Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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In the early hours of August 21, 2017, the M/V ALNIC, a Liberian-flagged oil-and-chemical tanker, collided with the U.S.S. JOHN S. MCCAIN, a Navy destroyer, in the Singapore Strait. The collision resulted in the deaths of ten Navy sailors and injuries to dozens more. Both vessels sustained significant damage. Energetic Tank, Inc., the owner of ALNIC, sought exoneration from or limitation of liability for the collision. Forty-one Navy sailors or their representatives, along with the United States, filed claims for damages against Energetic. Energetic counterclaimed against the United States. The parties agreed on the monetary value of the damages to ALNIC and MCCAIN as $442,445 and $185 million, respectively.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that Singapore law would govern the determination of liability and the calculation of damages. After a Phase 1 bench trial, the district court denied Energetic’s petition for exoneration or limitation of liability, allocating 80% of the fault to the United States and 20% to Energetic. The court indicated it would proceed to a Phase 2 trial to determine damages to the Sailor-Claimants. Energetic appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the district court dismissed Energetic’s claims for contribution or indemnity against the United States for any damages awarded to the Sailor-Claimants, citing sovereign immunity. Energetic also appealed this order. The district court retroactively certified its earlier opinion on the apportionment of liability as a final judgment as to the United States. Several Sailor-Claimants cross-appealed, challenging the application of Singapore law to the calculation of damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no error in the district court’s apportionment of liability under Singapore law or its sovereign immunity ruling, affirming the district court’s judgment and order on Energetic’s appeals. However, the court dismissed the Sailor-Claimants’ cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction, as the choice-of-law ruling was a non-appealable collateral order. View "In the Matter of Energetic Tank, Inc." on Justia Law

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T.W., a Harvard Law School graduate with disabilities, sued the New York State Board of Law Examiners for denying her requested accommodations on the New York State bar exam in 2013 and 2014. She alleged violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. T.W. claimed that the Board's actions caused her to fail the bar exam twice, resulting in professional and financial harm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially denied the Board's motion to dismiss, finding that the Board had waived its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Board was immune from suit under Section 504. On remand, the district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss T.W.'s Title II claim, ruling that the Board was an "arm of the state" and entitled to sovereign immunity. The court also held that Title II did not abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity for money damages and that T.W. could not seek declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. It further concluded that Title II of the ADA does not validly abrogate sovereign immunity in the context of professional licensing. Additionally, the court found that the declaratory relief sought by T.W. was retrospective and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that the injunctive relief sought by T.W. was not sufficiently tied to an ongoing violation of federal law, making it unavailable under Ex parte Young. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of T.W.'s claims for compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. View "T.W. v. New York State Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law

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The case involves Amazon.com Services LLC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB alleged that Amazon committed an unfair labor practice by discharging an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity. While the charge was pending before the Board, the Board sought temporary injunctive relief, including the employee’s reinstatement. The district court found "reasonable cause" to believe Amazon committed an unfair labor practice in terminating the employee. However, it concluded that ordering Amazon to cease and desist from committing certain violations of the Act was "just and proper," but that ordering Amazon to reinstate the employee was not.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court did not adequately explain why the cease-and-desist order was just and proper, particularly in light of its conclusion that the employee’s reinstatement was not. Therefore, the injunction was vacated in part. The court noted that the district court's lack of explanation for granting the cease-and-desist order, coupled with its explicit, undisputed findings in rejecting the request to order the employee's reinstatement, cast serious doubt on the propriety of the cease-and-desist order. View "Poor v. Amazon.com Services LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves Travis Woods, a wheelchair user, who sued the Central New York Regional Transportation Authority and its subsidiary Centro of Oneida, Inc. (collectively, "Centro"), which operate the public bus service in Oneida County. Woods claimed that Centro violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide wheelchair-accessible bus stops. He argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Centro on his claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted summary judgment to Centro, dismissing Woods's complaint. The court found that Centro's paratransit service and its flexible pick-up and drop-off policy were reasonable accommodations providing meaningful access to Centro’s bus service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Woods's claims under sections 12147 and 12148 of the ADA failed as a matter of law. The court concluded that Woods had not shown that the altered portions of Centro’s bus stops were inaccessible or that Centro’s bus service was not readily accessible to individuals with disabilities. The court also found that Woods had not established that any modifications to Centro’s policies, practices, or procedures were necessary to avoid discrimination or to provide program access. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Woods v. Centro of Oneida, Inc." on Justia Law

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Chamma K. Brandon, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, filed a lawsuit against three prison officials. Brandon alleged that the officials violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by denying him a special meal in celebration of Eid al-Adha. He also claimed that one of the officials, Mark Royce, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by ordering that his housing block be constantly illuminated.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Brandon's First Amendment claim and denied Brandon's request to reopen discovery for a second time to permit expert testimony on his Eighth Amendment claim. Following a trial, a jury found that Royce had not violated Brandon's Eighth Amendment right.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with Brandon that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on his First Amendment claim. The court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Brandon had an alternative means of exercising his right to the free exercise of religion. The court also found that the penological concerns raised by the defendants did not support granting judgment as a matter of law in their favor. However, the court found no error in the district court's denial of Brandon's motion to reopen discovery. The court therefore vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court's decision. View "Brandon v. Royce" on Justia Law

