Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his requests for cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The court held that a conviction for witness tampering under Connecticut General Statutes 53a-151 constituted an "offense relating to obstruction of justice" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), and that petitioner was therefore ineligible for relief. His conviction stemmed from allegations that petitioner sexually assaulted a minor and later instructed her that, if she talked to the police, she should tell them that "nothing ever happened." Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "Higgins v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner and her husband, natives and citizens of the People's Republic of China (PRC), petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of their application for asylum and other relief despite a finding by an IJ that petitioner would be subjected to coercive sterilization if returned to the PRC. The court concluded that an IJ's finding that a future even would occur if an applicant was removed was a finding of fact subject to review for clear error and that the BIA properly applied de novo review to an IJ's determination that an applicant had not satisfied her burden to establish an objectively reasonable fear of prosecution. The court also concluded that the BIA could determine the weight to be accorded to State Department country reports. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded the case. View "Huang v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, appealed the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's finding that she filed a frivolous asylum application. At issue was whether (1) a "frivolousness finding" could be entered against an alien who had withdrawn her asylum application; and (2) an IJ retained any discretion to decline to make a frivolousness finding. The court held that the BIA's conclusion that a withdrawn asylum application could serve as the basis of a frivolousness finding was reasonable, but that the BIA's decision that the IJ lacked discretion not to make such a finding was unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and granted in part, vacating the BIA's decision and remanding for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ecuador, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal and ordering him removed. At issue was whether the notice requirements of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1), were satisfied by service of a Notice to Appear that indicated that the date and time of a hearing would be set in the future, followed by service of a separate notice specifying the precise date and time of the hearing. Also at issue was whether the stop-time rule of INA 240A(d)(1) was triggered by proper notice under section 239(a)(1) even if the notice requirements of section 239(a)(2) were not satisfied. The court held that service of Notice of Appear followed by service of a separate notice indicating the precise date and time of the hearing satisfied the notice requirements of section 239(a)(1). The court also held that, once a petitioner had been served with notice complying with INA 239(a)(1), the stop-time rule of section 240A(d)(1) was triggered, regardless of whether subsequent notices regarding changes in time or place of proceeding complied with section 239(a)(2). Because petitioner could not demonstrate that he was physically present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years immediately prior to his application for relief, he was ineligible for relief in the form of cancellation of removal and adjustment of status under section 240A(b)(1) and therefore, the petition was denied.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ireland, sought review of an order of the BIA finding him ineligible for adjustment of status due to his inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(c)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(c)(ii), for falsely representing himself to be a United States citizen. The court concluded that petitioner did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he did not represent himself to be a United States citizen when he checked the "citizen or national" box on an 1-9 Employment Eligibility Verification Form. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief after finding that he did not derive citizenship from his father. The district court ruled that petitioner was not in his father's "legal custody" when his father naturalized. The court concluded that the district court erred because it relied on an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody award where New York had jurisdiction to determine custody. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitioned from an order of the BIA affirming the IJ's denial of asylum, but granting his application for withholding of removal. At issue was whether the government's prima facie showing of firm resettlement could be rebutted by an alien's showing that his ties to the third country into which he fled, in this case Guatemala, before coming here were formed before his last flight from persecution. The court held that firm resettlement was determined from the totality of the circumstances and that even ties formed in the third country prior to an alien's last flight from persecution were relevant to that determination. The court considered petitioner's arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, denied the petition for review.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture on the basis that her testimony regarding an alleged forced abortion was insufficient to carry her burden of proof and she failed to produce reasonably available corroborative testimony from her husband, an undocumented immigrant. The principal issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that petitioner failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence to support her claim. The court held that the IJ's determination that petitioner's testimony was insufficient by itself to meet her burden of proof was supported by substantial evidence; the IJ's determination that petitioner's husband was available to provide corroborating testimony was reasonable; and the IJ's consequent conclusion that petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof, despite providing arguably credible testimony, was reasonable. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner was convicted in New York for promoting prostitution in the third degree and subsequently sought review of the BIA's order declining to reconsider whether she had been convicted of an aggravated felony and dismissing her appeal from an order of removal. Petitioner argued that her offense did not constitute an aggravated felony because New York law defined "prostitution" more broadly than federal law did for the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(i). The court held that because N.Y. Penal Law 230.25(1) punished conduct that did not involve a "prostitution business" as the term prostitution was used in the INA, petitioner's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony. Thus, the BIA erred in finding petitioner removable. The court also held that because petitioner was not removable, the court need not address her challenge to the agency's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.