Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of first degree robbery, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner alleged that counsel's failure to raise the trial court's refusal to give a requested charge to the jury - that to find petitioner guilty of first-degree robbery by using or threatening the immediate use of a dangerous instrument, it had to find that petitioner actually possessed a dangerous instrument at the time of the crime - was error. The court concluded that counsel's failure to raise that issue and her decision instead to raise weaker issues that were unlikely to succeed fell below prevailing norms of professional conduct; given the weakness of the evidence that petitioner in fact possessed a weapon during the robbery, the instructional error was not harmless, and there is a reasonable probability that, had counsel raised the issue, the state appellate court would have reversed the conviction on the most serious count; and, applying the correct standard, and in light of the evidence at trial and the pattern of the jury’s verdicts, the court concluded that the state courts’ dismissal of petitioner’s claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and that his appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lynch v. Superintendent Dolce" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the production of child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motions to suppress the searches of his residence and his computer. At issue was whether a search warrant affidavit that relied upon evidence generated by an automated software program provided a substantial basis for a magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was probable cause that child pornography would be found on defendant’s computer. The court held that the affidavit at issue sufficiently established probable cause and that defendant’s motions to suppress were properly denied. Based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances, there existed sufficient “indicia of reliability” to permit a reasonable person to conclude that probable cause existed in these circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the administration of the internal revenue laws. On appeal, defendant argued that he should have been granted a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence of juror bias. The court reversed the district court's denial of the motion where, in this case, the juror at issue aligned herself with the government, lied pervasively in voir dire for the purpose of avoiding dismissal for cause, believed prior to the presentation of any evidence that the defendants were "'crooks,'" and expressly mentioned defendant as a target of her efforts to persuade the other jurors to convict. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to convict him and that the jury instructions were not erroneous. The remaining claims are moot or without merit. The court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Parse" on Justia Law

Defendant and others were charged with narcotics conspiracy. After the unsealing of the indictment, the others were promptly arrested but federal agents were unable to find defendant until his arrest during a traffic stop 27 months later. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because the pre‐arrest delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court granted defendant's motion and the government appealed. The court concluded that the entire pre‐arrest delay cannot be attributed to the government’s negligence, and defendant did not adequately show prejudice. In this case, the court concluded that the district court misapplied the second and fourth Barker v. Wingo factors, and thereby abused its discretion in dismissing the indictment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the indictment. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of possessing child pornography. On appeal, the government challenged the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that law enforcement agents exceeded the scope of the warrant when they searched an apartment other than the one approved by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed, concluding that the search of defendant's apartment was not objectively reasonable and that the agents could not have relied on the warrant in good faith. Further, the court held that the benefits of deterring the agentsʹ unlawful conduct outweigh the costs of suppressing the evidence obtained. View "United States v. Bershchansky" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in 2005 and sought to file another such motion in 2014. Petitioner argued that the district court erred in treating his present section 2255 motion as second or successive because, after his first section 2255 motion, the court entered an amended judgment to correct clerical errors in the original judgment, and petitioner's present section 2255 motion is his first such motion since the entry of the corrected judgment. The court concluded that Magwood v. Patterson does not extend judgments amended only to correct clerical errors. The court considered all of petitioner's arguments in support of his contention that his present section 2255 motion should not be considered second or successive and have found them to be without merit. Therefore, the court denied petitioner's motion for a certificate of appealability. Further, construed as a motion for retransfer to the district court, the motion is denied. View "Marmolejos v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 63 months' imprisonment for bank robbery. The court concluded that Application Note 5 to 6 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, not Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), provides the proper standard for applying the enhancement based on a co‐defendant’s conduct. In this case, the district court plainly erred in applying the Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement based solely on a finding that defendant reasonably could have foreseen that his co‐defendant would recklessly endanger others while fleeing from the scene of his bank robbery. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McCrimon" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud. The court concluded that since the relevant charges in the superseding indictment were well within the applicable ten‐year statute of limitations, the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. The court considered defendants' remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Heinz" on Justia Law

Defendant, a volunteer firefighter and captain of the Wallingford Volunteer Fire Department, appealed a conviction for conspiring to set fires to public lands. Defendant and other members of the Department were "bored" and conspired to set fires because it gave them "something to do." The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of conspiracy to set fires on public lands where specific knowledge of federal ownership is not required, either for the substantive statute or for conspiracy to violate the substantive statute. Further, even assuming that defendant had a right to be present at the jury orientation, he knowingly and voluntarily waived it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendants McGinn and Smith appealed their convictions for various securities, mail, and wire fraud and tax charges. The government cross-appealed the district court's restitution and forfeiture orders. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendants of the charges; the district court did not plainly err when instructing the jury on the tax counts; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting portions of Smith's 1999 letter where use of the document did not have a substantial impact on the result of the trial and where reading portions of the letter did not constitute a constructive amendment or variance; McGinn's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable; and Smith's restitution and forfeiture orders are not erroneous. In regard's to the government's cross-appeal, the court concluded that the restitution orders failed to make clear that funds should be credited against restitution only when they are distributed to victims and not when they are merely collected by the receiver. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgments to conform them to the requirements of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. View "United States v. McGinn" on Justia Law