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In 2021, New York enacted the Affordable Broadband Act (ABA), which required internet service providers to offer broadband internet to qualifying households at reduced prices. A group of trade organizations representing internet service providers sued, arguing that the ABA was preempted by federal law. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction barring New York from enforcing the ABA. The parties later requested that the district court enter a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the ABA was not field-preempted by the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996), because the Act does not establish a framework of rate regulation that is sufficiently comprehensive to imply that Congress intended to exclude the states from entering the field. The court also concluded that the ABA was not conflict-preempted by the Federal Communications Commission’s 2018 order classifying broadband as an information service. The court reasoned that the order stripped the agency of its authority to regulate the rates charged for broadband internet, and a federal agency cannot exclude states from regulating in an area where the agency itself lacks regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the permanent injunction. View "New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

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The case in question involves a defendant, Saba Rosario Ventura, who was initially detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after the District Court ordered his release on bail pending his criminal trial. The District Court later dismissed the indictment against Ventura, arguing that ICE had detained him in bad faith, aiming to circumvent the bail order. The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which previously remanded the case to the District Court to clarify whether it had found that ICE's detention of Ventura was a direct violation of a federal court order releasing him under the Bail Reform Act.On remand, the District Court reasserted its claim that ICE's detention of Ventura was pretextual and in bad faith, not for removal, but to detain him pending his criminal trial. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding no substantial evidence to support the District Court's assertion. The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court's finding was based on legal arguments rather than factual evidence. It also noted that, even if ICE disagreed with the District Court's assessment of Ventura's risk of flight, it was not enough to prove that ICE's detention was pretextual.The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the District Court's orders, concluding that the finding of ICE's pretextual and bad faith detention of Ventura was clearly erroneous, given the lack of factual evidence. View "United States v. Ventura" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute over the legality of an agreement between River 1, LLC, an American company, and Viking USA LLC, a subsidiary of a Swiss company, under federal maritime law. The United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) had confirmed the legality of the agreement as a "time charter" under 46 U.S.C. § 56101(a)(i). However, American Cruise Lines argued that the agreement should be construed as a "bareboat" charter which is not covered under the standing blanket approval of MARAD, and thus, grants a foreign company impermissible control of an American vessel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed MARAD's decision. It found that the agreement didn't grant Viking exclusive possession and control of the cruise ship in a way that blackletter maritime law recognizes as sufficient to create a bareboat charter. It noted that the ship's crew was provided by River 1, the vessel master was overseen by River 1, and River 1 bore primary responsibility for the ship’s day-to-day maintenance and care. Viking's ability to set the itinerary was consistent with the maritime law definition of a time charter.The court also rejected American Cruise Lines' allegations that MARAD failed to follow the notice and comment provisions applicable to this case. It concluded that MARAD fully complied with the new procedural requirements imposed by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021. View "American Cruise Lines v. United States of America" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard a case initiated by Adam Hart, who filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) against pharmaceutical distributor McKesson. Hart alleged that McKesson provided business management tools to its customers for free in exchange for commitments to purchase drugs, which he claimed violated the federal anti-kickback statute (AKS) and several analogous state laws. The district court dismissed Hart's FCA claim, determining he failed to allege McKesson acted "willfully" as required by the AKS.On appeal, the Second Circuit held that to act "willfully" under the AKS, a defendant must knowingly act in a way that is unlawful. The court found that Hart failed to provide sufficient facts to meet this standard. However, the court disagreed with the district court's assertion that Hart's state claims were premised solely on a violation of the federal AKS. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hart’s federal FCA claim, vacated the dismissal of the remaining state claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States, ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp." on Justia Law

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The case involves Brian Benjamin, a state senator in New York from 2017 to 2021, who was indicted on charges of federal funds bribery, honest services wire fraud, conspiracy to commit each of those offenses, and falsifying records. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed three of the charges on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an explicit quid pro quo between Benjamin and his campaign donor. The government appealed this decision.According to the allegations, Benjamin agreed to allocate state funds to a non-profit organization controlled by a real estate developer in his district, in exchange for campaign contributions. The developer was allegedly aware of the quid pro quo arrangement and proceeded to provide funds to Benjamin's campaign. Furthermore, Benjamin allegedly attempted to conceal this arrangement by falsifying campaign forms and providing false information during his background check when he was nominated to be lieutenant governor of New York.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that an explicit quid pro quo does not need to be expressly stated; it can be inferred from the official’s and the payor’s words and actions. The court concluded that the indictment sufficiently alleged an explicit quid pro quo, as it stated that Benjamin obtained campaign contributions in exchange for his agreement to use his official authority to obtain a state grant for a non-profit organization. Therefore, the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Benjamin" on Justia Law