Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pakistani nationals and brothers petitioned for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision upholding orders denying them adjustment of status and directing their removal from the United States. Petitioners argued that the agency erred in finding them ineligible for adjustment of status based on their earlier filing of frivolous, i.e., deliberately and materially false, asylum applications because those applications were untimely and, thus, their concededly false statements could not have been material to a matter properly before the agency for decision. Petitioners further faulted the agency for alternatively denying them adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.   The Second Circuit denied Petitioners’ petition for their review. However, the court explained that a question arises as to how Petitioners removal will affect their future ability to apply for reentry to the United States. A permanent and unwaivable bar on reentry applies to any alien who filed a frivolous claim for asylum after receiving notice of that consequence. Otherwise, the alien may be subject to lesser, waivable bars on reentry. Because this court cannot determine on the present record whether Petitioners received the notice required to trigger a permanent, unwaivable bar. The court granted review as to that single question and remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the agency to make an express finding as to notice and, based on that finding, to specify the scope of the reentry bar that will attend Petitioners’ removal. View "Ud Din v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal, ordering her removed, and denying her application for cancellation of removal. The BIA ordered that she be removed under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Specifically, the BIA and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that a conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101 is categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court concluded that a conviction under ACA Section 5- 60-101 is not categorically a CIMT because the statute criminalizes conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” The court explained that the BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. That test “operates as a backstop when a statute has indeterminate reach, and where minimum conduct analysis invites improbable hypotheticals.” It applies only when there is a match between the state statute and federal standard, but a petitioner posits imaginative scenarios in which the state statute would be violated in such a way that does not meet the requirements of a CIMT. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a 32-year-old native and citizen of Jamaica who entered the United States in 2006 and overstayed his visitor visa. On December 20, 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested Petitioner pursuant to a warrant issued by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). In removal proceedings before the IJ, Petitioner argued that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and the officers violated agency regulations and his fundamental rights during his arrest and interrogation.   The Second Circuit denied the petition. The court agreed that the agency had jurisdiction and that termination of the removal proceeding was not warranted. The court explained under Rajah termination may be warranted for pre-hearing regulatory violations in cases involving "prejudice that may have affected the outcome of the proceeding, conscience-shocking conduct, or a deprivation of fundamental rights." As Petitioner has failed to show that he satisfies any of the three requirements for termination, he is not entitled to termination of his removal proceedings, with or without prejudice to renewal. Accordingly, the court found that the immigration court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to terminate. View "Medley v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his application for cancellation of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). After an immigration judge (“IJ”) initially granted cancellation, the BIA reversed, determining that Petitioner was statutorily eligible for cancellation but did not merit a favorable exercise of the agency’s discretion in light of his criminal history— namely, his two convictions for domestic violence. Petitioner objected to the BIA’s characterization of his criminal history, arguing that it impermissibly engaged in factfinding and reevaluated the IJ’s factual findings.   The Second Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that it lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary decision. The court explained that the BIA did not second-guess the IJ’s factual findings or find facts of its own—it conducted a de novo reweighing of the equities based on the facts found by the IJ. The BIA thus properly exercised its discretion to deny cancellation of removal. View "Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ukraine, sought review of a December 12, 2019 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Based on ostensible inconsistencies in  Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) entered an adverse credibility finding.   The Second Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded the case. The court explained that based on ostensible inconsistencies in Petitioner’s testimony and a purported failure to submit corroborating evidence, the IJ entered an adverse credibility finding. However, the court d that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that the IJ unjustifiably refused to allow Petitioner to present readily available witness testimony, thereby depriving him of a full and fair hearing.   The court reasoned that the IJ identified discrepancies between Petitioner’s testimony as to whether his prior employment included driving responsibilities and whether his most recent period of employment began in October 2013 or March 2014. These findings were not adopted by the BIA. Though labeled a “material inconsistency” by the IJ, nowhere in his decision did he explain how these issues relate to Petitioner’s asylum claim, nor is the connection self-evident. The court explained that it has doubts whether, absent the errors identified above, the IJ would have reached the same conclusion based on these remaining issues. View "Malets v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his request for administrative closure of his removal proceedings. The agency relied on the Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018), a then-controlling decision of the Attorney General that prohibited administrative closure. The Attorney General subsequently overruled that decision and revised the agency’s position.   