Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that BOE is failing to provide them with meaningful access to its voting program, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132. The district court concluded that pervasive and recurring barriers existed at poll sites operated by BOE and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The district court later ordered a remedial plan after the parties had the opportunity to develop and propose a joint plan of relief. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that BOE failed to grant voters with disabilities meaningful access to its voting program. The court also found that the district court's remedial order was a proper exercise of the district court's authority to grant equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Disabled in Action, et al. v. Bd. of Elections in the City of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking documents related to the drone attacks that killed three United States citizens. Plaintiffs sought information concerning the attacks, notably, documents prepared by DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) setting forth the Government's reasoning as to the lawfulness of the attacks. The district court dismissed on motions for summary judgment. The court concluded that a redacted version of the OLC-DOD Memorandum must be disclosed; a redacted version of the classified Vaughn index submitted by OLC must be disclosed, including the number, title, and description of all documents, with the exception of certain listing numbers; [redacted]; the Glomar and "no number, no list" responses were insufficinetly justified; DOD and CIA must submit Vaughn indices to the District Court for in camera inspection and appropriate redaction; and the OIP search was sufficient. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "The New York Times Company v. United States" on Justia Law

The Board and School District appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Reg. I.Q. Reg. I.Q. governs the "extended use" of school facilities outside of school hours by outside organizations and individuals. The district court found that enforcement of Reg. I.Q. to exclude religious worship services would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The court concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle Bronx Household to a grant from the Board of a subsidized place to hold religious worship services; the Supreme Court's ruling in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that invidiously discriminatory ordinances targeting a religious practice of a particular religion were subject to strict scrutiny had no application to Reg. I.Q.; if the Board has a reasonable, good faith concern that making its school facilities available for the conduct of religious worship services would give rise to a substantial risk of violating the Establishment Clause, the permissibly of the Board's refusal to do so did not turn on whether such use of school facilities would in fact violate the Establishment Clause; and therefore, Reg. I.Q. did not violate plaintiffs' rights to free exercise of religion, whether or not it was subject to strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the district court erred in concluding that Reg. I.Q. violates the Establishment Clause because it compelled the Board to become excessively entangled with religion by deciding what were religious worship services. The court considered Bronx Household's other arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the injunction barring enforcement of Reg. I. Q. View "Bronx Household v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging, among other things, that defendants violated their First Amendment and substantive due process rights by closing down Royal Crown's day care facility in retaliation for a letter of complaint that Royal Crown sent to a New York State senator. On appeal, the individually named defendants challenged from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and from the denial of their motion to reconsider. The court concluded that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity solely because closing down Royal Crown may have been justified under the Health Code; defendants' motivation in closing down Royal Crown was material to Royal Crown's First Amendment and substantive due process claims and the court did not have jurisdiction to consider whether the dispute about defendants' motivation was genuine; properly assuming on this interlocutory appeal that defendants retaliated against Royal Crown for speech protected by the First Amendment, defendants' action was not objectively reasonable; Royal Crown's First Amendment and substantive due process rights to be free from retaliation and irrational government action in response to its letter to the Senator were clearly established at the time that defendants closed down plaintiff's day care facility; and therefore, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

After plaintiff sought to obtain records from the SSA related to his father's disability status in order to support his efforts to obtain proceeds of his father's life insurance policy, plaintiff filed suit pro se alleging that the failure to provide the requested records violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552. The SSA eventually voluntarily provided the requested records to plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his claim for damages and litigation fees under the Privacy Act and FOIA. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim for damages under the Privacy Act because the Act guarantees access only to an individual's own records and does not require federal agencies to provide information that pertains to a requesting individual, but is contained in another individual's records. However, because FOIA allows for fee shifting where, as here, a federal agency voluntarily complies with a requested disclosure following the filing of a FOIA lawsuit, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment denying plaintiff's request for $350 in litigation costs and remanded with instructions. View "Warren v. Colvin" on Justia Law

A Vermont statute requires all "health insurers" to file with the State reports containing claims data and other "information relating to health care." Liberty Mutual sought a declaration that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., preempted the Vermont statute and regulation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Vermont. The court held that the reporting requirements of the Vermont statute and regulation have a "connection with" ERISA plans and were therefore preempted as applied. The court's holding was supported by the principle that "reporting" is a core ERISA function shielded from potentially inconsistent and burdensome state regulation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Liberty Mutual. View "Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Donegan" on Justia Law

Starr, AIG's former principal shareholder, filed suit against the FRBNY for breach of fiduciary duty in its rescue of AIG during the fall 2008 financial crisis. The district court dismissed Starr's claims and Starr appealed. The suit challenged the extraordinary measures taken by FRBNY to rescue AIG from bankruptcy at the height of the direst financial crisis in modern times. In light of the direct conflict these measures created between the private duties imposed by Delaware fiduciary duty law and the public duties imposed by FRBNY's governing statutes and regulations, the court held that, in this suit, state fiduciary duty law was preempted by federal common law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Starr Int'l Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York" on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's grant of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Local Law 17. Local Law 17, inter alia, requires pregnancy services centers to make certain disclosures regarding the services that the centers provide. The court concluded that the law was not impermissibly vague; plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to one of the challenged disclosures, which requires pregnancy services centers to disclose if they have a licensed medical provider on staff; plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to other provisions challenged by plaintiffs that require other forms of disclosure and impermissibly compel speech; and because the provisions are severable, the court severed the enjoined provisions from the rest of Local Law 17. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "The Evergreen Association, Inc v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's order denying their Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the district court's judgment dismissing sovereign defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 1602 et seq. Plaintiffs moved for relief from judgment in order to appeal the district court's alternative ground for finding sovereign immunity - a ground that the court declined to reach in its prior opinion. The district court denied the motion under the impression that the court would be able to consider that unreviewed issue on appeal from the denial. But the court could not. Accordingly, the court concluded that this was an error of law and that "extraordinary circumstances" existed warranting relief under Rule 60(b). The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to NYPD Interim Order 52 (IO-52). IO-52 requires the administration of a breathalyzer test to any officer whose discharge of his firearm within New York City resulted in death or injury to any person. The court concluded that the immediate objectives of IO-52 testing were personnel management of, and public confidence in, the NYPD; the identified objectives qualified as "special needs" for purposes of Fourth Amendment reasonableness review because they were distinct from normal law enforcement concerns and incompatible with the warrant and probable cause requirements for law enforcement searches; and the special needs greatly outweighed officers' reduced expectation of privacy with respect to alcohol testing at the time of any firearms discharge causing death or personal injury, thereby rendering warrantless, suspicionless IO-52 testing constitutionally reasonable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to the NYPD on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenge to IO-52. View "Lynch v. City of New York" on Justia Law