion; but the Government failed to prove defendant's involvement in the charged Hobbs Act conspiracy. View "United States v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for using firearms in the commission of violent crimes. The court held that defendant's argument as to substantive Hobbs Act robbery was defeated by this court's post-Dimaya decision in United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018), which held that substantive Hobbs Act robbery was a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). Defendant's argument as to conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery failed for two reasons: first, circuit precedent has long recognized that a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence was itself a crime of violence, and Dimaya/Johnson warranted no different conclusion; and second, in any event, the section 924(c)(3) definitions of a crime of violence applied only to the predicate offense of a crime of pending prosecution, not a crime of prior conviction as in Dimaya and Johnson. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

Attempted robbery in the second degree under New York law is not a "crime of violence" under the "enumerated offenses" of application note 1(B)(iii) to Section 2L1.2 of the November 1, 2014 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, but it is a "crime of violence" under the "force clause" of application note 1(B)(iii) to Section 2L1.2 of the November 1, 2014 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines.The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for illegal reentry into the United States after previously having been deported after the commission of an aggravated felony. The court held that defendant's prior New York conviction for attempted robbery was a crime of violence under the force clause. View "United States v. Pereira-Gomez" on Justia Law

Empire a distributor of alcoholic beverages, is New York State’s exclusive distributor for popular brands like Johnnie Walker, Grey Goose, and Seagram’s Gin. Empire alleges that from 2008-2014, Reliable and (non‐party) RNDC, among Maryland’s largest liquor distributors, conspired with retail liquor stores in Cecil County, Maryland and New York City to smuggle liquor from Maryland to New York, in violation of New York liquor law. Empire sued Reliable and several Cecil County and New York retailers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, alleging that their bootlegging directly harmed Empire “because every case of alcohol smuggled into New York from Maryland was a lost sale by New York’s authorized distributors.” The defendants argued that the smuggling operation did not directly cause Empire to lose sales and that Empire had not adequately alleged proximate cause under RICO. The district court dismissed the case. The Second Circuit affirmed. Empire failed to allege proximate cause adequately. Empire adequately alleged a smuggling scheme, satisfying the first element of wire fraud and satisfied the third element of wire fraud, alleging “dozens of specific wire communications allegedly made by defendants.” The Supreme Court, however, has suggested the need for skepticism “to claims brought by economic competitors” and New York State was a more direct victim of the smuggling operation. View "Empire Merchants, LLC v. Reliable Churchill, LLLP" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 and related statutes for ordering the lethal toxin ricin over the internet for the stated purpose of facilitating murder. The court held that defendant did not stand convicted of purely local conduct so as to require construction of the Act according to principles of federalism. The court also held that defendant's conduct fell within the Act even when construed according to principles of federalism. In this case, defendant's conduct -- attempting to acquire ricin over the internet and using a false identity to have the Postal Service deliver the toxin to him -- manifests no purely local crime as in Bond v. United States, but conduct of primarily federal concern. Furthermore, Congress's enactment of the Act fell within its Commerce Clause authority and defendant's constitutional challenges failed. Finally, the court declined to review defendant's ineffective assistance claim in this appeal. View "United States v. Le" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute heroin, oxycodone, and cocaine, and distributing and possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. The court held that the police officer conducting the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop when defendant and the driver appeared nervous and were unable to provide information about where they were coming from; the stop did not ripen into a de facto arrest because the police officer used reasonable methods and intrusions to confirm or dispel his suspicions; and, although certain evidence was improperly seized during a frisk, the physical evidence would have inevitably been discovered and thus suppression was not warranted. The court also held that accompanying statements should have been suppressed but the error was harmless. The court found no merit in defendant's remaining challenges. View "United States v. Santillan" on Justia Law

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) defines precisely the categories of persons who may be charged for violating its provisions and states clearly the extent of its extraterritorial application. In this case, the Second Circuit held that the FCPA's carefully-drawn limitations did not comport with the government's use of the complicity or conspiracy statutes. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision to bar the government from bringing the charge at issue. The court reversed the district court's holding on the Second Object of the Conspiracy because the government's intention to prove that defendant was an agent of a domestic concern placed him squarely within the terms of the statute and took the provision outside the court's analysis on the other counts. View "United States v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

Miller and Jenkins entered into a civil union in Vermont in 2000. In 2002, Miller gave birth to IMJ. Miller took IMJ to Virginia. Jenkins remained in Vermont. In 2003, a Vermont court dissolved the union and awarded custody to Miller. Miller repeatedly refused to respect Jenkins’ visitation rights. Following several contempt citations, the Vermont court awarded sole custody to Jenkins in 2009. While the litigation was pending, Miller kidnapped IMJ, fleeing to Nicaragua. The government issued subpoenas under the Stored Communications Act 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2), rather than a court‐approved warrant, to a cell phone company, seeking billing records spanning 28 months and other information. As confirmed by Zodhiates’ cell phone and email records, which were introduced at trial, Zodhiates drove Miller and IMJ from Virginia to Buffalo, where they crossed into Ontario. Miller remains a fugitive. Zodhiates coordinated delivery of Miller's personal items to Nicaragua. Zodhiates was convicted of conspiring with and aiding and abetting Miller to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights, International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1204, and 2. The district court declined to suppress inculpatory location information garnered from his cell phone records. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Fourth Amendment and that the charge to the jury, referring to Vermont family law, denied Zodhiates a fair trial. The court noted that in 2011 a warrant was not required for cell records so the government acted in good faith. View "United States v. Zodhiates" on Justia Law

Lloyd pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), based on the “Pinkerton” theory of co-conspirator liability. The court sentenced Lloyd to 25 years in prison, the mandatory minimum term for these offenses. Lloyd argued that the court failed to satisfy requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 that a district judge accepting a plea personally inform the defendant of the “nature of each charge” as to which the defendant is pleading guilty, and determine “that there is a factual basis for the plea. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court erred by failing to ensure that Lloyd understood “the nature of each charge,” but the record does not establish that but for this Rule 11 violation Lloyd would not have pleaded guilty; Lloyd has not demonstrated that his substantial rights were violated. The court adequately “determine[d] that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Lloyd’s substantive arguments regarding Pinkerton liability were barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. The court declined to consider the ineffective assistance claim; Lloyd may pursue it in habeas corpus proceedings. View "United States v. Lloyd" on Justia Law