The Second Circuit denied the petition for review. First, the court held that an agency does not abuse its discretion by relying on an interpretation of its regulations that are controlling at the time of its decision—even if the agency subsequently revises that interpretation—as long as it reflects a reasonable interpretation of the regulations. Second, the court concluded that the regulations, in this case, are at least ambiguous with respect to the availability of administrative closure and that Matter of Castro-Tum expressed a reasonable interpretation of the regulations that is entitled to deference. Third, the court agreed with the BIA that the Matter of Castro-Tum did not authorize administrative closure in this case. View "Garcia v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) finding him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). The IJ and BIA concluded that Petitioner is removable because his prior conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) 2 is both (1) “sexual abuse of a minor,” which is an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); and (2) “a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   The Second Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition in part and denied it in part. The court reasoned that a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) constitutes “sexual abuse of a minor.” Further, the court wrote that “sexual abuse of a minor” is defined as an “aggravated felony” under the INA, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien who committed an “aggravated felony.” The court, therefore, dismissed Petitioner’s petition in part. Second, Petitioner has abandoned any arguments as to whether N.Y. Penal Law Section 130.60(2) constitutes a “crime of child abuse,” so the court declined to reach the issue and denied this aspect of the petition. View "Debique v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union Immigrants’ Rights Project (“ACLU”) brought a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) suit in district court to compel Defendant, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), to produce agency records in the form of electronic spreadsheet data pertaining to five stages of the immigration enforcement and deportation process. ICE produced 21 spreadsheets of responsive data but did not comply with ACLU’s request to replace exempt Alien Identification Numbers (“A-Numbers”) on such spreadsheets with anonymized unique identifiers (“Unique IDs”). ACLU submits that such Unique IDs could be any combinations of numbers, letters, or symbols that, while meaningless in themselves, would allow ACLU to track datapoints pertaining to individual (but unidentified) aliens across ICE databases. The district court granted ICE’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that ACLU’s requested substitution effectively required ICE to create new records.   The Second Circuit reversed the award of summary judgment to ICE and remanded. The court reasoned that by redacting A-Numbers from the spreadsheets, it produced conveying datapoints by event rather than by person, ICE not only shielded the FOIA-exempt personal identifying information (“PII”) documented by the A-Numbers but also effectively deprived the public of access to nonexempt records in the same person-centric manner available to the agency. The court explained that the substitution of Unique IDs for A-Numbers does not create any new agency records and is a reasonable step to shield the exempt content of A-Numbers while preserving the function necessary to afford public access to non-exempt records in the same person-centric form or format available to the agency. View "ACLU Immigrants' Rts. Project v. ICE" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guyana, sought a review of a decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering Petitioner’s removal based on a prior aggravated felony conviction. At issue is whether Petitioner’s conviction for attempted first-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 110.00, 120.10(1) is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 16(a).   The Second Circuit concluded that it is and denied the petition for review. The court explained that Petitioner’s argument that NYPL Section 120.10(1) is not a crime of violence because the statute does not use the words “physical force” fails because the intent to cause serious physical injury, particularly in combination with the deadly weapon or dangerous instrument element, necessarily encompasses the use of violent force required under Section 16(a). View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, sought review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Specifically, Petitioner claimed that her family had been threatened, kidnapped, and beaten by members of the Mara 18 gang while a local Honduran police officer was present. Garcia-Aranda sought asylum and withholding of removal, arguing that the gang had persecuted her because she was a member of the Valerio family, which ran its own drug trafficking ring in Garcia-Aranda’s hometown. She also sought protection under CAT based on an asserted likelihood of future torture at the hands of the gang with the participation or acquiescence of the local Honduran police.Petioner's CAT petitioner alleged that she had been kidnapped while local police were present. These allegations required the BIA to inquire, whether it was more likely than not (1) that the gang will intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering to intimidate or coerce her, including meeting all the harm requirements for torture under section 1208.18(a); and (2) that local police acting under color of law will either (i) themselves participate in those likely gang actions or (ii) acquiesce in those likely gang actions.However, neither of these inquiries was made below. Thus, the Second Circuit reversed in part, remanding to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Garcia-Aranda v. Garland" on Justia Law