Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department appealed summary judgment to R.E. and M.E. on their claim for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq, and summary judgment to R.K. on her claim for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. Plaintiff E.Z.-L. also appealed. The court held that courts must evaluate the adequacy of an individualized educational program (IEP) prospectively as of the time of the parents' placement decision and could not consider "retrospective" testimony regarding services not listed in the IEP. However, the court rejected a rigid "four-corners rule" that would prevent a court from considering evidence explicating the written term of the IEP. In R.E., the court found that the Department offered the student a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and reversed the decision of the district court. In R.K., the court found that the Department failed to offer the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. In E.Z.-L., the court found that the Department offered the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. View "R.E. v. New York City Dept of Education; R.K. v. New York City Dept of Education; E.Z.-L v. New York City Dept of Education " on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and their motion for a new trial following a jury verdict partially in favor of plaintiff on his claims regarding the misuse of a research training grant brought on behalf of the government pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., and awarding principally $855,714 in treble actual damages. The court concluded that: (1) where the government had provided funds for a specified good or service only to have defendant substitute a non-conforming good or service, a court could, upon a proper finding of False Claims Act liability, calculate damages to be the full amount of the grant payments made by the government after the material false statements were made; (2) there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that the false statements at issue were material to the government's funding decision; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of inaction on the part of the NIH in response to plaintiff's complaint regarding the fellowship program in which he had been enrolled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Daniel Feldman v. Van Gorp" on Justia Law

Defendants, an elementary school principal and two teachers, appealed from a denial of summary judgment by the district court on defendants' claims that qualified immunity shielded them from suit for alleged deliberate indifference to kindergarten and first-grade students' racial harassment of a classmate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to claims that the kindergarten teacher and the principal were deliberately indifferent to racial name-calling by kindergarten students because there were questions of disputed fact for which the district court identified sufficient record evidence to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed the denial, however, as to claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to all other allegedly racially motivated physical misbehavior by kindergarten and first-grade students because no clearly established law permitted a finding that defendants had actual knowledge that commonplace physical misbehavior by children of this age was racially motivated in the absence of some objective evidence connecting the physical misbehavior to the earlier racial name-calling. Further, the first-grade teacher was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because her transmittal of parental complaints of physical misbehavior to the principal for investigation could not be deemed "clearly unreasonable" as a matter of law. View "DiStiso v. Wolcott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their suit for failure to state a claim and denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, parents and/or legal guardians of seven children with disabilities, sought equitable relief preventing defendants from enforcing a prohibition on the use of aversive interventions. The court concluded that the State's prohibition of one possible method of reducing the consequences of a child's behavioral disability did not undermine the child's right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) or prevent administrators from enacting an individualized plan for the child's education. The court also concluded that New York's law represented a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the education and safety of its children that was consistent with federal education policy and the United States Constitution. View "Bryant v. New York State Education Dept." on Justia Law

In 1999, Bucalo, then 42 years old, applied for a position as a school librarian and was not hired; the position went to a 35-year-old man. Bucalo filed a charge of age and sex discrimination with the EEOC, which granted a right-to-sue letter, but she did not file. In 2003, the position re-opened and Bucalo, then 46, reapplied. Lanier, a new superintendent, selected interviewees; Bucalo was not among them. A committee hired a 32-year-old woman. Bucalo sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and retaliation for her 1999 EEOC complaint, violating the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Lanier, then suffering from a debilitating disease, executed an affidavit asserting that he had not selected Bucalo because she had worked in numerous short-term positions, evidencing “instability,” and denying that he had considered Bucalo’s age or 1999 EEOC charge. Lanier died before trial. The district court ruled in favor of the District. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that because of the death of the sole District employee with direct knowledge of the reasons she was not hired, Bucalo was entitled to judgment under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. View "Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The District hired Donnelly as a teacher under a three-year probationary contract. During his first year he received the highest rating and had perfect attendance. The District transferred him. His performance included episodes that required admonition. He told a student she was “acting retarded” and wrote the word “retard” on the board and told another to “go back to Mexico.” In the final year of his probation, Donnelly required gallbladder surgery, which occurred on November 27. He took leave through December 5. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Donnelly worked at least 1,247 hours (7.25 per day for 172 days) during the 12-month period prior to his leave: three hours short of Family Medical Leave Act eligibility, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A)(ii). When he returned, he received unsatisfactory evaluations and was denied tenure. The district court held that he was not eligible for FMLA leave and that he had not shown that he was qualified for tenure. The Second Circuit reversed. Donnelly presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether he qualifies for FMLA leave; the standard applied by the court does not apply outside of the college tenure context; and Donnelly presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find unlawful retaliation. View "Donnelly v. Greenburgh Central Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2009 the university announced that in the 2009–10 academic year, it would eliminate its varsity sports teams for women’s volleyball, men’s golf, and men’s outdoor track and field, while creating a new varsity sports team for women’s competitive cheerleading. Plaintiffs, five women’s volleyball players and their coach, charged violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). The district court enjoined the school from withdrawing support from its volleyball team, finding that it systematically and artificially increased women’s teams’ rosters and decreased men’s teams’ rosters to achieve the appearance of Title IX compliance. The court then certified a class of present and future female students and ultimately granted permanent injunctive relief. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s counting of participation opportunities in varsity sports afforded female students. The district court correctly concluded that the disparity revealed by that calculation demonstrated a failure to provide substantially proportionate athletic participation opportunities as required by Title IX. View "Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in consolidated cases are the parents of disabled children, challenging the procedural and substantive adequacy of Individualized Education Plans that the New York City Department of Education, developed for their children pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 8 Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. They also sought reimbursement of funds spent on private-school tuition for their children. In one case, the Second Circuit held that the district court properly agreed with the determinations of the hearing officer who initially considered the matter and properly rejected the subsequent determinations of the state review officer. In the other case, the Second Circuit found that the magistrate judge, who recommended granting the Department's motion for summary judgment, overstated the extent to which federal courts must defer to the findings of state administrative officers, but that the Department's motion was properly granted. View "M.H. v. NY City Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing their complaint, which alleged that an elementary school student's First Amendment rights were violated when he was suspended for six days after expressing a wish for violence to the school and teachers. The litigation arose out of a crayon drawing by B.C., a ten-year-old fifth-grader, in response to an in-class assignment. The drawing depicted an astronaut and expressed a desire to "[b]low up the school with the teachers in it." The court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the astronaut drawing could create a substantial disruption at the school and defendants' resulting decision to suspend B.C. was constitutional. The court also held that there was no merit to plaintiffs' argument that B.C.'s punishment was excessive in light of the court's deference to school authorities. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cuff v. Valley Central School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants had retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that the speech on which plaintiff based her claim was not protected under the First Amendment and that the individual defendants had qualified immunity from suit. The district court held, alternatively, that summary judgment would have been appropriate if the speech had been protected, because the school district would have fired plaintiff even in the absence of the speech. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; that appellees' rebuttal was subject to credibility questions and hence could not be resolved as a matter of law; and that appellees were not, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to qualified immunity.