Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that two federal law enforcement officers caused the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress when they maliciously and falsely testified before a federal grand jury about his involvement in a drug conspiracy. Although the court disagreed with the district court about the need to evaluate the possible ambiguity of section 2674, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that, in FTCA suits, the United States could assert common law defenses available to private individuals under relevant state law. The court also concluded that, were Connecticut courts to consider the matter, they would find statements made under oath by federal grand jury witnesses to be privileged. View "Vidro v. United States" on Justia Law

The United States brought suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination in the hiring of New York City firefighters. On appeal, the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta challenged the district court's order issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters. Intervenors cross-appealed a partial final judgment dismissing their federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta. The City, inter alia, sought review of an order granting Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim. The court concluded that (1) summary judgment was improperly entered on Intervenors' disparate treatment claims; (2) the federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg were properly dismissed, as were the state law claims against Commissioner Scopetta, but the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta should be reinstated; (3) most portions of the injunction based on the unchallenged disparate impact finding were within the district court's remedial discretion, but other portions, particularly those portions based on the improper discriminatory treatment ruling, exceeded that discretion; and (4) on remand, the bench trial on the liability phase of the disparate treatment claim against the City should be reassigned to a different district judge. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Steel institute appealed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissal of its complaint, which alleged that the City's regulation of cranes and other hoisting equipment was preempted by federal law. The court granted some weight to OSHA's view in reaching its conclusion that local regulatory schemes such as the City's crane regulations have the aim and primary effect of regulating conduct to secure the safety of the general public, rather than the safety of workers in the workplace. Therefore, the City's crane regulations were saved from preemption as laws of general applicability and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Steel Institute of New York v. City of New York" on Justia Law

After defendant, a developer, had not furnished a "printed property report," as required by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ISLA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., plaintiff claimed that their contract to purchase a condominium unit from defendant was voidable. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. At issue was whether a single-floor condominium unit in a multi-story building was a "lot," thus triggering the disclosure and reporting requirements of the ISLA. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Urban Development (HUD) promulgated a rule defining the term "lot" to require the "exclusive use of... land," and, in turn, interpreted the term "land" to mean "realty," thus applying ILSA's requirements to condominium units in multi-story buildings. Because "land" could be used as a term of art meaning "realty," the court held that CFPB and HUD have reasonably interpreted their own definition of the term "lot." Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Further, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees. View "Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of the United States' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints against the SEC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs also appealed from the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs sought to hold the United States liable for SEC employees' failure to detect Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme and for the financial losses that plaintiffs claimed they suffered as a result. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, finding that the SEC's actions, along with its regrettable inaction, were shielded by the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). View "Molchatsky, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a participant in the Justice Department's Witness Security Program, brought suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that he was terminated from the Program without being afforded procedural due process. Plaintiff also alleged that following his termination he was placed in a Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) for 188 days and that this confinement violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim concerning his termination based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 18 U.S.C. 3521(f). However, with respect to SHU detention, the district court should have sua sponte granted plaintiff leave to replead before sua sponte dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. T'Kash" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of a letter written by the FAA to the City of New York which endorsed a series of recommendations made by a panel of experts regarding the impact of a proposed marine trash-transfer facility on safe airport operations at LaGuardia Airport. The court held that, because the letter was not a final order for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 46110(a), the court was without jurisdiction to review it and, therefore, dismissed the petition. View "Paskar v. USDOT" on Justia Law

The County appealed from a judgment of the district court finding that the County was in violation of its duty to promote source-of-income legislation under a Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal (consent decree) entered into by the County with the United States to resolve a qui tam action initially brought by relator, ADC, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging the submission of false claims by the County to HUD in order to obtain federal grant monies for fair housing. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the reviewing magistrate judge under the consent decree. On the merits, the court held that the County violated the terms of the consent decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Westchester County, New York" on Justia Law

FHFA, as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued UBS for fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgage-backed securities. The district court denied UBS's motion to dismiss and certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the "extender statute" in section 4617(b)(12) of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, applied to this action, and thus concluded that the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for untimeliness. The court further held that FHFA had standing to bring this action and the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Federal Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc." on Justia Law

Livecchi appealed from an amended judgment of the district court following partial summary judgment in favor of the government's equity-skimming claim (Livecchi I), and a subsequent bench trial rejecting Levecchi's counterclaim for recoupment and granting the government's application for double damages and prejudgment interest (Levecchi II). The court concluded that Livecchi's interpretation of the equity-skimming statute was inconsistent with the statute's clear purpose; the government's authority to foreclose on a HUD-insured mortgage could not preclude the government from subsequently recovering assets or rental income retained in violation of a related regulatory agreement; as for the limitations period, Levecchi failed to establish that HUD had any knowledge of his equity skimming prior to August 21, 2000, the date HUD first acquired Levecchi's financial records; and therefore, the court affirmed the amended judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Livecchi" on Justia Law