Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City of New York and police officers, asserting claims of constitutional torts involving arrest without probable cause and malicious prosecution. In regards to the timeliness of plaintiff's suit against the John Doe officers, the court concluded that plaintiff waived the arguments he raised on appeal by failing to raise them in the trial court. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims of municipal liability against the City should not have been dismissed by reason of Officer Symon's entitlement to qualified immunity and the untimeliness of plaintiff's suit against the Doe defendants. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the City and remanded those claims for further consideration. View "Askins v. City of New York et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of firearms by a convicted felon and possession of a machinegun by any person. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearms, which were discovered after a warrantless entry into defendant's motel room, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that the record supported a finding that the evidence at issue would inevitably have been discovered. The district court's inevitable discovery analysis was erroneous in several respects and the court held that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the guns and ammunition would inevitably be discovered. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's conviction, reversed the denial of the suppression motion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after her arrest and detention pursuant to a material witness warrant. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's denial of her motion for reconsideration as to the individual defendants. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in finding that detaining an individual for two days pursuant to a material witness warrant was a prosecutorial function entitled to absolute immunity. The court agreed and held that defendants were not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to plaintiff's allegation that she was unlawfully detained for investigative interrogation. In the absence of any discovery by plaintiff, the record was insufficiently developed at this stage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Simon v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for committing an assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The court agreed with defendant that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) was within "the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Even though the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the jurisdictional element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the court affirmed the judgment because the jurisdictional status of the MDC was a "legislative fact" of which the court could take judicial action. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims in a separate summary order. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for transporting a minor for illegal sexual purposes, transporting an unlawfully present alien, and harboring an unlawfully present alien. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of transporting a minor in interstate commerce with intent to commit unlawful sexual activity; the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental charge to the jury upon receipt of its first note, which the district court described as a modified Allen charge; the district court's jury instructions on harboring an unlawfully present alien was not erroneous; and defendant's argument that the district court committed non-harmless error by sustaining the government's objections to two questions during the victim's cross examination was rejected. The court rejected defendant's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Vargas-Cordon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to exceed authorized access to a government computer in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. On appeal, defendant principally challenged the supplemental instruction regarding the jury's power to render inconsistent verdicts. The court concluded that the district court's instruction misled the jury as to its duty to follow the law and such error was not harmless where the court could not say with any confidence that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have convicted defendant of felony-level unlawful computer access conspiracy. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of conviction based on such error and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Moran-Toala" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for three counts of possession with intent to distribute and one count of escape. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in holding that his residence in a halfway house as a condition of the modification of his supervised release constituted "custody...by virtue...of [a] conviction of any offense" under 18 U.S.C. 751(a), and that therefore he was not an escapee under the statute. The court held that residence in a halfway house as a condition of post-incarceration supervised release was "custody" for purposes of section 751(a); defendant's placement in the halfway house was part of the original sentence for his 1993 conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the search of an apartment where he resided after leaving the halfway house because defendant did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy; and defendant's residence in the apartment began after he escaped from the halfway house in violation of section 751(a). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Edelman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly failing to register and update his sex offender registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. Defendant's principal argument on appeal was that SORNA was unconstitutional as applied to him because SORNA was enacted in 2006, defendant had already served his full sentence, left the military and severed any connection to the federal government. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Kebodeaux, Congress possessed the requisite authority through the Military and Necessary and Proper Clauses to hold defendant to SORNA's registration requirements. View "United States v. Brunner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and second-degree burglary, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After petitioner was charged, petitioner elected to represent himself pro so. The trial judge introduced petitioner's standby counsel to the jury as his attorney and later corrected the mischaracterization by reintroducing him as a "legal advisor." On appeal, petitioner challenged the judge's introduction, arguing that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The court concluded that the state proceeding did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Further, McKaskle v. Wiggins did not support petitioner's position because standby counsel's extremely limited participation was simply not substantial or frequent enough to have seriously undermined petitioner's appearance before the jury in the status of one representing himself. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ramos v. Racette" on Justia Law

Petitioner was found guilty of murder but his conviction was reversed on direct appeal and remanded for a new trial because of a mistake in swearing the venire panel from which the trial was selected. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to prevent New York State from retrying him for murder. The court concluded that, because 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) required a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, without regard to the statutory section under which the habeas proceeding was filed, a state prisoner must secure such a certificate in order to appeal from the denial of habeas relief sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, 28 U.S.C. 2254, or any other provision of law. In this instance, the court excused petitioner's failure to seek a COA and granted his belated COA request nunc pro tunc. The court also concluded that petitioner was placed in jeopardy at the initial murder trial and no different conclusion was warranted by the fact that the venire panel was not sworn in accordance with New York law. Further, the evidence at petitioner's first trial was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar his retrial following reversal of his initial conviction based on the error in swearing in the venire panel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hoffler v. Bezio" on Justia Law