Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Roger Alberto Lainez was born in El Salvador in 1970 to parents who never married. He and his mother immigrated to the United States in 1979 as lawful permanent residents, and his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1985. Lainez's father never naturalized and did not participate in raising him. Lainez faced removal proceedings due to convictions for several crimes, including robbery and burglary.In 2009, the government initiated removal proceedings against Lainez, citing his aggravated felony convictions and crimes involving moral turpitude. Lainez, representing himself, claimed U.S. citizenship derived from his mother's naturalization. In 2012, an Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected his citizenship claim and ordered his removal. Lainez did not appeal but later sought a certificate of citizenship, which was denied. In 2017, Lainez filed a complaint in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment of U.S. citizenship, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized his nonfrivolous citizenship claim and suggested he seek to reopen his immigration case. Lainez filed a motion to reconsider or reopen the proceedings in 2020, which the IJ denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 2021.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Lainez's paternity was not "established by legitimation" under former § 321(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court determined that El Salvador's 1983 constitution, which equalized the rights of children regardless of their parents' marital status, did not establish Lainez's paternity by legitimation. Consequently, Lainez derived U.S. citizenship from his mother's naturalization. The court granted Lainez's petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to terminate the removal proceedings. View "Lainez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2017, Gladys Eudosia Toalombo Yanez, a native and citizen of Ecuador, was placed in removal proceedings for entering the United States without inspection. She conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her deportation would cause "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to her U.S. citizen children. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied her application, finding that she did not meet the burden of proving the required level of hardship. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the evidence did not demonstrate the necessary hardship.Toalombo Yanez appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the BIA's hardship determination was not supported by the evidence and that the BIA retroactively applied a new legal standard to her case. Initially, the government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over these issues. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, the government conceded that the court had jurisdiction to review the agency's hardship determination and the retroactivity claim.The Second Circuit held that the appropriate standard of review for the hardship determination is clear error. Upon review, the court found that the agency did not err in concluding that Toalombo Yanez failed to demonstrate the required hardship for cancellation of removal. The court also reviewed the retroactivity claim de novo and concluded that the BIA did not impermissibly retroactively apply any new rules. Therefore, the Second Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Yanez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A man was accused in Ecuador of repeatedly sexually abusing his partner’s ten-year-old daughter over the course of a year, beginning in August 2016. The alleged abuse included digital penetration and other sexual acts, accompanied by threats to the victim and her family. After the allegations surfaced, the man fled to the United States in 2018. Ecuador requested his extradition, and U.S. authorities arrested him in July 2024. The extradition request was based on charges of sexual abuse under Ecuadorian law, which does not require penetration, unlike the offense of rape.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held an extradition hearing, excluded the defendant’s proposed expert testimony about Ecuadorian evidentiary law, and certified his extradition, finding probable cause that he committed acts constituting rape as defined in the extradition treaty. The defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court, arguing that sexual abuse was not an extraditable offense, that the magistrate judge erred in excluding his expert, and that humanitarian concerns should preclude extradition. The district court denied the petition, rejecting all arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It held that extradition is permissible when the underlying conduct matches an offense listed in the relevant treaty, regardless of the specific charge’s name in the requesting country. The court found probable cause that the defendant’s conduct constituted rape, an extraditable offense. It also held that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the expert testimony and reaffirmed that humanitarian concerns are for the Executive Branch, not the courts, to consider. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lalama Gomez v. United States" on Justia Law

