Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wright-Darrisaw called the White House Comments Line and, after statements characterized as “foul,” and “irrational,” stated “I’m going to f**k and kill Obama.” A telephone operator transferred her to the Secret Service. The call was not recorded. The Secret Service subpoenaed phone records and determined that Wright-Darrisaw had called the White House Comments Line several times. Wright-Darrisaw admitted to calling to voice her displeasure with child custody laws, but denied making any threats. Wright-Darrisaw was convicted of threatening to kill the President, 18 U.S.C. 871(a), and of making a false statement, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2),and was sentenced to 33 months in prison. The district court declined to apply a four-level decrease in the offense level under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(6), finding that the threat involved deliberation, and applied a three-level increase under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(a) because Wright-Darrisaw was motivated by the victim’s status as a government official. The Second Circuit deferred consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence that the communication constituted a “true threat,” pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Elonis, but remanded for reconsideration of the sentence in light of a Second Circuit holding that “deliberation” under U.S.S.G. 2A6.1(b)(6) is deliberation related to the communication of the threat itself. View "United States v. Wright-Darrisaw" on Justia Law

Over the past several years, Arzuaga, who is currently incarcerated in Connecticut, filed three separate actions against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the district court initially granted Arzuaga’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), the court later revoked Arzuaga’s IFP status because Arzuaga had received approximately $6,000 in past‐due Social Security benefits that he had not reported to the court. Arzuaga subsequently failed to pay the filing fees. The district court dismissed all three actions. The Second Circuit vacated. Arzuaga’s past‐due Social Security benefits did not provide a basis for revoking his IFP status because the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act of 2009 barred Arzuaga from accessing those benefits while incarcerated, 42 U.S.C. 404(a)(1)(B)(ii). After the three complaints were filed, Arzuaga received a separate deposit of $350 into his prisoner trust account and spent that money on consumer goods rather than filing fees. The court rejected an argument that by failing to apply these funds to filing fees, Arzuaga made himself ineligible for IFP status. View "Arzuaga v. Quiros" on Justia Law

Smith was charged with murder, based on a 1996 Bronx armed robbery. The prosecution called an incarcerated witness, Ferguson, to whom Smith had made incriminating statements while in jail, indicating that Ferguson was not a government agent. Ferguson later admitted that he had previously been a paid informant. Defense never moved to suppress the incriminating statements. Following his conviction, Smith’s new counsel uncovered undisclosed evidence that Ferguson had collaborated with law enforcement for four years before Smith’s trial. State courts rejected direct appeals. Smith, pro se, moved to vacate his conviction. The state court denied the motion as unsupported by the record. Smith, through counsel, filed another motion, arguing for the first time that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress. The state court denied the motion as “procedurally barred and meritless … defendant was in the position to adequately raise all issues … in the previous motion [and] failed to establish … ineffective assistance of counsel.” Smith sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, reasserting the ineffective assistance claim. The district court granted the writ, finding that the state court decision rested on procedural grounds. The Second Circuit reversed: the decision was adjudication on the merits, entitled to AEDPA deference, and not so lacking in justification as to warrant habeas relief. View "Fischer v. Smith" on Justia Law

After a 22-minute traffic stop in Massachusetts, Foreste was given a speeding ticket. During the stop, the officer was concerned about Foreste’s vague answers and that his car rental agreement had expired. After he drove away, the police learned that Foreste was a dealer who transported drugs from New York to Burlington in rental vehicles. Hoping to stop him again, police watched as the car entered Vermont and saw it roll through a stop sign. Officers saw what they believed to be narcotics residue on his clothing and face. About 38 minutes after the stop, a canine alerted to drugs in the car. Foreste was found to be in possession of oxycodone. He entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute, but preserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The Second Circuit rejected his argument that the duration of the two successive traffic stops was unreasonably intrusive in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but vacated for discovery of the narcotics canine’s field performance records. The district court erred in denying his discovery request. View "United States v. Foreste" on Justia Law

