Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The County filed suit against HUD, alleging that HUD acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by rejecting the County's fiscal year (FY) 2011 Action Plan and certification that it would affirmatively further fair housing. The County submitted these items to obtain certain HUD-administered grants. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded, however, that HUD's actions are not "committed to agency discretion by law" so as to render them unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), because the statutes governing HUD's administration of the relevant grant programs provide meaningful standards against which to judge HUD's exercise of discretion. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing the County's APA claims as not subject to judicial review under the APA. The court affirmed the dismissal of certain of the County's claims as moot insofar as the County seeks relief with respect to certain grant funds that have already been reallocated to other jurisdictions. View "Cnty. of Westchester v. HUD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the creation in Westhampton Beach of an "eruv," a delineated geographic area significant to certain adherents of Judaism. The district court dismissed the complaint based on Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) and plaintiffs appealed. The court rejected defendants' two jurisdictional challenges and concluded, on the merits, that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause against any of defendants. Two of the remaining three defendants are plainly not state actors and claims against these defendants must be dismissed for lack of state action. As to the remaining defendant, LIPA, plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that there was no secular purpose to the governmental action here. LIPA entered into a paid licensing agreement allowing the installation of items of religious significance on utility poles. Further, no reasonable observer who notices the strips on LIPA utility poles would draw the conclusion that a state actor is thereby endorsing religion, even assuming that a reasonable observer is aware that a state actor was the entity that contracted with a private party to lease the space. Finally, there is no risk of excessive government entanglement with religion. Accordingly, the court found no merit in plaintiffs' arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against the Secretary on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries who were placed into "observation status" by their hospitals rather than being admitted as "inpatients." Placement into "observation status" allegedly caused these beneficiaries to pay thousands of dollars more for their medical care. The district court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395, claims where plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the adequacy of the notices they received and nothing in the statute entitles plaintiffs to the process changes they seek. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Due Process claims where the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs lacked a property interest in being treated as "inpatients," because the district court accepted as true the Secretary's assertion that a hospital's decision to formally admit a patient is "a complex medical judgment" left to the doctor's discretion. The district court's conclusion constituted impermissible factfinding, which in any event is inconsistent with the complaint's allegations that the decision to admit is guided by fixed and objective criteria. View "Barrows v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner, as assignee of his brother's interest in the forfeited property ($50,000 in bail money), appealed the district court's denial of his motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983(e)(1). The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the assignment was invalid because the forfeiture had been completed and all interest in the property had vested in the United States at the time of the assignment. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the Act permits any person with an interest in forfeited property to file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture after the forfeiture has occurred on grounds of lack of notice. The court also concluded that the assignment of petitioner's brother's interest to him was valid under New York law. View "Lucas v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of New York State's requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend public school. The statute provides two exemptions from the immunization mandate: a medical exemption and a religious exemption. Rejecting plaintiffs' substantive due process, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and Ninth Amendment challenges, the court concluded that the statute and regulation are a constitutionally permissible exercise of the State's police power and do not infringe on the free exercise of religion. The court further concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are either meritless or waived. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Phillips v. City of New York" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' request for tuition assistance for their daughter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the State Review Officer's (SRO) decision to deny reimbursement for private schooling and the district court reversed in part and ordered the school district to reimburse plaintiffs for May 1, 2009 to May 31, 2009, and for the 2009-2010 school year. Because the court deferred to the SRO's determination that plaintiffs did not meet their obligation to demonstrate the appropriateness of their daughter's placement, plaintiffs cannot recover under the IDEA for any portion of the time she was placed at Family Foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of an order affirming the SRO's decision. View "Hardison v. Bd. of Ed. Oneonta City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Intervenors, a group of police unions, challenged the ruling of the district court that the City of New York's "stop-and-frisk" policy was carried out in a discriminatory manner, as well as its imposition of various reforms to that policy. These cases were previously ordered to be reassigned to a different district court judge. The new district judge denied the unions' motion to intervene in these cases and the unions appeal. At issue was whether public-sector unions may intervene into a litigation where the actual parties to that litigation, including a newly-elected mayoral administration, have agreed to a settlement. The court held that the unions' motions to intervene are untimely and do not assert an interest that the law seeks to protect; the unions knew, or should have known, of their alleged interests in these controversial and public cases well before they filed their motions; granting the unions' motions in the wake of the mayoral election would essentially condone a collateral attack on the democratic process and could erode the legitimacy of decisions made by the democratically-elected representatives of the people; and the unions' interests in their members' reputations and collective bargaining rights are, as a matter of law, too remote from the "subject of the action" to warrant intervention as a "party." View "Floyd v. City of New York" on Justia Law

This case concerns compliance reports regarding improving conditions in two correctional facilities under a settlement agreement between the United States and Erie County. The NYCLU sought to intervene in order to have the reports unsealed. The court held that the public's fundamental right of access to judicial documents, guaranteed by the First Amendment, was wrongly denied when the compliance reports in this case were sealed. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision and ordered that the judicial documents be unsealed.View "United States v. Erie County" on Justia Law

The FTC appealed the damages portion of a district court order granting in part the FTC's motion for contempt relating to defendants' violation of a Consent Order. The FTC argued that it was entitled to a presumption that consumers relied, when deciding to purchase defendants' products, on defendants' omissions and misrepresentations. Therefore, the FTC sought over $14 million in contempt damages, an amount equal to defendants' gross receipts. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the FTC may pursue recovery for contempt damages based on alleged violations of a Consent Order. The court agreed with the FTC and joined its sister circuits in holding that the FTC is entitled to a presumption of consumer reliance. Here, in the context of a contempt action arising out of violations of a promise to refrain from misrepresentations concerning material terms or omissions of material terms, the court held that the calculation of the appropriate measure of loss begins with defendants' gross receipts derived from such contumacious conduct. After the court uses defendants' gross receipts as a baseline for calculating damages, the court must permit defendants to put forth evidence showing that certain amounts should offset the sanctions assessed against them. The court vacated that portion of the district court's contempt order that has calculated damages and remanded for further proceedings.View "FTC v. BlueHippo, et al." on Justia Law