Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Diego Penaranda Arevalo, a citizen of Ecuador unlawfully present in the United States, sought cancellation of a removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An immigration judge denied his application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Penaranda then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review. While this petition was pending, Penaranda filed a motion with the BIA to terminate or remand his removal proceedings, arguing that his removal order was invalid because his original notice to appear did not include the date and time of his initial hearing, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The BIA denied the motion, reasoning that Penaranda had forfeited any objection based on the time-and-place requirement by failing to raise it in a timely manner.The Second Circuit reviewed both cases together. The court reaffirmed its decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that the time-and-place requirement is a non-jurisdictional rule and held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Penaranda forfeited his objection. Therefore, the court denied that petition.In his first petition, Penaranda challenged the immigration judge’s finding that he gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, which led to the conclusion that he failed to establish good moral character and was therefore ineligible for the requested relief. The Second Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to review Penaranda’s petition insofar as it contested whether and why he testified falsely, as these are unreviewable questions of fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Penaranda also argued that the immigration judge held him to a higher burden of proof than required. The court found that this argument, while a question of law, failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part Penaranda’s first petition. View "Penaranda Arevalo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Shuqiang Tian, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. Tian claimed persecution by the Chinese government due to his opposition to the government's forcible demolition policy, which involved demolishing villagers' homes without just compensation. Tian testified that he protested against the demolition, was arrested, beaten, and threatened by the police, and ultimately forced to accept inadequate compensation under duress.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Tian's claims, concluding that his prosecution for blocking a road and agitating in a government office did not amount to persecution. The IJ found no sufficient nexus between Tian's political opinion and the harm he suffered. The IJ also summarily denied Tian's CAT claim, stating that he had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture upon return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Tian failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground, and that he did not meet the burden for CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the agency's analysis was legally deficient. The court noted that the IJ and BIA failed to consider material evidence and the context of Tian's protests, which indicated that his persecution was linked to his political opinion. The court also found that the agency did not adequately address the possibility that Tian's arrests were pretextual and failed to provide a reasoned basis for denying his CAT claim. Consequently, the Second Circuit granted Tian's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Tian v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lau, a native and citizen of China, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey. While awaiting trial, he left the United States and upon his return, he was paroled for deferred inspection by immigration authorities. Lau was later convicted and sentenced to probation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting he was inadmissible due to his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Lau inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The IJ concluded that Lau’s conviction constituted a CIMT, did not qualify as a petty offense, and that he was properly classified as an applicant for admission upon his return. The IJ also determined that Lau did not meet the continuous residency requirement for a 212(h) waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing with the findings and dismissing Lau’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that DHS improperly classified Lau as an applicant for admission when he returned to the United States while his criminal charge was pending. The court found that a pending charge does not provide clear and convincing evidence of a CIMT necessary for DHS to consider an LPR an applicant for admission. Consequently, the court granted Lau’s petition for review, vacated the final order of removal, and remanded the case to the agency with instructions to terminate removal proceedings against Lau based on his inadmissibility under section 1182(a), without prejudice to any future deportation proceedings. View "Lau v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Everod Ray Anthony Reid, a Jamaican national, petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge's (IJ) order for his removal and denial of his applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, adjustment of status, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Reid suffers from schizophrenia, experiencing delusional thinking, hallucinations, and paranoia, which impair his ability to assist his attorney and participate meaningfully in his defense.The IJ found Reid incompetent to establish an attorney-client relationship but did not make a formal finding of overall incompetency. The IJ implemented safeguards, including relying on objective evidence, not requiring Reid to testify, and having his counsel present witnesses and affidavits. Despite these measures, the IJ denied Reid's applications, finding him ineligible for section 212(c) relief due to insufficient evidence of his prison term and denying CAT protection due to a lack of evidence of likely torture in Jamaica.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the safeguards were sufficient to ensure a fair hearing, despite acknowledging the IJ's failure to make a formal competency determination. The BIA also upheld the IJ's discretionary denial of section 212(c) relief and the denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that the IJ improperly applied the framework for protecting the rights of incompetent noncitizens. The court held that the IJ must make a specific finding of competency, generate a record of sufficient findings regarding the noncitizen's incompetency, implement appropriate safeguards, and articulate how these safeguards protect the noncitizen's rights. The court granted Reid's petition, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, directing the agency to reevaluate Reid's competency and consider additional safeguards if necessary. View "Reid v. Garland" on Justia Law

