Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, who was born in Nigeria and came to the United States when he was four years old, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of an appeal of an IJ's decision denying his motion to terminate his removal proceedings. At issue was whether petitioner's failure to become a lawful permanent resident before turning eighteen years old, when his parents became naturalized citizens when he was seventeen, barred him from claiming derivative citizenship from his parents. In considering petitioner's claim, the court must apply the law in effect when he fulfilled the last requirement for derivative citizenship. In this instance, the law in effect when petitioner applied for lawful permanent residence status after his parents were naturalized was former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1432(a). The court concluded that petitioner satisfied the derivative citizenship conditions of section 321(a) and, therefore, granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nwozuzu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the BIA's decision reversing the IJ's grant of their motion to suppress evidence obtained in egregious violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and termination of removal proceedings. Relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA found that it need not determine whether petitioners suffered an egregious violation because birth certificates and arrest records were obtained after the Government had determined their identities. The court joined the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in finding that Lopez-Mendoza reaffirmed a long-standing rule of personal jurisdiction; it did not create an evidentiary rule insulating specific pieces of identity-related evidence from suppression. Therefore, the BIA erred in concluding that the Government had met its burden of establishing that certain alienage-related evidence had been obtained independent of any constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the BIA to reach the issue of whether Government agents seized evidence of alienage from petitioners in the course of committing an egregious Fourth Amendment violation. View "Pretzantzin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. After the Government instituted removal proceedings, petitioner filed a motion to suppress the Government's evidence, arguing that ICE officers obtained the evidence in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when they forcibly gained entrance to his home and arrested him without a warrant or probable cause. The court concluded that the IJ erred in finding that petitioner's submissions were insufficient to shift the burden to the Government to establish consent and erred in concluding that the facts alleged, even accepted as true, were insufficient to yield an egregious Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Cotzojay v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the USCIS and the agency's New York District Director. The district court determined that the statements plaintiff submitted to show that he was entitled to derivative United States citizenship were inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff's brother was killed on Pan Am Flight 103 by Libyan terrorists, and if plaintiff were able to prove derivative citizenship, he could ostensibly be entitled to compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under the family history exceptions to the hearsay rule. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was not entitled to derivative citizenship because he submitted no sufficient admissible evidence establishing his mother's age at relocation. View "Porter v. Quarantillo" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, pleaded guilty to robbery after illegally reentering the United States. At issue on appeal was whether the district court plainly erred by sentencing defendant to, inter alia, a three-year term of supervised release even though U.S.S.G. 5D1.1(c) provided that district courts "ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which... the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will be deported after imprisonment." The court held that the district court adequately explained why it sentenced defendant to a term of supervised release where "an added measure of deterrence and protection" was needed in defendant's case. Even assuming arguendo that the district court erred by not adequately explaining its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release on defendant, in the circumstances presented here, it did not "plainly err" because the alleged error did not affect his substantial rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Alvarado" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a national of India and lawful permanent resident in the United States, pled guilty to one count of receiving Medicare kickbacks and one count of income tax evasion. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his tax evasion conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his criminal defense attorney's advice as to the deportation consequences of pleading guilty to that count. The court concluded, based on the entire record, that the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to establish that, if counsel had recommended withdrawal of the plea, petitioner would have accepted that recommendation in order to go to trial. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the petition was untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chhabra v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner was able to demonstrate this continuous presence except for two encounters with U.S. Border Patrol in 2007, each of which resulted in what the parties termed petitioner's "voluntary return" to Mexico. The court held that the immigration judge reasonably found that during each of those well-documented encounters, petitioner knowingly and voluntarily conceded his removability, waived his right to appear before an immigration judge, and chose to leave the United States in lieu of more formal proceedings. The court further held that petitioner's return to Mexico under those circumstances severed his continuous physical presence in the United States, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Finally, the court denied petitioner's appeal of the denial of his motion to reopen proceedings. View "Rosario-Mijangos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that he was ineligible for the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997's (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193, so-called "special rule cancellation of removal" under 8 C.F.R. 1240.66(b)(1). The court concluded that the BIA's interpretation of section 1240.66(b)(1) was inconsistent with the regulation, and as an unadmitted alien, petitioner could not be ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal on the basis of a conviction that would make an admitted alien "deportable" under section 237 of the INA. Because the court's holding was limited to the conclusion that conviction of a crime specified under section 237 could not render petitioner, as an unadmitted alien, ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal, the court remanded so that the BIA could decide in the first instance any other matters that could be appropriate in determining whether to grant special rule cancellation of removal to petitioner. View "Reyes v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Trinidad and Tobago, petitioned for review of a decision by the BIA finding him inadmissible because he made a false claim of United States citizenship in order to avoid being placed in removal proceedings. The BIA concluded that the false claim triggered the inadmissibility provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(l). The court concluded that neither the BIA nor the court had previously issued a precedential opinion defining what counted as a "purpose or benefit" under federal or state law. Therefore, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded so that the BIA could determine in the first instance the scope of conduct encompassed by section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(l). View "Richmond v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in state court of attempted arson in the second degree in violation of New York law, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that the attempted arson in the second degree was a felony that, by its nature, involved a substantial risk of the intentional use of physical force against the person or property of another. Therefore, attempted arson in the second degree was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b), and an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(F), (U). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for review. View "Santana v. Holder" on Justia Law