In 1993, a jury found Rivas guilty of second-degree murder for killing his former girlfriend (Hill) on March 27, 1987. Rivas was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life. In 1999, Rivas sought post-conviction relief (NY Criminal Procedure Law 440.10), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and presenting essentially unchallenged expert testimony persuasively demonstrating that Hill could not have died on Friday, March 27, 1987. The Onondaga County trial court denied Rivas’s petition. In 2002, Rivas filed an amended federal petition for habeas corpus. After a remand, the district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a credible and compelling showing of actual innocence warrants an equitable exception to the limitation period set forth by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and that Rivas had made such a showing. The court stated that a reasonable juror, apprised of all the evidence in the record, would more likely than not vote to acquit. On second remand, the court denied Rivas’s petition in its entirety. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the state court’s denial of Rivas’s ineffective-assistance claim involved an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s decision, Strickland v. Washington. View "Rivas v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Florez, a citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident of the U.S., was charged in New York with a variety of offenses. Florez was twice convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, for “knowingly act[ing] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old.” The first conviction, in 2004, arose from Florez’s involvement with a co‐defendant who was charged with “acting in concert with another person” in the rape of a teenage girl. His precise role in the incident was unclear. The second conviction, in 2010, resulted from Florez’s driving under the influence of alcohol while his two children, aged one and nine, were in the car. The Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). The Immigration Judge held that Florez’s convictions each satisfied the generic federal definition of a “crime of child abuse.” The BIA affirmed. The Second Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the broad interpretation of the statutory phrase “crime of child abuse” is unreasonable. View "Florez v. Holder" on Justia Law

More than nine months after someone using Raymonda’s IP address accessed thumbnail images of child pornography on the Internet, government agents obtained a search warrant for his home and discovered more than 1000 files of child pornography. The district court granted Raymonda’s motion to suppress, finding that the government’s evidence that Raymonda had accessed child pornography on a single occasion nine months earlier was too stale to establish probable cause that he would still possess illicit images at the time of the search. The Second Circuit reversed, rejecting the government’s arguments that the recognized propensity of persons interested in child pornography to collect and hoard such images supports an inference that Raymonda would still possess child pornography when the warrant was sought, but holding that, even if probable cause was lacking, the evidence should not be suppressed because the agents who executed the search relied in good faith on a warrant duly issued by a judicial officer. View "United States v. Raymonda" on Justia Law

In 1984, V.J. was raped. She lost an eye and suffered broken ribs. The NYPD collected a rape kit, with pubic and head hair, swabs, and microscope slides. Based on line‐ups, V.J. and a witness identified Newton as her assailant. The rape kit was not tested for DNA. Newton was convicted. In 1988, by court order, the sample was tested by the Chief Medical Examiner, which reported that it contained no testable spermatozoa. In 1994, based on new law, Newton sought testing, alleging that technological advances had enabled testing of samples previously deemed untestable. The District Attorney’s Office responded that the evidence could not be found. Newton’s motion was denied. In 1995 Newton sought habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), unsuccessfully, because the evidence was not found. In 1998, Newton again sought testing; the DA’s Office indicated that the kit “must have been destroyed,” noting a 1995 fire and that the Property Clerk had a practice of destroying records after six years. In 2005 Newton again requested a search; the evidence was found. The Chief Medical Examiner concluded that the rape kit DNA profile did not match Newton. The state court vacated Newton’s conviction. Newton sued the city and NYPD officials, claiming that the inadequate evidence management system had deprived him of due process and access to the courts. The district court set aside a verdict in Newton’s favor. The Second Circuit vacated. New York law does provide a convicted prisoner a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with newly available DNA evidence and such a prisoner is entitled to reasonable procedures that permit him to vindicate that interest. View "Newton v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Ortiz pleaded guilty in 2003 to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He acknowledged being an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and faced a mandatory minimum term of 180 months’ imprisonment and a maximum term of life imprisonment. A downward departure for substantial assistance yielded a new Guidelines range of 120–150 months. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised release, and classified his offense as a Class A felony, for which the maximum post‐revocation sentence was five years. Ortiz began supervised release on June 21, 2010. On May 9, 2011, he burglarized a Connecticut home and stole 12 firearms, which he sold to drug dealers. Ortiz pleaded guilty to new federal firearms charges. The district court imposed a sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release on those charges. For violating the conditions of supervised release imposed for his 2003 offense, the court revoked Ortiz’s supervised release and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the statutory maximum post‐revocation sentence is determined by reference to the law in effect at the time of the underlying offense. View "United States v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for harboring an illegal alien under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), and a related order of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II). The court affirmed the conviction and order, concluding that the district court's jury instruction on "harboring" adequately communicated the required concealment aspect of that proscribed activity and, thus, manifests no plain error; the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant where a reasonable jury could find that defendant afforded shelter to an illegal alien for more than five years intending to help prevent detection of the alien by federal authorities; and the forfeiture of defendant's equity interest in her home, when considered in light of the gravity of her crime of conviction, does not demonstrate gross disproportionality in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "United States v. George" on Justia Law