Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners seek review of a Vessel General Permit (VGP) issued by EPA to regulate the discharge of ballast water from ships under section 402(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1342(a). The court concluded that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing parts of the 2013 VGP. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review with respect to (1) EPAʹs decision to set the technology‐based effluent limits (TBELs) at the IMO Standard, (2) EPAʹs failure to consider onshore treatment for ballast water discharge, (3) EPAʹs decision to exempt pre‐2009 Lakers from the TBELS in the 2013 VGP permit, (4) EPAʹs narrative standard for water quality‐based effluent limits (WQBELs), and (5) the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for WQBELs. The court remanded for further proceedings in these respects. The court denied the petition for review with respect to TBELs for viruses and protists and the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for TBELs. View "NRDC v. EPA" on Justia Law

From 1987 to 2001, Bengis and Noll engaged in a scheme to harvest large quantities of South Coast and West Coast rock lobsters from South African waters for export to the United States in violation of both South African and U.S. law. Defendants, through their company, Hout Bay, harvested rock lobsters in amounts that exceeded the South African Department of Marine and Coastal Management’s quotas. In 2001, South Africa seized a container of unlawfully harvested lobsters, declined to prosecute the individuals, but charged Hout Bay with overfishing. Bengis pleaded guilty on behalf of Hout Bay. South Africa cooperated with a parallel investigation conducted by the United States. The two pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit smuggling and violate the Lacey Act, which prohibits trade in illegally taken fish and wildlife, and to substantive violations of the Lacey Act. Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act. The district court entered a restitution order requiring the defendants to pay $22,446,720 to South Africa. The Second Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the extent of Bengis’s liability, rejecting an argument the restitution order violated their Sixth Amendment rights. View "United States v. Bengis" on Justia Law

NYSEG filed suit against FirstEnergy under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., to recover certain costs incurred in remediating coal tar contamination at certain of NYSEG's manufactured gas plants in upstate New York. NYSEG contends that FirstEnergy is liable as the successor to NYSEG's former parent company, AGECO, for a portion of the cleanup costs. FirstEnergy filed counterclaims against NYSEG and third-party claims against I.D. Booth, the current owner of one of the sites, for cost contribution under section 113(f). The district court held that NYSEG was entitled to recover certain cleanup costs from FirstEnergy based on a veil piercing theory, but limiting that recovery to certain sites. The district court also found I.D. Booth liable for a portion of the cleanup costs at one site. The court held that NYSEG's CERCLA claims against FirstEnergy are not barred by the covenant not to sue; AGECO is not directly liable under CERCLA as an operator; FirstEnergy is liable to NYSEG on a veil piercing theory based on AGECO's control of NYSEG from 1922 to January 10, 1940, but not for contamination created by other AGECO subsidiaries before those subsidiaries merged into NYSEG; NYSEG's claims as to the (a) Plattsburgh site are timely, (b) Norwich site are untimely, and (c) Oswego site are untimely; the district court did not err in calculating total gas production at the sites; the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing NYSEG's recovery from FirstEnergy by a portion of NYSEG's $20 million insurance settlement; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce NYSEG's recovery to reflect the increased value of the remediated properties or NYSEG's alleged delay in the remedial efforts; and I.D. Booth is liable for a portion of cleanup costs and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning liability in this respect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New York State Elec. & Gas v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

Asarco appealed from the district court's dismissal of its Second Amended Complaint. As part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved two settlement agreements related to the environmental contamination of the Everett Smelter and the Monte Cristo Mining area in Washington State. Asarco paid the United States as a result of those settlements and the Port of Everett $50.2 million for costs related to the remediation of the sites. Asarco then sought contribution, directly and as a purported subrogee, from the Trustees of the residuary trust created by the will of John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1937. At issue was whether, in 2014, the Trustees may be made to contribute to cleanup costs of environmental contamination allegedly caused by corporations controlled by Rockefeller in Washington State between 1892 and 1903. Assuming arguendo that New York law permitted the imposition of liability on testamentary beneficiaries in this instance, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Asarco's contribution claims because they were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and its subrogation claims because Asarco was not a subrogee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Asarco LLC v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Cedar & Washington, a real estate developer, filed suit against the owners and lessees of the World Trade Center and others under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, seeking recovery of costs incurred in remediating a nearby building contaminated by the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. The court concluded that the attack constituted an "act of war" for purposes of CERCLA's affirmative defense. The attacks directly and immediately caused the release of harmful substances (WTC dust), and were the "sole cause" of the release because the attack "overwhelm[ed] and swamp[ed] the contributions of the defendant[s]." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Cedar & Washington's claim. View "In re: September 11 Litigation" on Justia Law

Defendant paid a general contractor for costs associated with the cleanup of a contaminated parcel of land that defendant owned. After the general contractor failed to remit those payments to plaintiff, a subcontractor who performed the work, plaintiff sought payment directly from defendant. The court concluded that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607, did not grant the subcontractor a right to recovery against defendant in these circumstances where defendant would effectively be required to pay twice for the same work performed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to defendant. View "Price Trucking Corp. v. Norampac Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The State filed suit against defendants under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. The State sought to recover costs incurred in investigating and addressing groundwater contamination in the Town of Hempstead caused by pollution emanating from the New Cassel Industrial Area (NCIA). The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action as time-barred by the six year statute of limitations governing suits to recover costs for remedial actions under section 9613(g)(2)(B). The court held that the cleanup activities here were implemented as removal measures and continued to be removal measures at all relevant times. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the statute of limitations for remedial rather than removal actions. The court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of New York v. Next Millennium Realty" on Justia Law

This case arose when appellant settled an environmental enforcement action brought against him by the United States through a consent decree providing, inter alia, that defendant would pay the government an amount equal to the fair market value of a parcel of real property owned by appellant. At issue on appeal was whether a district court, under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), and the Anti-Injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. 2283, had the authority to enjoin a party from litigating in state court issues arising out of the consent decree which settled the civil action brought against the party in federal court by the United States. The court held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not permit the district court in this case to enjoin appellant's state court suit. Accordingly, the court vacated the injunction, concluding that the district court erred by relying on the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act in enjoining appellant's state court suit. View "United States v. Manne" on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

The NRC granted Entergy an exemption from compliance with certain fire safety regulations at its Indian Point nuclear plant operating unit No. 3. Plaintiffs alleged that the NRC's award of the exemption to Entergy violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Entergy on all of these claims except in one respect. Insofar as plaintiffs contended that the NRC granted the challenged exemption in violation of NEPA's regulations, which allowed for public involvement where appropriate and practicable, the court concluded that the agency record did not permit a reviewing court to determine whether a reasoned basis existed for the NRC's decision not to afford any such public involvement in the exemption decision. View "Brodsky v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law