Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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The district court decided that the government was not authorized under 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) to continue holding petitioner in immigration detention pending his removal from the United States and ordered the government to release him. The government appealed and argued that section 241.14(d) is not inconsistent with its authorizing statute, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6), and that it provides adequate procedural due process.The Second Circuit granted the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, holding that the government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is inconsistent with section 1231(a)(6) and does not provide adequate procedural due process. The court also held that the government has made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is not a permissible reading of section 1231(a)(6). Furthermore, considerations of irreparable harm and the equities favor a stay of petitioner's release pending appeal. View "Hassoun v. Searls" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that defendant's denial of plaintiff's application pursuant to the Child State Protection Act (CSPA) for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court set aside defendants' October 2017 decision denying plaintiff's adjustment of status application and directed defendants to reopen and readjudicate the application.The court held that the government is equitably estopped from initiating rescission proceedings to reopen plaintiff's adjustment of status application or placing her in removal proceedings. In this case, the undisputed facts show that USCIS failed to issue a rejection notice, despite controlling regulation and, consequently, plaintiff was not advised of any defect in her application, depriving her of the opportunity to correct the issue. View "Schwebel v. Crandall" on Justia Law

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Healthcare insurers filed suit challenging an emergency regulation promulgated in 2017 by New York's Superintendent of the Department of Financial Services that would have significantly reduced the amount of risk adjustment funding to which plaintiffs were entitled in 2017 under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and subsequent years using HHS's federal methodology.The Second Circuit held that New York's emergency regulation was preempted by the ACA and HHS's regulations. The court held that New York's regulation interferes with, indeed reverses, some of the central "criteria and methods" that HHS, acting within its statutory authority, established for implementing a risk adjustment program and methodology. Accordingly, the court reversed the portion of the district court's judgment that dismissed plaintiffs' preemption claim and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor on that claim. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' takings and exaction claims, remanding for further proceedings. View "UnitedHealthcare of New York, Inc. v. Lacewell" on Justia Law

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The Times filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action seeking acknowledgement from the CIA that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert program of arming and training rebel forces in Syria. The CIA responded to the request with a Glomar response, stating that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of such records.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the CIA. After according appropriate deference to the uniquely executive purview of national security, the court held that President Donald Trump's statements, even when coupled with General Raymond (Tony) Thomas's statements, left lingering doubts and thus were insufficient to amount to an official acknowledgement of the alleged covert program in Syria, much less the existence of records related to the program. The court stated that it is still logical or plausible that disclosing the existence or nonexistence of an intelligence interest in such a program would reveal something not already officially acknowledged and thereby harm national security interests. The court also held that President Trump's tweet and statements to the Wall Street Journal interviewer did not declassify the existence of the covert program. View "The New York Times v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

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The Second Circuit denied a petition for review, under the Administrative Procedure Act, of Regulation Best Interest, which creates new standards of conduct for broker-dealers providing investment services to retail customers. Petitioners claimed that Regulation Best Interest is unlawful under the 2010 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.The court held that Ford Financial Solutions has Article III standing to bring its petition for review. The court also held that the SEC lawfully promulgated Regulation Best Interest pursuant to Congress's permissive grant of rulemaking authority under Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Finally, the court held that Regulation Best Interest is not arbitrary and capricious, holding that the SEC's interpretation of the scope of the broker-dealer exemption was not so fundamental to Regulation Best Interest as to make the rule arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Furthermore, the SEC gave adequate reasons for its decision to prioritize consumer choice and affordability over the possibility of reducing consumer confusion, and it supported its findings with substantial evidence. View "XY Planning Network, LLC v. Securities Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action claiming that Connecticut's Public Act 17-2, as amended by Public Act 18-81, which transfers money from the state's legislatively created energy funds to the general purpose fund, violates the Contract and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiffs had no contractual right to prevent the transfer of money to the general purpose fund and that the Act is an allocation of state revenue, not a tax, so that the taxpayer standing doctrine bars plaintiffs' claim. In this case, plaintiffs do not have a contractual right to control transfers from the Energy Fund and thus plaintiffs have failed to plead a violation of the Contract Clause.The court also held that because the transfer of previously collected revenue from the Energy Funds to the General Fund is not a transfer of plaintiffs' property to the state, it cannot constitute a tax. The court explained that, at its core, plaintiffs' argument is that funds previously collected for green energy and conservation initiatives will now be expended for another use, but taxpayers do not have standing to challenge such expenditures. Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs have no standing to proceed with their Equal Protection claim. View "Colon de Mejias v. Lamont" on Justia Law

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The NRDC and the State of Vermont seek review of certain provisions of a rule promulgated by the EPA, pursuant to the Toxic Substances Control Act, that requires manufacturers to report information about their use of mercury. Specifically, petitioners argue that three exemptions for categories of manufacturers and importers are unlawful.The Second Circuit denied review of the exemption for manufacturers of assembled products with mercury-added components at 40 C.F.R. 713.7(b)(3) and the partial exemption for high-volume manufacturers at 40 C.F.R. 713.9(a). The court held that these exemptions are reasonable in light of Congress's directive to the EPA to avoid requiring duplicative or unnecessary reporting. However, the court granted review of and vacated the exemption for importers of assembled products with mercury-added components at 40 C.F.R. 713.7(b)(2), finding that the EPA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for this exemption. View "Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request from the Secret Service seeking visitor logs for the White House Complex and President Trump's Mar-a-Lago home in Florida. After the Secret Service denied the request, the district court agreed and refused to compel production of the withheld records. The district court also dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiffs' claims that an agreement between the Secret Service and the Executive Office of the President that allegedly governed the maintenance of the visitor logs violated the Presidential Records Act (PRA) and the Federal Records Act (FRA).The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the visitor logs that plaintiffs seek are not agency records subject to FOIA. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the PRA or the FRA, because plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently to allege that the 2015 MOU prescribes recordkeeping practices that violate the FRA or PRA. Finally, plaintiffs' remaining arguments lack merit. The court denied plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint. View "Doyle v. US Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

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Unions representing Nassau County employees filed suit against NIFA after it instituted a year-long wage freeze for all county employees. The unions alleged that the wage freeze, because it was a legislative act that was not reasonable and necessary to achieve NIFA's purported goal of fiscal soundness, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court held that NIFA's implementation of the wage freeze was administrative, rather than legislative, and granted summary judgment for defendants.The Second Circuit held that NIFA's wage freeze did not violate the Contracts Clause and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The court assumed without deciding that NIFA's imposition of the wage freeze was legislative in nature, and held that the wage freeze was a reasonable and necessary means to achieve NIFA's asserted end of ensuring the continued fiscal health of the county. View "Sullivan v. Nassau County Interim Finance Authority" on Justia Law

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The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act's (FDCA) broad preemption clause, 21 U.S.C. 379s, bars plaintiffs from seeking to impose additional or different labeling requirements through their state-law claims, especially when Congress and the FDA already have provided for specific labeling requirements. Plaintiffs filed suit against L’Oréal, alleging common law claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, as well as claims under eight state consumer protection statutes. Plaintiffs believed they were being deceived into buying more product, because a portion of each of the liquid cosmetics they purchased could not be extracted.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiffs' state law claims at issue are preempted by the FDCA. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that their injuries resulted from the fact that the labels of the various L’Oréal products omitted certain critical information—specifically, that the creams could not be fully dispensed from their respective containers. Plaintiffs also admit that the packages comply with federal labeling requirements. The court explained that, if plaintiffs were permitted to move forward with their claims, they would be using state law to impose labeling requirements on top of those already mandated in the FDCA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. View "Critcher v. L'Oreal USA, Inc." on Justia Law