Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Governor and DCJS on plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenges to the enforcement of certain amendments to the New York State Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), N.Y. Correct. Law 168-h. The amendments were enacted after plaintiff pleaded guilty to misdemeanor attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child, as a result of which he was classified as a level-one sex offender required to register under SORA. The court concluded, among other things, that requiring plaintiff to comply with these post-plea amendments did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Fourth Amendment, nor deprived him of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and concluded that they were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Doe v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault on a federal officer (Count 1), false personation of a federal officer (Count 2), and concealment of public record (Count 3). The court concluded that the district court did not err in giving jury instructions as to Count One where the district court declined to instruct the jurors that they must agree unanimously as to which theory of the offense supported the verdict; defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable; and the district court did not err in denying defendant's Rule 35 motion where the district court did not err in declining to make a determination whether the federal and state sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Claimants appealed from the district court's forfeiture orders of 23 of the defendant funds and properties to the United States. The judgments were entered by default after the district court granted the motion of the United States under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466, to strike Claimants' claims to the properties on the ground that Claimants Padma and Reddy (the "Allens") remained outside the United States in order to avoid prosecution in a related criminal case. The court rejected the government's contention that the burden of proof as to intent under the fugitive disentitlement statute was on Claimants. However, the court also rejected Claimants' contentions that summary judgment standards were applicable, and that the court was required to find that avoidance of criminal prosecution was the Allens' sole, dominant, or principal reason for remaining outside of the United States. The court concluded that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that its application of the fugitive disentitlement statute was well within the bounds of its discretion. The court considered all of Claimants' challenges and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Technodyne LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from their convictions of conspiracy; aiding and abetting violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; mail fraud; and making false statements to federal officials. Defendants argued that the district court improperly excluded evidence that they acted under a good-faith belief that they were complying with state law and that, in any event, their convictions and sentences were irreparably tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. The Government cross-appealed. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the court was compelled to conclude that the totality of the Government's misconduct in this case, combined with the district court's erroneous exclusion of evidence favorable to the defense denied defendants their right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgments of conviction as to CES, Copeland, and Dunn. The court ordered a new trial. The court also concluded that the district court clearly erred in setting the amount of restitution. Finally, factual and procedural errors required the court to vacate the sentences of Allen and Onoff and remand for resentencing. The court need not, and did not, consider whether their sentences were substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Certified Environmental Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree under Connecticut General Statute 53a-73a(a)(2), which criminalizes subjecting "another person to sexual contact without such other person's consent." The United States then commenced removal proceedings against petitioner under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under federal immigration law, petitioner's removal turns on whether the crime he was convicted of is a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court is unable to predict what level of mens rea the Connecticut courts would require, and because the issue involves the weighing of important policy considerations, the court certified questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court. View "Efstathiadis v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions stemming from his participation in coordinated suicide bombings in the New York City subway system. Defendant eventually caused a high-speed collision with another car, attempting to trigger an explosion that would kill himself and others. On appeal, defendant sought a new trial solely on the basis that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress postarrest statements. The court concluded that, even assuming that Miranda rights may properly be asserted by a suspect prior to his being in custody and prior to his being questioned, there was no clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel by defendant before his arrest; defendant's signing of the Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary; the court rejected defendant's contention that the government's interference with the attorney-client relationship prior to his indictment ripened into a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel upon his indictment and that the government's refusal to honor his choice to deal with the government through counsel violated his right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "United States v. Medunjanin" on Justia Law

Defendants Mandell and Harrington appealed from their convictions of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud, and mail fraud; securities fraud; wire fraud; and mail fraud. The principal issue on appeal was whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendants of securities fraud. The court concluded that, in light of the evidence of domestic transactions, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of defendants' convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendants of securities fraud. The government conceded that the forfeiture order should have made defendants jointly and severally liable for forfeiture. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded as to this issue. The court rejected defendants' remaining arguments and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Mandell" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to drug-related offenses. On appeal, defendant argued that his erratic and irrational behavior following the entry of his plea required the district court to hold a competency hearing before imposing sentence and that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by the denial of his multiple post-plea requests for an attorney to help him withdraw his plea. The court held that the district court was not required to hold a competency hearing before defendant's plea; defendant's post-plea behavior was not so erratic that it should have given the district court reason to doubt his competency; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's post-plea requests for an attorney in light of defendant's alternating positions with respect to representation and his attempt to delay the proceedings; and defendant's sentence was reasonable. The court rejected defendant's arguments in his pro se brief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, the NYPD, and four individual State and Federal law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988 and State law. Plaintiff claimed that a Federal agent presented false testimony to the State grand jury that returned the indictment against him. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's Bivens and section 1983 claims were foreclosed by Rehberg v. Paulk; plaintiff's allegation that his indictment was premised on faulty laboratory results failed to support a plausible fair trial claim; the district court correctly held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for abuse of process as to either the individual NYPD defendants or the agent; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution; plaintiff failed to plead facts showing that defendants acted with discriminatory animus, as required to state a claim under sections 1981 or 1985; and the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim against the City and the NYPD for municipal liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's second amended complaint. View "Morales v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2), which requires a minimum term of imprisonment of ten years. The enhancement applied when a defendant is found guilty of possessing child pornography and was previously convicted under state law of a crime "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." Defendant had previously been convicted in state court of first degree sexual abuse of his fifty-three year-old girlfriend. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that section 2252(b)(2) does not require that a prior state-law aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse conviction involve a minor. View "United States v. Lockhart" on Justia Law