Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when the Department imposed penalties on plaintiffs for their violation of a New York law that taxes the sale of cigarettes and provides for the issuance of tax stamps evidencing payment of the required taxes. On appeal, the Department challenged a permanent injunction issued by the district court forbidding it from imposing penalties on plaintiffs under N.Y. Tax Law 481(1)(b)(i). The court concluded that the district court was barred by the comity doctrine from granting injunctive and declaratory relief to plaintiffs because such relief would interfere with the state's administration of its tax laws; the district court erred in finding that section 481(1)(b)(i) constituted a criminal penalty; and, instead, the court concluded that section 481(1)(b)(i) provided for a civil penalty and plaintiffs therefore did not suffer double jeopardy when the Department imposed the penalties on them. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the suit with prejudice. View "Abuzaid, et al. v. Woodward" on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that two federal law enforcement officers caused the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress when they maliciously and falsely testified before a federal grand jury about his involvement in a drug conspiracy. Although the court disagreed with the district court about the need to evaluate the possible ambiguity of section 2674, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that, in FTCA suits, the United States could assert common law defenses available to private individuals under relevant state law. The court also concluded that, were Connecticut courts to consider the matter, they would find statements made under oath by federal grand jury witnesses to be privileged. View "Vidro v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States brought suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination in the hiring of New York City firefighters. On appeal, the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta challenged the district court's order issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters. Intervenors cross-appealed a partial final judgment dismissing their federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta. The City, inter alia, sought review of an order granting Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim. The court concluded that (1) summary judgment was improperly entered on Intervenors' disparate treatment claims; (2) the federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg were properly dismissed, as were the state law claims against Commissioner Scopetta, but the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta should be reinstated; (3) most portions of the injunction based on the unchallenged disparate impact finding were within the district court's remedial discretion, but other portions, particularly those portions based on the improper discriminatory treatment ruling, exceeded that discretion; and (4) on remand, the bench trial on the liability phase of the disparate treatment claim against the City should be reassigned to a different district judge. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Steel institute appealed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of its complaint, which alleged that the City's regulation of cranes and other hoisting equipment was preempted by federal law. The court granted some weight to OSHA's view in reaching its conclusion that local regulatory schemes such as the City's crane regulations have the aim and primary effect of regulating conduct to secure the safety of the general public, rather than the safety of workers in the workplace. Therefore, the City's crane regulations were saved from preemption as laws of general applicability and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Steel Institute of New York v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After defendant, a developer, had not furnished a "printed property report," as required by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ISLA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., plaintiff claimed that their contract to purchase a condominium unit from defendant was voidable. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. At issue was whether a single-floor condominium unit in a multi-story building was a "lot," thus triggering the disclosure and reporting requirements of the ISLA. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Urban Development (HUD) promulgated a rule defining the term "lot" to require the "exclusive use of... land," and, in turn, interpreted the term "land" to mean "realty," thus applying ILSA's requirements to condominium units in multi-story buildings. Because "land" could be used as a term of art meaning "realty," the court held that CFPB and HUD have reasonably interpreted their own definition of the term "lot." Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Further, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees. View "Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of the United States' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints against the SEC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs also appealed from the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs sought to hold the United States liable for SEC employees' failure to detect Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme and for the financial losses that plaintiffs claimed they suffered as a result. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, finding that the SEC's actions, along with its regrettable inaction, were shielded by the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). View "Molchatsky, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a participant in the Justice Department's Witness Security Program, brought suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that he was terminated from the Program without being afforded procedural due process. Plaintiff also alleged that following his termination he was placed in a Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) for 188 days and that this confinement violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim concerning his termination based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 18 U.S.C. 3521(f). However, with respect to SHU detention, the district court should have sua sponte granted plaintiff leave to replead before sua sponte dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. T'Kash" on Justia Law