Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

The City of New York ("City") brought suit against defendants, retail firearms dealers located in South Carolina and Georgia, alleging public nuisance on the theory that they intentionally or negligently sold firearms in a manner susceptible to illegal trafficking to the City. After engaging in litigation with the City for several years, each defendant defaulted and upon entry of default judgment, the district court issued permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants from further violations of the law and required them to undergo supervision by court-appointed special master. At issue was whether a default judgment should have been entered; whether the default judgment was, in any event, void for lack of personal jurisdiction over each defendant; and, in the alternative, that the injunctions violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) or are unconstitutional. The court held that defendants' withdrawal from the district court proceedings justified the entry of default, followed by default judgment; that defendants forfeited their defense of lack of personal jurisdiction; and that the default judgment was not void. The court also held that the injunctions issued by the district court violated Rule 65(d) and therefore vacated the injunctions and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants, corrections officers at Queens Private Correctional Facility ("QPCF"), appealed from convictions of conspiracy to obstruct justice, attempted intimidation and corrupt persuasion, and making false statements when defendants submitted false reports of an investigation involving the use of excessive force to an inmate. At issue was whether an internal investigation, by a privately owned prison that housed federal prisoners, of an allegation of excessive force involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The court found no basis to reverse defendants' convictions for obstruction of justice under section 18 U.S.C. 1519 and held that QPCF's internal investigation into whether the defendants' conduct violated QPCF's internal regulations involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the DOJ for purposes of section 1519.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.

Plaintiffs, four taxi cab drivers and the New York Taxi Workers Alliance ("Alliance"), sued the City of New York and its Taxi and Limousine Commission when plaintiffs' licenses to drive taxi cabs was automatically suspended without a hearing when plaintiffs were arrested on criminal charges. At issue is whether the Alliance has standing where it has expended resources to assist its members who face summary suspension by providing initial counseling and making an effort to explain the urgency of the situation to criminal defense lawyers. Also at issue was whether a pre-suspension hearing was required to comport with due process and whether a post-deprivation hearing comported with due process. The court held that the Alliance had standing even if only a few suspended drivers were counseled by the Alliance where it experienced a "perceptible impairment" sufficient to demonstrate an "injury in fact" and the Alliance had an interest specific to it that was independent of individual drivers. The court also held that a pre-suspension hearing was not required after weighing the three factors in the Mathews test and that the factual record was inadequate to permit summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the post-deprivation hearing was insufficient to provide due process.