Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing claims against Defendants, challenging Public Act 21-6, which revised the Connecticut General Statutes to repeal religious exemptions from state immunization requirements for schoolchildren, college and university students, and childcare participants. Plaintiffs are two organizations and three individuals who allege that the Act violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and other federal constitutional and statutory guarantees. The district court granted the motions of Defendants to dismiss certain of Plaintiffs’ claims against the state agencies as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, to dismiss the organizational Plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing, and to dismiss all counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court explained the district court's distinction between "special services" and "special education" was overly strict. The IDEA and its associated regulations do not use the phrase "special services." A reasonable inference from the allegation that Plaintiff’s son suffers from "a speech and learning disorder for which he now receives special services," combined with the allegation that he "is disabled within the meaning of the IDEA," is that the "special services" the complaint mentions constitute "special education" rather than "related services." Therefore, the court concluded that because the district court parsed the complaint too restrictively, failing to draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the court erred when it found Plaintiff had not stated a plausible claim for relief under the IDEA. The court, therefore, vacated this portion of the judgment. View "We The Patriots USA, Inc. et al. v. Conn. Office of Early Childhood Dev." on Justia Law

Third-Party Plaintiff Dynasty Healthcare, LLC, a medical billing firm, claimed that a Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) negligently processed and misclassified the enrollment and payment application of one of Dynasty’s clients, a medical services supplier, and that. As a result, the client was underpaid for providing Medicare services. When the client sued Dynasty for the error, Dynasty sued the MAC, blaming it for the error. The district court dismissed Dynasty’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Dynasty failed to pursue administrative channels through the United  States Department of Health and Human Services before seeking judicial review. At issue on appeal is whether Dynasty’s claims “arise under” the Medicare Act, such that the administrative channeling requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 14 Section 405(h) applies; and second, if so, whether the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction based on a narrow exception to the  Medicare Act’s jurisdiction stripping provision recognized in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the claims arise under the Medicare Act and that the Illinois Council exception does not apply to these claims. The court explained that Dynasty is not entitled to the exception because Retina’s financial interests in the claims alleged in this case were aligned with Dynasty’s interests at all relevant times, and Retina had both the incentive and the ability to seek administrative review. That Retina pursued a different course is irrelevant to the court's analysis under Illinois Council’s “objective inquiry.” View "Dynasty Healthcare, LLC v. Nat'l Gov't Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP”) appealed from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing its putative class action against Defendant Hereford Insurance Company (“Hereford”) and denying leave to amend. MSP has brought several lawsuits around the country seeking to recover from insurance companies that allegedly owe payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations (“MAOs”) under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (the “MSP Act”). In the putative class action brought here, MSP charges Hereford with “deliberate and systematic avoidance” of Hereford’s reimbursement obligations under the MSP Act.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that MSP lacked standing because its allegations do not support an inference that it has suffered a cognizable injury or that the injury it claims is traceable to Hereford. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied MSP leave to amend based on MSP’s repeated failures to cure. The court explained that the plain language of Section 111 provides that when a no-fault insurance provider such as Hereford reports a claim pursuant to Section 111, it does not thereby admit that it is liable for the claim. The statutory context of the section’s reporting obligation and the purpose of the reporting obligation confirms the correctness of this interpretation. Because MSP’s argument that the payments made by EmblemHealth are reimbursable by Hereford rests entirely on its proposed interpretation of Section 111, MSP has not adequately alleged a “concrete” or “actual” injury or that the injury it alleges is fairly traceable to Hereford. View "MSP v. Hereford" on Justia Law

The Evergreen Association brought an action against New York officials, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of New York Labor Law Sec. 203-e, which prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees for their reproductive health decisions. Evergreen claimed that Sec. 203-e unconstitutionally burdens its right to freedom of expressive association, preventing it from employees who seek abortions. The district court granted the New York defendants' motion to dismiss, and Evergreen appealed.On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evergreen's claims that Sec. 203-e violates its right to freedom of speech, violates its right to the free exercise of religion, and is impermissibly vague. However, the court reversed Evergreen's claim that the statute violates its freedom of expressive association. More specifically, the panel held that the district court should have applied strict scrutiny. Because the state did not show that Sec. 203-e is the least restrictive means to achieve its governmental interest, the panel reversed on this issue alone. View "Slattery v. Hochul" on Justia Law

