Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights and that defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by terminating his employment. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff does not have a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that this claim was properly dismissed. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Service" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a decade-long dispute over whether the County has adequately analyzed - in its applications for HUD funds - impediments to fair housing within the County’s jurisdictions. The County challenges final administrative determinations by HUD to withhold funds allocated to the County under the Community Planning and Development Formula Grant Programs (“CPD funds”) for fiscal years (“FY”) 2011, 2013 and 2014. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that HUD’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious and that 42 U.S.C. 12705 and section 12711 did “not relieve the County of its obligation to make accurate Certifications and to produce adequate analysis impediments in order to obtain CPD Funds.” The court agreed, concluding that HUD’s withholding of CPD funds did not violate federal law. However, the court vacated in part the temporary injunction issued pendente lite. HUD is authorized to reallocate the County’s FY 2013 funds forthwith. As to the County’s FY 2014 funds, however, HUD is directed to delay reallocating those funds until after the County exhausts its right to seek further review of this decision. View "City of Westchester v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, eight male, "out-of-status" aliens who were arrested on immigration charges and detained following the September 11th attacks, filed a putative class action asserting various claims arising out of the discriminatory and punitive treatment they suffered while confined at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) or the Passaic County Jail (Passaic). The district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that: (1) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a substantive due process claim against the DOJ defendants, against Hasty with regard to both official and unofficial conditions, and against Sherman with regard to official conditions only, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (2) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an equal protection claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (3) the free exercise claim is dismissed as to all defendants; (4) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged their Fourth Amendment strip search claim against Hasty and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; (5) the MDC plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim against the DOJ defendants, Hasty, and Sherman, and these defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim; and (6) the MDC plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged any claims against Zenk.  The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims brought by the Passaic plaintiffs. View "Turkmen v. Hasty, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Sheriff's Department and others, alleging that he was severely beaten by deputy sheriffs while being detained in a holding cell. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court vacated the district court's judgment, remanding for further proceedings because failure to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), is an affirmative defense, and because the evidence adduced by defendants - principally in the form of a conclusory affidavit - does not suffice to establish the defense as a matter of law. The court need not consider plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Hubbs v. Suffolk Cnty. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has regulatory authority over interstate aspects of the nation’s electric power system, but not over “facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” 16 U.S.C. 824(a). FERC entered orders adopting standards and procedures for determining which power distribution facilities are subject to the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction and which facilities fall within the statutory exception for local distribution of electric energy. The state and the Public Service Commission of the State of New York challenged the standards and procedures as an unreasonable interpretation of the agency’s statutory grant of jurisdiction and as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Second Circuit upheld the orders as reasonably interpreting the agency’s regulatory jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act as amended by the Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 and supported by sufficient explanation and substantial evidence as required by the Administrative Procedure Act. View "New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders issued in 2013 and 2014 approved the New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) creation of a new wholesale electric power “capacity zone” comprising areas of Southeastern New York, including the lower Hudson Valley. The orders followed NYISO’s identification of areas in which customers received power from suppliers located on the other side of a “transmission constraint” in the electrical grid. Because of the way New York’s capacity markets work, NYISO concluded that financial incentives for capacity resources in the transmission‐constrained area that became the Valley Zone were inadequate, jeopardizing the reliability of the grid. FERC’s approval of the Zone, with a new “demand curve” to set capacity prices, were designed to address the reliability problem by providing more accurate price signals to in‐zone resources, but were expected to result in higher prices to customers. Utilities, the state, and the New York Public Service Commission alleged that FERC failed adequately to justify the expected higher prices, particularly without a “phase‐in” of the new zone and its demand curve, in violation of FERC’s statutory mandate to ensure that rates are “just and reasonable,” 16 U.S.C. 824d(a). The Second Circuit rejected the challenge. FERC adequately justified its decisions. View "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The County filed suit against HUD, alleging that HUD acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by rejecting the County's fiscal year (FY) 2011 Action Plan and certification that it would affirmatively further fair housing. The County submitted these items to obtain certain HUD-administered grants. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that HUD's actions are not "committed to agency discretion by law" so as to render them unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), because the statutes governing HUD's administration of the relevant grant programs provide meaningful standards against which to judge HUD's exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing the County's APA claims as not subject to judicial review under the APA. The court affirmed the dismissal of certain of the County's claims as moot insofar as the County seeks relief with respect to certain grant funds that have already been reallocated to other jurisdictions. View "Cnty. of Westchester v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the creation in Westhampton Beach of an "eruv," a delineated geographic area significant to certain adherents of Judaism. The district court dismissed the complaint based on Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) and plaintiffs appealed. The court rejected defendants' two jurisdictional challenges and concluded, on the merits, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause against any of defendants. Two of the remaining three defendants are plainly not state actors and claims against these defendants must be dismissed for lack of state action. As to the remaining defendant, LIPA, plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that there was no secular purpose to the governmental action here. LIPA entered into a paid licensing agreement allowing the installation of items of religious significance on utility poles. Further, no reasonable observer who notices the strips on LIPA utility poles would draw the conclusion that a state actor is thereby endorsing religion, even assuming that a reasonable observer is aware that a state actor was the entity that contracted with a private party to lease the space. Finally, there is no risk of excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, the court found no merit in plaintiffs' arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the Secretary on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries who were placed into "observation status" by their hospitals rather than being admitted as "inpatients." Placement into "observation status" allegedly caused these beneficiaries to pay thousands of dollars more for their medical care. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395, claims where plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the adequacy of the notices they received and nothing in the statute entitles plaintiffs to the process changes they seek. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Due Process claims where the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in being treated as "inpatients," because the district court accepted as true the Secretary's assertion that a hospital's decision to formally admit a patient is "a complex medical judgment" left to the doctor's discretion. The district court's conclusion constituted impermissible factfinding, which in any event is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations that the decision to admit is guided by fixed and objective criteria. View "Barrows v. Burwell" on Justia Law