Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are U.S. service members wounded in terrorist attacks in Iraq and the families and estates of service members killed in such attacks. They appealed from the dismissal of their claims under the Antiterrorism Act (the “ATA”) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (the “JASTA”), against various financial institutions in the United States and abroad (the “Banks”). As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the Banks conspired with and aided and abetted Iranian entities to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and channel funds to terrorist groups that killed or injured U.S. service members. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims primarily because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead a direct connection between the Banks and the terrorist groups. The district court also declined to consider Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims because they were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.   The Second Circuit explained that while it disagreed with the district court’s primary reason for dismissing Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims, it affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the Banks conspired – either directly or indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service members were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs forfeited their JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims by raising them for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. View "Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC" on Justia Law

Yale New Haven Hospital (“YNHH”) receives federal funds under the Medicare Act. As part of the statutory formula for determining appropriate funding, the Medicare Act directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) to “estimate” the “amount of uncompensated care” that each hospital will provide to indigent patients in a given federal fiscal year (“FFY”). Here, YNHH contended that the Secretary failed to conduct adequate notice-and-comment rulemaking before choosing to use only YNHH’s historical data – and not that of a hospital that had recently merged into YNHH – to estimate YNHH’s amount of uncompensated care for FFY 2014. The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C Section 1395ww(r)(3), which prohibits “judicial review” of “[a]ny estimate of the Secretary.” The district court denied the Secretary’s motion, reasoning that section 1395ww(r)(3) applies only to substantive challenges to estimates, but not to procedural challenges like YNHH’s. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of YNHH.   The Secretary appealed, disputing (1) the district court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider YNHH’s procedural challenge, and alternatively (2) the district court’s merits ruling that the Secretary’s estimate was procedurally unlawful.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Secretary’s motion to dismiss YNHH’s procedural challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; vacated, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for YNHH on its procedural challenge; REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the remainder of YNHH’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and dismissed YNHH’s cross-appeal disputing the district court’s chosen remedy. View "Yale New Haven Hosp. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought various claims against Rockland County ("Rockland County Defendants") officials including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of public assembly. The district court granted summary judgment for Rockland County Defendants.The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Plainitffs' claim raises numerous disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. View "M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought a petition seeking review of a final order issued on December 31, 2020 by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission found the phrase “stored in tiers” in the second sentence of 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.176(b) did not apply to pallets of merchandise located in a Walmart Distribution Center in Johnstown, New York.   The Secretary argued that the Commission erred in finding Section 11 1910.176(b) inapplicable to Walmart’s tiered storage system because it unambiguously includes material placed or arranged one above another in tiered storage racks, such as the system used at the Distribution Center. Alternatively, the Secretary also argued that if the Court found the regulation ambiguous, the Court should defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded finding that the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation was reasonable. The court explained that the Commission’s cramped definition ignores other types of tiers, including seating arrangements at sporting events and music venues with layers of seats that are independently supported and placed one over the other with gaps between them. There is nothing inconsistent in the remaining language of the standard that militates against an interpretation that shelves can be tiers. Here, the pallets stored on the selective racking became unstable and merchandise on the pallets fell. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Secretary’s competing interpretation of the language of the standard is reasonable. View "Martin J. Walsh v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Donald J. Trump and Movant-Appellant the United States of America appealed from a district court’s judgment denying their motion to substitute the United States in this action pursuant to the Westfall Act of 1988. On appeal, Appellants argued that substitution is warranted because the President of the United States is a covered government employee under the Westfall Act, and because Trump had acted within the scope of his employment when he made the allegedly defamatory statements denying Plaintiff-Appellee’s 2019 sexual assault allegations.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the President of the United States is not an employee of the government under the Westfall Act. And the court vacated the district court’s judgment that Trump did not act within the scope of his employment, and certified that question to the D.C. Court of Appeals.   The court certified the following question: Under the laws of the District, were the allegedly libelous public statements made, during his term in office, by the President of the United States, denying allegations of misconduct, with regards to events prior to that term of office, within the scope of his employment as President of the United States? View "E. Jean Carroll v. Donald J. Trump" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted the Government’s application for writs of garnishment seeking access to Defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. Defendant appealed. 
 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes garnishment of Defendant’s 401(k) retirement funds. The court remanded to the district court, however, to determine whether the ten-percent early withdrawal tax will be imposed upon garnishment, limiting the Government’s access to Defendant’s retirement funds. The court also held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25-percent cap on garnishments does not apply to limit the Government’s garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law

Appellees hold a Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on that judgment, Appellees moved for a writ of execution against the assets of Kuwait Finance House (KFH) Malaysia in district court. The district court granted the writ before making any findings as to whether KFH Malaysia is an “agency or instrumentality” of Iran or whether the assets at issue are “blocked.” The primary issue on appeal is whether the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) permits those assets to be executed prior to such findings.   The Second Circuit denied Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal, denied KFH Malaysia’s petition for a writ of mandamus, vacated the order granting the writ of execution, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained to be entitled to attachment or execution under the TRIA a plaintiff must first establish defendant’s status as an agency or instrumentality. Here, these procedures were not followed. Article 52 permits parties to commence turnover proceedings to enforce money judgments. Below, that turnover proceeding commenced, but the district court granted the relief sought in that proceeding—a writ of execution—before it considered the antecedent issue of whether KFH Malaysia is an agency or instrumentality of Iran or whether the assets at issue are “blocked.” Without such findings, there has been no showing that KFH Malaysia is in possession of property. Accordingly, Appellees failed to meet the statutory and, and consequently, they failed to establish that they were entitled to a writ of execution. View "Christine Levinson et al. v. Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pfizer, Inc. brought an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2), challenging an advisory opinion issued by the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General ("HHS OIG"). Pfizer produces and sells a drug called tafamidis that treats a rare, progressive heart condition known as transthyretin amyloid cardiomyopathy. To make the expensive treatment more affordable, Pfizer proposed a Direct Copay Assistance Program, through which Pfizer would directly cover the cost of a patient's co-pay for tafamidis.    HHS OIG issued an advisory opinion stating that the Direct Copay Assistance Program would violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. Section  1320a-7b(b)(2)(B). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, rejecting Pfizer's argument that liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute requires an element of "corrupt" intent.   The Second Circuit affirmed the decision holding that the agency’s interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statute is not contrary to law. Specifically, the court explained that it has no doubt that hat at least some kind of quid pro quo, direct or indirect, exists here. However, the court does not think it is the case that every quid pro quo is inherently corrupt. Thus, while Pfizer relies heavily on two cases to argue that the word "induce" implies corruption. Neither supports its position. View "Pfizer, Inc. v. HHS" on Justia Law