Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence. Defendant argued that he was seized when a police officer in a squad car, who had been alerted to a man lurking with a gun, shined a spotlight on defendant and asked questions to which he responded. The court held that its precedent in United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007), was controlling. In this case, defendant never submitted to police authority and therefore he was never seized. View "United States v. Huertas" on Justia Law

The Fifth Amendment's prohibition on the use of compelled testimony in American criminal proceedings applies even when a foreign sovereign has compelled the testimony.  When the government makes use of a witness who had substantial exposure to a defendant's compelled testimony, it is required under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), to prove, at a minimum, that the witness's review of the compelled testimony did not shape, alter, or affect the evidence used by the government.  A bare, generalized denial of taint from a witness who has materially altered his or her testimony after being substantially exposed to a defendant’s compelled testimony is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the prosecution’s burden of proof. In this case involving the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), defendants were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. The Second Circuit held that defendants' compelled testimony was "used" against them, and this impermissible use before the petit and grand juries was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the court reversed the judgments of conviction and dismissed the indictment. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit after the county refused to return her longarms that had been seized in connection with a New York Family Court temporary order of protection issued against her, even though the order was no longer in effect. The Second Circuit held that, because the litigation had not terminated on the merits, the district court's order was not final, and thus not appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291. However, under 28 U.S.C. 1292, the the court had jurisdiction to review the district court's grant of injunctive relief. The court held, consistent with the district court's decision in the instant case, and the decision in Razzano v. Cty. of Nassau, 765 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), that persons in plaintiff's situation were entitled to a prompt post-deprivation hearing under the four conditions set forth by the district court in this case and in Razzano. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order insofar as it granted plaintiff an injunction and directed the County to hold a post-deprivation hearing. The court dismissed in all other respects. View "Panzella v. Sposato" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for leave to file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate petitioner's sentence on the ground that the enhanced punishment imposed because of his prior state convictions was unconstitutional in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). The court held that Mathis did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and thus petitioner's proposed successive motion was impermissible. View "Washington v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded defendant's conviction for all counts related to the abuse of his public position by engaging in two quid pro quo schemes in which he performed official acts in exchange for bribes and kickbacks. Defendant, the former Speaker of the New York State Assembly, then laundered the proceeds of his schemes into private investment vehicles. Although the court rejected defendant's sufficiency challenges, the court held that the district court's instructions on honest services fraud and extortion did not comport with McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), and were therefore in error. McDonnell clarified the definition of an "official act" in honest services fraud and extortion charges. The court further held that this error was not harmless because it was not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same conclusion if properly instructed, as was required by law for the verdict to stand. View "United States v. Silver" on Justia Law

HSBC and the government appealed the district court's grant of a motion by a member of the public to unseal the Monitor's Report in a case involving a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with HSBC. The Second Circuit held that the Monitor's Report is not a judicial document because it is not relevant to the performance of the judicial function. By sua sponte invoking its supervisory power at the outset of this case to oversee the government's entry into and implementation of the DPA, the court explained that the district court impermissibly encroached on the Executive's constitutional mandate to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that a district court could revoke a speedy trial waiver were it to later come to question the bona fides of a DPA, the presumption of regularity precludes a district court from engaging in the sort of proactive and preemptive monitoring of the prosecution undertaken here. View "United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for 21 counts of public-corruption-related offenses. The Government conceded that, in light of McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), which narrowed the interpretation of "official act" within the meaning of the federal bribery statute, the instructions on Counts Five through Fifteen, the honest-services wire fraud counts, were erroneous. The Second Circuit held that the trial court's instructions on Counts Three, Four, Seventeen, and Nineteen through Twenty-One were not erroneous; that the instructions on the Hobbs Act and honest-services wire fraud counts, to which defendant did not object at trial, do not meet the "plain error" standard; and that defendant's other contentions provided no basis for reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Boyland" on Justia Law

Defendants Martinez, Rodriguez, Fiorentino, and Tejada appealed their convictions stemming from their involvement in a conspiracy, spanning at least a decade, in which more than two dozen persons were alleged to have committed more than 200 robberies of drug traffickers. The Second Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Fiorentino was a member of the conspiracy within the statute-of-limitations period; his sentence was substantively reasonable; and the court rejected his remaining challenges. Because Rodriguez did not raise his statute-of-limitations contention until long after his trial, the district court properly denied his motion for acquittal. The court held that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support Tejada's convictions for obstruction of justice; if it was error to admit the out-of-court description of the attempted robbers, it was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt; and the court rejected challenges to the Government's summation. Martinez's motion for new counsel was properly denied, and there was no plain error in the district court's acceptance of Martinez's plea of guilty to aiding and abetting others in brandishing in furtherance of the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy. Finally, the court rejected Fiorentino and Tejada's challenges to their sentences. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's 63 month sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery, holding that the district court denied the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment under USSG 3E1.1(a) based on clearly erroneous factual findings. In light of a defendant's due process right to contest alleged factual errors in his PSR, his good-faith objection to material PSR statements that he disputes does not provide a proper foundation for denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility credit. In this case, the district court's denial of the credit because it viewed defendant as falsely attempting to minimize his participation in the robbery conspiracy was erroneous. View "United States v. Delacruz" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's motion for summary judgment dismissing on qualified immunity grounds an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff, as conservator of the estate of his brother, Israel Soto, alleged the use of excessive force by the officers in connection with Soto's flight from police. The court held that Defendant Csech's appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment was properly before the court, but that the other appeals were not because they were not immediately appealable. In this case, Csech was entitled to qualified immunity because no precedent at the time established that a suspect who was fleeing had a right not to be stopped by means of a taser. In this case, the undisputed facts show that Soto was fleeing when Csech tased him. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and dismissed in part. View "Soto v. Gaudett" on Justia Law