Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of misdemeanor computer intrusion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), a provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA). The court held that defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of section 1030(a)(2)(C) failed because the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and, even if the statute's application may be unclear in some marginal cases, defendant's conduct fell squarely and unambiguously within the core prohibition of the statute. The court also held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to search warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act and obtained during searches of defendant's home in Italy. Finally, the court rejected defendant's challenge to the authentication of screenshots of websites registered to defendant for use in the click fraud scheme, which were captured and stored by the Internet Archive, and maintained as business records of that entity. View "United States v. Gasperini" on Justia Law

In 1999, Villanueva was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged two prior convictions for narcotics violations, a third for first-degree assault, Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a‐59(a), and a fourth for assault on an officer. After a jury found Villanueva guilty, a presentence report recommended sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e) minimum 15-year sentence provision. The report reflected that the first-degree assault conviction resulted from Villanueva’s firing a gun three or four times and hitting his victim in the shoulder and calculated a Guidelines range of 262‐327 months. The court concluded that each of the narcotics convictions was a “serious drug offense” and at least one of the assault convictions was a “violent felony” under ACCA without specifying whether the elements clause or the residual clause of ACCA applied. In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the “residual clause” of the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. In 2016, the district court vacated Villanueva’s sentence and sentenced him to time served. The Second Circuit disagreed and remanded, finding that the Connecticut statute, analyzed under the so‐called “modified categorical approach,” has as an element, the use of “physical force” as federal law uses in defining “violent felony.” View "Villanueva v. United States" on Justia Law

New York authorities arrested Olmeda for attempted murder, attempted assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon, attempted assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. Olmeda had two firearms in his possession. Later searches of his home and storage locker revealed more than 20 additional firearms. While state proceedings were ongoing, a federal grand jury indicted Olmeda as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and for possession of unregistered firearms, 26 U.S.C. 5845, 5861(d). Olmeda pleaded guilty to the six federal counts. The government argued that Olmeda should receive a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6) because he used one of the firearms in connection with another felony offense—the altercation with the New York police officers (relevant conduct enhancement). Olmeda asked that his federal sentence be concurrent with any term of imprisonment for the pending state charges, citing U.S.S.G. 5G1.3. The court declined to order a concurrent sentence, then held a “Fatico hearing” and concluded that the government had proven the state offenses for the relevant conduct enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court applied that increase and calculated a Guidelines range of 121-151 months, and sentenced him to 151 months. Olmeda had not yet been convicted in state court. The Second Circuit vacated. Section 5G1.3(c) applies where state charges for relevant conduct are pending at the time of the federal sentencing. View "United States v. Olmeda" on Justia Law

New York law provides that a court may order that a person who has information material to a criminal proceeding be detained to secure her attendance at the proceeding, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 620.10–50. In 2008, McKinnies, a New York Police Officer, was under investigation for potential insurance fraud. McKinnies’ car, which she had reported stolen, had turned up in a “chop shop” covertly run by the NYPD. McKinnies stated her friend “Alexandra Griffin” was the last person to drive her car. But “Alexandra Griffin” stated that she had never been given the vehicle, did not have a driver’s license, and that her surname was Simon. Her real name is Dormoy, she is Simon's daughter. Simon was twice taken to the precinct and held for a total of 18 hours over two days. Simon sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and imprisonment. Simon alleged that the warrant, on its face, directed officers to bring Simon to court at a fixed date and time for a hearing to determine whether she should be detained as a material witness. Simon was never presented to the court. The district court held that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. With the facts taken in the light most favorable to Simon, the defendants violated Simon’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Simon v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute various quantities of cocaine base and cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a narcotics trafficking crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. The court rejected defendant's arguments and, in this opinion, held that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence seized from a car parked in the common parking lot of a multi‐family building where the vehicle search was warrantless but supported by probable cause. Remaining arguments were resolved by a simultaneously issued summary order. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

On a second appeal following resentencing, the Second Circuit vacated defendant's 300 month sentence for production of child pornography and receipt of child pornography. The court held that the district court did not sufficiently address on remand deficiencies in the district court's analysis. The district court failed to comply with the mandate rule when it ordered no downward departure on either of the grounds specifically identified in the court's summary order as grounds for significant downward departures. The court remanded for resentencing and assigned the matter to a different judge where the district court noted on the record her continuing disagreement with the court and informed the court that "it would probably be better for judicial economy if another judge sentence for a third time." View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit set aside defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court held that the government did not waive arguments based on the former "residual clause" of USSG 4B1.2(a)(2); the generic definition of "manslaughter" included the unlawful killing of another human being recklessly; manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law 125.20(1), was narrower than the generic definition of "manslaughter"; and the district court erred when it found that defendant's prior conviction for manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law 125.20(1), did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under Application Note 1 of the commentary to Section 4B1.2 of the November 1, 2015 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for a writ of error coram nobis where petitioner sought vacatur of his prior conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, as well as 21 counts of mail fraud, based on his conduct in the rare-coins business. Petitioner contended that newly discovered evidence would undermine the reliability of expert testimony submitted against him at trial. The court held that, given the strength of evidence of defendant's fraudulent activity in support of his sale of coins, the issue he raised as to the government expert's method of valuation did not show circumstances compelling grant of the writ to achieve justice. View "Du Purton v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit remanded the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court failed to state whether it had made the requisite initial determination that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction. The court found that the record suggested that the district court erred either by failing to determine defendant's eligibility or by miscalculating the revised Guidelines range, which prejudiced defendant. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit remanded the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), holding that the district court failed to state whether it had made the requisite initial determination that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction. The court found that the record suggested that the district court erred either by failing to determine defendant's eligibility or by miscalculating the revised Guidelines range, which prejudiced defendant. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law