Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The case involves the surviving relatives of Quinn Lucas Schansman, a passenger on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a missile launched from territory controlled by the Russian Federation-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The plaintiffs allege that Sberbank of Russia PJSC (Sberbank) provided material support to the DPR by facilitating money transfers from donors to the DPR via correspondent accounts in the United States, which they claim proximately caused the downing of MH17.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sberbank’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Sberbank argued that it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) after the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation acquired a majority share in Sberbank. The district court found that Sberbank was presumptively immune under the FSIA but that the commercial activity exception applied, as the claims were based on commercial activities carried out in the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sberbank is presumptively immune under the FSIA due to its majority ownership by the Russian Ministry of Finance. However, the court also held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies to Sberbank’s conduct, as the alleged claims are based on commercial activities—facilitating money transfers—carried out in the United States. Additionally, the court held that the ATA’s immunity provisions apply to instrumentalities of foreign states and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies equally to actions brought under the ATA. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schansman v. Sberbank" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

Relators Ralph Billington, Michael Aceves, and Sharon Dorman filed a qui tam action against HCL Technologies Ltd. and HCL America, Inc., alleging that HCL defrauded the United States by securing visas for foreign employees, primarily from India, to avoid paying higher salaries to American citizens. They claimed this scheme violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by underpaying H-1B visa workers, thus reducing tax obligations, and by applying for less expensive visas instead of the required H-1B visas, thereby avoiding higher visa application fees.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed all claims, concluding that relators could not demonstrate that HCL avoided or decreased any established obligation to pay money to the United States. The court found no established obligation for HCL to pay federal payroll taxes on wages it never paid and no obligation to pay higher H-1B visa fees when it applied for B-1 and L-1 visas instead.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court. The appellate court held that HCL did not have an obligation under the FCA to pay taxes on wages it never paid, as the duty to pay taxes arises only from wages actually paid. Similarly, the court found no obligation for HCL to pay higher visa application fees for visas it never applied for. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that relators failed to state a plausible claim that HCL decreased or avoided an established obligation to pay money to the United States. View "United States ex rel. Billington v. HCL Techs. Ltd." on Justia Law

Steven M. Camburn, a former sales specialist for Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) and equivalent state and municipal laws. Camburn alleged that Novartis violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by offering remuneration to physicians to induce them to prescribe its drug Gilenya, which treats multiple sclerosis. He claimed that Novartis used its peer-to-peer speaker program and other forms of illicit remuneration to influence physicians' prescribing practices.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Camburn's Third Amended Complaint (TAC) with prejudice, concluding that he had not pleaded his allegations with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) to support a strong inference of an AKS-based FCA violation. The court found that Camburn's allegations did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a kickback scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff states an AKS violation if they allege with particularity that at least one purpose of the purported scheme was to induce fraudulent conduct. The court found that Camburn had adequately pleaded certain categories of factual allegations that gave rise to a strong inference of an AKS violation. Specifically, Camburn sufficiently alleged that Novartis held sham speaker events with no legitimate attendees, excessively compensated physician speakers for canceled events, and selected and retained speakers to incentivize prescription-writing.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part but vacated the judgment and remanded the case in part. The court instructed the district court to evaluate whether Camburn had stated all the elements of an FCA claim with respect to the adequately pleaded AKS violations and to assess the adequacy of Camburn's claims under state and municipal law. View "Camburn v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

A group of skilled nursing facilities in New York and Rhode Island challenged a rule promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The rule allowed certain inspections of these facilities without the presence of a registered nurse, which the plaintiffs argued contradicted the Medicaid Act's requirement for a registered nurse to be part of the survey teams. The dispute arose after an incident at Avon Nursing and Rehabilitation, where a resident was injured, leading to an inspection by a team that did not include a registered nurse. The plaintiffs contended that the rule violated the statutory requirement.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the Medicaid Act's registered nurse requirement applied only to surveys conducted under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(2) and not to activities under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(4), which were the subject of the challenged rule. The court also determined that even if the statute were ambiguous, the agency's interpretation was reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the registered nurse requirement did not extend to complaint investigations and other enforcement activities under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(g)(4). The court reasoned that the term "survey" in the statute referred specifically to annual standard surveys, extended surveys, and validation surveys, and not to the investigatory activities described in § 1396r(g)(4). Consequently, the rule allowing inspections without a registered nurse did not contradict the Medicaid Act. View "Avon Nursing & Rehabilitation v. Becerra" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law

Reporters from Bloomberg L.P. and Dow Jones & Company, Inc. requested aggregated, anonymized change-of-address (COA) data from the United States Postal Service (USPS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). They intended to use this data for reporting on population movement trends during the COVID-19 pandemic. USPS denied the requests, citing FOIA Exemption #3, which allows withholding of "information of a commercial nature" under the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. USPS argued that the data was intended for a commercial product called "Population Mobility Trends."The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of USPS. The court found that the COA data was indeed "information of a commercial nature" and that USPS had met its burden of proof under FOIA Exemption #3. The court noted that USPS had previously provided similar data but had since decided to monetize it through the Population Mobility Trends product.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the COA data was "of a commercial nature" because it had monetary value derived from USPS's core business of delivering mail. The court also found that under good business practice, a private business would not disclose such valuable data for free if it intended to sell it. Therefore, USPS was justified in withholding the data under FOIA Exemption #3 and the Postal Reorganization Act. The court emphasized that Congress had granted USPS broad exemptions to operate more like a business, including the ability to withhold commercially valuable information. View "Bloomberg L.P. v. United States Postal Service" on Justia Law