Yale New Haven Hospital (“YNHH”) receives federal funds under the Medicare Act. As part of the statutory formula for determining appropriate funding, the Medicare Act directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the “Secretary”) to “estimate” the “amount of uncompensated care” that each hospital will provide to indigent patients in a given federal fiscal year (“FFY”). Here, YNHH contended that the Secretary failed to conduct adequate notice-and-comment rulemaking before choosing to use only YNHH’s historical data – and not that of a hospital that had recently merged into YNHH – to estimate YNHH’s amount of uncompensated care for FFY 2014. The Secretary moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C Section 1395ww(r)(3), which prohibits “judicial review” of “[a]ny estimate of the Secretary.” The district court denied the Secretary’s motion, reasoning that section 1395ww(r)(3) applies only to substantive challenges to estimates, but not to procedural challenges like YNHH’s. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of YNHH.   The Secretary appealed, disputing (1) the district court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to consider YNHH’s procedural challenge, and alternatively (2) the district court’s merits ruling that the Secretary’s estimate was procedurally unlawful.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the Secretary’s motion to dismiss YNHH’s procedural challenge for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; vacated, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court’s grant of summary judgment for YNHH on its procedural challenge; REMAND the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the remainder of YNHH’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and dismissed YNHH’s cross-appeal disputing the district court’s chosen remedy. View "Yale New Haven Hosp. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought various claims against Rockland County ("Rockland County Defendants") officials including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of public assembly. The district court granted summary judgment for Rockland County Defendants.The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Plainitffs' claim raises numerous disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment. View "M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health" on Justia Law

Class members are Medicare Part A beneficiaries who are formally admitted to a hospital as "inpatients" before their subsequent reclassification as outpatients receiving "observation services." Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Secretary violated their due process rights by declining to provide them with an administrative review process for the reclassification decision. The district court entered an injunction ordering the creation of such a process.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the named plaintiff had standing by demonstrating that they suffered a financial injury as a result of being reclassified as receiving observations services; the failure of the Secretary to provide an appeals process for the reclassification decision implicates the same set of concerns—namely, a loss of Part A coverage—for both the named plaintiffs and the absent class members; and the litigation incentives are sufficiently aligned so that the named plaintiffs can properly assert claims on behalf of those class members who will be hospitalized in the future. The court also concluded that the district court properly certified the plaintiff class and that the class satisfies the commonality and typicality requirements. Furthermore, the plaintiff class was properly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by finding that plaintiffs' due process rights are violated by the current administrative procedures available to Medicare beneficiaries. In this case, plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Secretary violates their due process rights when utilization review committees reclassify them from inpatients to those receiving observation services without providing a mechanism to appeal that decision. View "Barrows v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for damages for violation of section 18(2)(e) of the New York Public Health Law, which provides that health care providers may impose only a "reasonable charge," not to exceed "seventy-five cents per page," for copies of medical records. In its answer to a certified question of law from the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that no private right of action lies for violations of section 18(2)(e). Accordingly, dismissal was proper. View "Ortiz v. Ciox Health LLC" on Justia Law

Teachers and school administrators challenge the denial of motions to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of an order issued by the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene mandating that individuals who work in New York City schools be vaccinated against the COVID-19 virus.The Second Circuit concluded that the Vaccine Mandate does not violate the First Amendment on its face. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs have established their entitlement to preliminary relief on the narrow ground that the procedures employed to assess their religious accommodation claims were likely constitutionally infirm as applied to them. The court explained that the Accommodation Standards as applied here were neither neutral nor generally applicable to plaintiffs, and thus the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis at this stage of the proceeding. The court concluded that these procedures cannot survive strict scrutiny because denying religious accommodations based on the criteria outlined in the Accommodation Standards, such as whether an applicant can produce a letter from a religious official, is not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing the spread of COVID-19. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's orders denying preliminary relief and concurred with and continued the interim relief granted by the motions panel as to these fifteen individual plaintiffs. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Kane v. De Blasio" on Justia Law

New York’s “Prevention of COVID-19 transmission” Rule, issued in August 2021, directs hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, adult care facilities, and other healthcare entities to “continuously require” certain employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. It establishes a medical exemption to the requirement, but—consistent with New York’s prior vaccination requirements for healthcare workers—does not include an exemption based on religious belief. The Rule permits, but does not require, employers to make other accommodations for individuals who choose not to be vaccinated based on their sincere religious beliefs.The plaintiffs, primarily healthcare workers, challenged the Rule, claiming that being vaccinated would violate their religious beliefs because the vaccines were developed or produced using cell lines derived from cells obtained from voluntarily aborted fetuses. One district court enjoined the Rule insofar as it prevented healthcare workers from being eligible for a religious exemption; the other denied relief.The Second Circuit rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims. With respect to the Free Exercise claim, they have not established that they are likely to prove that the Rule is not a neutral law of general applicability or that it does not satisfy rational basis review. Nor have they demonstrated a likelihood of success on their Supremacy Clause claim; they have not shown that it would likely be impossible for employers to comply with both the Rule and Title VII. The Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that the Rule contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. View "We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul" on Justia Law