Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adams entered the U.S. from Jamaica in 1990 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Arrested in New York in 1992, for attempting to sell cocaine to an undercover officer, Adams represented that he was “Michael Thomas” and pleaded guilty. “Thomas” failed to appear for sentencing. The state court received a form from Jamaica certifying that “Michael Thomas” had committed suicide. Adams returned to Jamaica where, in 1994, he married a U.S. citizen. Adams applied for an immigrant visa, representing that he had never been in the U.S. and had never been arrested or convicted. The consul granted an immigrant visa in 1997. He was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2008, returning from a trip to Jamaica, he was stopped by Customs officials, who suspected that Adams was “Michael Thomas” in the outstanding arrest warrant. The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately ordered removal. Adams argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), barred removal because Adams was the beneficiary of an adjustment of status when he obtained an immigrant visa and that there is a five-year limitation on rescinding the status of a lawful permanent resident. The Second Circuit rejected the arguments.View "Adams v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mota and Castillo married in Mexico, where their daughter, Elena, was born. In 2007, when Elena was six months old, Castillo entered the U.S. illegally and began sending financial support to his wife and daughter. In 2010 Mota and Castillo decided to reunite. They hired a smuggler to take Elena across the border. After Elena had entered the U.S., Mota tried to cross the border, but was repeatedly blocked by American border guards. Meanwhile, the smugglers had transported Elena to New York, where she began living with her father. After one attempt to enter, Mota was arrested and prosecuted for use of false identification. Castillo began living with another woman, no longer sent financial support, and declared that he would keep Elena. Mexican authorities applied to the U.S. government for the child’s return. Castillo then instituted custody proceedings in New York. Having obtained no relief through official diplomatic channels, Mota filed a petition seeking an order requiring Castillo to return Elena to her in Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601. The district court granted the order. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Mota v. Castillo" on Justia Law

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment. View "Liranzo v. United States " on Justia Law

Vartelas, a native of Greece and permanent resident of the U.S. since 1989, pleaded guilty to a felony in 1994. At the time, lawful permanent residents were not regarded as making an “entry” when returning from “innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s] . . . outside this country’s borders.” An alien in Vartelas’s situation could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing resident alien status. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, under which lawful permanent residents returning from a trip abroad are regarded as seeking admission if they have committed an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), including the felony to which Vartelas had pleaded guilty. In 2003, Vartelas briefly traveled to Greece to visit family. Upon returning, he was treated as an inadmissible alien. An IJ denied ordered Vartelas removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and denied a motion to reopen based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit held that Vartelas was not prejudiced by failure to raise nonretroactivity, since the IIRIRA could apply retroactively. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed, “[g]uided by the deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation.” The Second Circuit remanded to the BIA to consider the performance of Vartelas’s attorneys. View "Vartelas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Velez moved from Ecuador at age 16 to live with her half-sister, Sanchez, Sanchez’s sister Munoz, and their mother, Yolanda Munoz, and perform housework and babysitting. The relationship deteriorated and Velez believed that she was being isolated and that promises were not kept. She sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and New York state law. The district court dismissed certain claims, including breach of contract claim, allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials, then found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, but granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract and ATS claims and vacated and remanded with respect to FLSA and state law claims. View "Velez v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are non-immigrant aliens, authorized by the federal government to reside and work as pharmacists in the U.S. All reside in New York and are licensed pharmacists there pursuant to a statutory waiver to New York Education Law 6805(1)(6)’s requirement that only U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents are eligible to obtain a pharmacist’s license in New York. The waiver provision was set to expire in 2009. The district court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law. The Second Circuit affirmed. A state statute that discriminates against aliens who have been lawfully admitted to reside and work in the United States should be viewed in the same light under the Equal Protection Clause as one which discriminates against aliens who enjoy the right to reside here permanently. Applying strict scrutiny and finding, as the state conceded, that there are no compelling reasons for the statute’s discrimination based on alienage, the court found the statute unconstitutional. View "Paidi v. Mill" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his application for adjustment of status and order of removal. At issue was whether petitioner was eligible to adjust his status to legal permanent resident (LPR) status on any basis other than marriage to his K-1 visa sponsor. Because petitioner was originally admitted to the United States on a K-1 nonimmigrant visa, he could not adjust his status to that of a full LPR on any basis other than marriage to his original K-1 visa sponsor. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Caraballo-Tavera v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a noncitizen from Nigeria, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's decision finding petitioner removable under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because his conviction of embezzlement by a bank employee under 18 U.S.C. 656 constituted an aggravated felony. The court held that because none of the facts to which petitioner actually and necessarily pleaded to establish the elements of his embezzlement revealed whether that offense was committed with a specific intent to defraud, it was error for the BIA to infer that his conviction was an offense involving fraud or deceit. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Akinsade v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction following his guilty plea to illegally transporting aliens within the United States; assisting an inadmissible alien in entering the United States; and illegally being present in the United States after having previously been removed. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court miscalculated the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines by adding two points to his criminal history pursuant to U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for his commission of an offense while under a criminal justice sentence. The court held that defendant's knowledge that he was subject to a term of supervised release was not required for the district court to impose an enhancement based on the fact that defendant committed the instant crimes while "under a[] criminal justice sentence." The court declined to reach defendant's ineffective assistance claim and dismissed without prejudice. With regard to defendant's remaining claims, the court found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Grenadines, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that he was removable based on his second-degree assault conviction in violation of New York Law 120.05(2) and on the basis of petitioner's conviction of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree in violation of New York Penal Law 110 and 220.3. The court concluded that a conviction for second-degree assault under section 120.05(2) categorically constituted a "crime of violence" for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 16(b). The court also concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky did not overturn the court's precedent holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not applicable in the deportation and removal context. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. View "Morris v. Holder" on Justia Law