Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of this qui tam action and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual members - including a former general counsel to defendant - and its outside counsel from bringing a subsequent qui tam action on the basis that the suit was brought in violation of the general counsel's ethical obligations under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. The court concluded that the attorney, through his conduct in this qui tam action, did violate N.Y. Rule 1.9(c) which prohibited lawyers from using confidential information of a former client protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client. The court held that the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint as to all defendants, and disqualifying plaintiff, its individual relators, and its outside counsel on the basis that such measures were necessary to avoid prejudicing defendants in any subsequent litigation on these facts. View "Fair Labor Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Although several claims of error asserted by claimant were without merit, the court acted nostra sponte in holding that the district court's application of legal standards antedating adoption of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. 983, constituted plain error and affected claimant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Pellegrino" on Justia Law

Press intervenors appealed the district court's decision denying them access to court proceedings and a sealed internal police document (Report) and continuing to redact parts of hearing transcripts. The court concluded that the district court erred by declining to order release of the full transcript of the contempt hearing, but that given the minimal relevance of portions of the Report that were not testified to at the contempt hearing to the substance of that proceeding, the Report did not become a judicial document to which the First Amendment right applied. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to the Report, reversed as to the hearing transcript; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Newsday v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit to contest a wage freeze imposed in 2011 on Nassau County employees by the Nassau Interim Finance Authority (NIFA). The police unions contended that the wage freeze was imposed in violation of the Contracts Clause, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, and that the authority conferred on NIFA to impose such a freeze had expired under the terms of the applicable statute, N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law 3669(3). The district court granted summary judgment to the police unions on their state law claim without reaching the constitutional question. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the district judge should have declined to reach the pendant state law claim, which required it to interpret, as a matter of first impression, an important state legislative scheme to prevent the fiscal demise of Nassau County. View "Carver v. Nassau County Interim Finance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, representative of the estate of her deceased son, filed suit against the City of New York, police officers, and others, alleging that they were liable for her son's death. A jury found in favor of defendants. The court held that, where a municipality acted in a governmental capacity, a plaintiff could not recover without proving that the municipality owed a "special duty" to the injured party. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a special relationship, and where the plaintiff failed to meet this burden, the analysis ended and liability could not be imputed to the municipality that acted in a governmental capacity. The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance was irrelevant to the analysis and the existence of a special relationship was a question of law that could be properly submitted to the jury. In this instance, the court found no error entitling plaintiff to a new trial and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Velez v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Time Warner petitioned for review of the FCC's 2011 order promulgated under section 616(a)(3) and (5) of the Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act), as amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act), 47 U.S.C. 536(a)(3), (5). Section 616(a)(3) and (5) and that part of the 2011 Order establishing the standard for demonstrating a prima facie violation of these statutory provisions (the program carriage regime) were intended to curb anticompetitive behavior by limiting the circumstances under which a distributor of video programming could discriminate against unaffiliated networks that provided such programming. The court concluded that the program carriage regime did not violate the First Amendment where its case-specific standards for identifying affiliation-based discrimination served important government interests in promoting competition and diversity in an industry still posing serious competitive risks and were narrowly tailored not to burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests. The court concluded, however, that the 2011 Order was substantive and therefore subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Because the FCC failed to comply with such requirements, the court granted the petition for review insofar as it raised an APA challenge. View "Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Department imposed penalties on plaintiffs for their violation of a New York law that taxes the sale of cigarettes and provides for the issuance of tax stamps evidencing payment of the required taxes. On appeal, the Department challenged a permanent injunction issued by the district court forbidding it from imposing penalties on plaintiffs under N.Y. Tax Law 481(1)(b)(i). The court concluded that the district court was barred by the comity doctrine from granting injunctive and declaratory relief to plaintiffs because such relief would interfere with the state's administration of its tax laws; the district court erred in finding that section 481(1)(b)(i) constituted a criminal penalty; and, instead, the court concluded that section 481(1)(b)(i) provided for a civil penalty and plaintiffs therefore did not suffer double jeopardy when the Department imposed the penalties on them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the suit with prejudice. View "Abuzaid, et al. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law