Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241, asserting that the BOP incorrectly calculated his ten-year prison sentence. While serving petitioner's state sentence, he was indicted on federal charges and temporarily transferred to federal custody after the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Petitioner argued that the writ was invalid because it required that he be produced in federal court for arraignment on October 10, 2001, and that when he was not so produced, there was no valid writ ad prosequendum that required him to be produced for arraignment at a later date. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that even if there was a technical deficiency in connection with the execution of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum that was issued, that deficiency did not invalidate the otherwise valid writ. View "Lugo v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of producing child pornography and witness tampering, appealed the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2255. At issue was the timeliness of the petition under the one‐year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104‐132, 110 Stat. 1214. The court joined eight of its sister circuits and held that the statute of limitations runs from the denial of certiorari, not from the denial of a rehearing of the certiorari petition. In this case, petitioner filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus more than one year after the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Therefore, the petition is untimely and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rosa v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendants Calderon, Sanchez, Cardoza, and DeLeon appealed from convictions of racketeering, narcotics, and obstruction-of-justice. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The court addressed only the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in regards to Cardoza's conviction for being an accessory after the fact to a murder. The court held that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Cardoza guilty of that charge where, based on the totality of the circumstances, no rational juror could find that Cardoza knew that the murder victim was dead or dying. Accordingly, the court reversed as to Cardoza's conviction and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss that count and resentence. The court affirmed on all other counts. View "United States v. Calderon" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. The court concluded that the evidence establishes no more than defendant's role as a mere purchaser from the conspiracy and cannot support an inference that he joined it. Therefore, the court did not address defendant's alternative argument for a new trial as to that count based on juror misconduct. The court reversed defendant's conspiracy conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

Defendants Pierce, Colon, and Meregildo appealed their convictions for conspiracy, racketeering, murder, narcotics trafficking, and firearms offenses. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendants; the admission into evidence of a rap video and images of tattoos posted on Colon's Facebook page were relevant, their probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and Colon's First Amendment rights were not implicated when the district court admitted evidence from his social media account; the court rejected Colon's claim regarding the constitutionality of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2702-2703, where he possessed the very contents he claims the Act prevented him from obtaining; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions the uncalled witness charge and the supplemental instruction regarding the narcotics conspiracy. In regards to Pierce's sentence, the court concluded that the rule of lenity applies because the statute is silent on how Pierce's discharge conviction and possession conviction should be sequenced for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the court vacated Pierce's sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Sellers was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 26 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. Application of the ACCA was error. Sellers’s 2001 state conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance did not qualify as one of the “three previous convictions” necessary to apply the ACCA because he was adjudicated as a youthful offender for that offense under New York law, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The youthful offender designation “set aside” the conviction. View "United States v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Roy was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349; three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; and conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that proof of an overt act is required for a conviction under the two section 1349 conspiracy charges. Proof of an overt act is not required for a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1349. View "United States v. Roy" on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

Cox was convicted in 2001 on narcotics and firearms charges and was sentenced to 540 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Cox’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. In 2004, he sought a new trial, arguing that the government knowingly allowed witnesses to testify falsely to his transactions in guns of a type that had not yet been manufactured. The district court denied the motion. Later in 2004, Cox unsuccessfully moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to set aside the convictions. The district court later vacated the firearms convictions and resentenced Cox on the narcotics convictions. Cox appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed. In 2011, Cox filed another section 2255 motion, seeking to overturn the narcotics convictions, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to detect and protest the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. The district court denied the motion, finding the claims time-barred because they “relate[d] only to the original sentencing,” and procedurally barred as first raised on collateral review; Cox had not demonstrated cause and actual prejudice or actual innocence to excuse his failure to raise them previously. The Second Circuit denied certificates of appealability. On some claims, Cox failed to make a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right; others are procedurally barred. View "Cox v. United States" on Justia Law

Lugo, a citizen of Venezuela, came to the U.S. in 1996 on a nonimmigrant visa, and remained beyond the authorized period. In 2005, she was charged with concealing a felony involving her boyfriend, who sold heroin. On advice of counsel, who told her that she faced up to five years of incarceration, Lugo pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 4. She was sentenced to time served. Lugo claims that her attorney never explained that a guilty plea could jeopardize her immigration status. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security charged Lugo as removable. She applied for cancellation of removal based on hardship to her U.S. citizen child, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. In 2011, an Immigration Judge found that Lugo was barred from cancellation of removal because of her conviction for misprision of felony was a “crime involving moral turpitude” that stops the clock on the 10-year “continuous physical presence” requirement for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B). The BIA affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded: the rights of fair notice and effective assistance of counsel may provide a reason not to apply, retroactively, new agency rules that establish deportation as a consequence of certain crimes. View "Lugo v. Holder" on Justia Law