Three practicing Muslim men alleged that federal agents asked them to serve as informants in Muslim communities. When they refused, the agents placed or retained them on the "No Fly List" and suggested they could be removed from the list if they agreed to work as informants. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), claiming that their religious beliefs precluded them from serving as informants and that the agents substantially burdened their exercise of religion by conditioning their removal from the No Fly List on actions that violated those beliefs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint on qualified immunity grounds, concluding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right not to be pressured to inform on members of one's religious community through the coercive or retaliatory use of the No Fly List.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in their position would not have understood that their conduct implicated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not disclose their religious objections to the agents, and there were no facts plausibly supporting the conclusion that the agents knew the plaintiffs' objections were grounded in their religious beliefs. Therefore, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity from damages in their personal capacities. View "Tanvir v. Tanzin" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law

Bessy Orbelina Castellanos-Ventura, a citizen of Honduras, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. She claimed past persecution due to her membership in a social group of Honduran women, citing physical and sexual abuse by family members and a local criminal. She did not report the abuse to authorities, believing they would not help her.The Immigration Judge (IJ) assumed without deciding that Castellanos-Ventura's social group was cognizable and that she suffered persecution. However, the IJ denied her application, finding she failed to show that the Honduran government was "unable or unwilling to control" her persecutors. The IJ noted her failure to report the abuse and pointed to her mother's success in obtaining a restraining order as evidence of government action. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, adopting the same reasoning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the agency incorrectly applied the "unable or unwilling to control" standard. It noted the agency failed to consider whether it would have been futile or dangerous for Castellanos-Ventura, as an abused child, to seek protection. Additionally, the agency did not evaluate significant evidence indicating the Honduran government's inability to protect women and children from violence. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castellanos-Ventura v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arjun KC, a native and citizen of Nepal, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States. He claimed that Maoist partisans in Nepal threatened to kill him unless he supported their party. KC argued that these threats constituted past persecution and that this past persecution should give rise to a presumption of future persecution if he were to return to Nepal.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found KC credible but concluded that he had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ denied his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. KC appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the IJ and BIA. The court held that death threats alone do not automatically constitute past persecution. Instead, such threats must be sufficiently imminent, concrete, or menacing to qualify as persecution. The court found that the threats against KC were not sufficiently imminent or concrete to constitute past persecution. Additionally, KC did not provide other evidence to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. Consequently, the court denied KC's petition for review and affirmed the BIA's decision ordering his removal. View "KC v. Garland" on Justia Law

Maximo Robert Vera Punin, a citizen of Ecuador, was ordered removed by immigration authorities after being convicted in state court of multiple counts involving the rape of a young child. He is currently serving a 25-year prison term and faces deportation upon completion of his sentence. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served him with a notice to appear in September 2020, charging him with being a removable alien under various sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act. DHS submitted a Form I-213 to prove his alienage, which listed detailed personal information and his previous removal from the United States.The Immigration Judge (IJ) admitted the I-213 over Vera Punin’s objection, finding it sufficient to prove his alienage by clear and convincing evidence. The IJ sustained the charges of removability and ordered Vera Punin removed to Ecuador. Vera Punin appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the I-213 was unreliable and should not have been admitted. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the I-213 was inherently trustworthy and sufficient to establish his alienage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Vera Punin did not exhaust his argument that the agency failed to explain its reasoning, and thus lacked authority to consider this claim. The court held that the I-213 is presumptively reliable and capable of proving alienage by clear and convincing evidence, and Vera Punin did not rebut that presumption. The court also found that the presumption of reliability afforded to an I-213 does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof away from the government. Additionally, the court determined that the temporary Appellate Immigration Judge was properly appointed by the Attorney General. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Punin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Shlomo Bador, an Israeli citizen, received conditional permanent resident status in the U.S. based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Two years later, he and his wife filed a joint petition to remove the conditions on his status. However, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) suspected the marriage was fraudulent. After interviewing Bador’s wife, she withdrew her support for the petition, leading to the automatic termination of Bador’s conditional status. Consequently, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Bador, and he conceded his removability.An Immigration Judge (IJ) reviewed the case, where Bador requested a good-faith waiver, claiming his marriage was genuine but had ended in divorce. During the hearing, Bador admitted the marriage was fraudulent, having paid his wife and a broker to secure his status. The IJ denied the good-faith waiver and ruled Bador ineligible for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H), which applies to aliens charged with being inadmissible at the time of admission due to fraud. The IJ found that Bador’s removal was based on the termination of his conditional status, not the fraud itself.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Bador could not use the fraud waiver to excuse his failure to file a joint petition. The BIA dismissed his appeal, leading Bador to petition the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review.The Second Circuit denied Bador’s petition, holding that he was ineligible for the fraud waiver. The court concluded that Bador’s removal was due to the termination of his conditional status for failing to file a joint petition, not because of his fraudulent marriage. Therefore, the fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) did not apply. View "Bador v. Garland" on Justia Law