Dharwinder Singh, a citizen of India, petitioned for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that affirmed an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh claimed he faced persecution in India due to his political opinion and provided testimony about attacks he suffered in 2013. However, his statements during a border interview in the United States contradicted his hearing testimony, leading to an adverse credibility determination by the IJ.The IJ found Singh not credible because his hearing testimony about being attacked in August and November 2013 conflicted with his statement to a border patrol agent that he left India in April 2013. Singh explained that he lied during the border interview on the advice of his smuggler. The IJ did not find this explanation convincing and determined that Singh's willingness to lie undermined his credibility. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the REAL ID Act's totality-of-the-circumstances standard applied, rather than the Ramsameachire factors previously used to evaluate the reliability of border interviews.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court agreed that the REAL ID Act displaced the Ramsameachire factors and established a presumption that border interviews are proper to consider in adverse credibility determinations. The court found that the IJ and BIA properly assessed the reliability of Singh's border interview under the totality of the circumstances and that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the court denied Singh's petition for review. View "Singh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Rajanbir Singh-Kar, a citizen of India, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that members of a rival political party attacked him twice due to his political activities and that a police officer slapped him, threatened to jail him, and threw him out of the police station when he tried to report the attacks.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Singh-Kar’s application, finding that his testimony regarding a single incident of police misconduct was insufficient to establish that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The IJ also found inconsistencies between Singh-Kar’s application and his testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Singh-Kar’s evidence was insufficient. The BIA also noted that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of Singh-Kar’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal. The court held that Singh-Kar’s testimony about a single incident of police misconduct and general country conditions evidence did not compel a different result. The court also found that Singh-Kar failed to preserve his CAT claim and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, the Second Circuit denied Singh-Kar’s petition for review. View "Singh-Kar v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Suqin Xia, a citizen of China, has lived unlawfully in the United States for over thirty years. She applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied her application, citing discretionary reasons. Xia then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.The district court dismissed Xia's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which bars judicial review of any judgment regarding an application made under § 1255. The court concluded that the denial of Xia's application was a "judgment" under this statute, thus precluding judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the denial of an application for adjustment of status under § 1255 is a "judgment" for purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether it is issued by an immigration court or USCIS. Consequently, the court held that there was no jurisdiction to review Xia's claims, affirming the district court's dismissal of her complaint. View "Xia v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law

A Turkish graduate student, Rümeysa Öztürk, was lawfully residing in Massachusetts on a student visa when she was arrested by plainclothes officers without warning on March 25, 2025. She was transported across state lines and eventually detained in Louisiana. Her counsel, unaware of her location, filed a habeas petition in the District of Massachusetts, alleging her arrest was based on an op-ed she co-authored. The petition was transferred to the District of Vermont after it was revealed she had been in Vermont during transit.The District of Vermont set a schedule for a bail hearing and to resolve the constitutional claims in the habeas petition. The court ordered the government to transfer Öztürk from Louisiana to Vermont to aid in these proceedings. The government appealed this order, seeking an emergency stay of the transfer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the government failed to justify a stay. It determined that the District of Vermont was the proper venue for the habeas petition since Öztürk was in Vermont when the petition was filed. The court also found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over Öztürk’s detention challenge. Additionally, the court held that the government did not demonstrate irreparable injury absent a stay and that the balance of equities favored Öztürk.The Second Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, denied the request for a writ of mandamus, and vacated the administrative stay. The court ordered the government to comply with the district court’s transfer order within one week. View "Öztürk v. Hyde" on Justia Law

Monika Kapoor, an Indian citizen, faces extradition from the United States to India to face criminal charges. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York determined that Kapoor was extraditable under the bilateral extradition treaty between the U.S. and India. The Secretary of State issued a surrender warrant, rejecting Kapoor’s claims that she would likely be tortured if returned to India, which would violate the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Kapoor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the Secretary’s decision, but the district court denied her petition, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) from the REAL ID Act of 2005, which divested the court of jurisdiction to hear her claim. Kapoor appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court, stating that the Convention is not a self-executing treaty and that courts can review claims under it only as authorized by Congress. The court referenced the Supreme Court’s test in I.N.S v. St. Cyr, noting that Section 1252(a)(4) clearly states that claims under the Convention can only be raised in petitions for review of immigration removal orders and specifically bars judicial review of such claims in habeas proceedings, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.The Second Circuit held that this interpretation does not violate the Suspension Clause in the extradition context due to the longstanding rule of non-inquiry, which precludes American habeas courts from considering the anticipated treatment of an extraditee in the receiving country. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision, denying Kapoor’s petition. View "Kapoor v. DeMarco" on Justia Law

Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law