Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, citizens of Columbia,entered the United States in September 2001, as nonimmigrant visitors. On May 7, 2002, they filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied the application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The BIA again ruled against the petitioners.The Second Circuit again vacated and remanded. The petitioners sought $9,690.00 in attorney’s fees and $751.04 in costs incurred in connection with the petitions for review After holding that he Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). applies to petitions for review from the BIA, the Second Circuit granted the award. The BIA position was without substantial justification; the BIA committed significant errors of law and fact that prejudiced the case by grounding its disposition of the claims on a material misquotation of death threat and inadequate consideration under the CAT.

The New York State Department of Education and related defendants appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to vacate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff where the district court had awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) after he successfully challenged on equal protection grounds New York State Education Law 6704(6), which restricted professional veterinarian licenses to United States citizens and aliens who were lawful permanent residents of the United States. The Department appealed the district court's ruling and while the appeal was pending, the United States granted plaintiff permanent legal resident status, which meant that section 6704(6) no longer precluded him from obtaining the license. Accordingly, a panel of the court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the judgment. The Department then moved to vacate the fee award. The court agreed with the district court that because the judgment in plaintiff's favor, though later vacated, had brought a judicially-sanctioned, material alteration of the parties' legal relationship that had not been reversed on the merits, plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

Plaintiffs appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs argued that the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), and in particular 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(3), entitled Duo Cen, an alien who aged out of eligibility for an immigrant visa as a derivative beneficiary to his grandfather's 1994 priority date for his mother's 2008 family-sponsored petition for Duo Cen. The court held that section 1153(h)(3) did not entitle an alien to retain the priority date of an aged-out family preference petition if the aged-out family preference petition could not be "converted to [an] appropriate category." Therefore, because plaintiffs have specified no "appropriate category" to which Duo Cen's grandfather's petition could be converted, section 1153(h)(3) did not entitle him to retain the 1994 priority date from his grandfather's petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of immigration fraud and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. At issue was under what circumstances did the exclusion of the public from a courtroom during voir dire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court held that, although the district court's exclusion of defendant's brother and girlfriend during voir dire failed to meet the four-factor test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and now Presley v. Georgia, the exclusion was too trivial to implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court also held that Presley did not alter the "triviality exception" to the public trial guarantee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner brought this mandamus action to compel USCIS to make a determination on the merits of her I-212 application, alleging that USCIS denied her application in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed petitioner's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), and in the alternative, petitioner's claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that petitioner was indirectly challenging her reinstated order of removal and accordingly, the court held that section 1252(a)(5)'s jurisdictional bar applied equally to preclude such an indirect challenge. Therefore, because the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, the court did not reach her remaining arguments.

Petitioner sought review of a final order of removal, issued after a determination that he was ineligible for a "hardship waiver" of the requirements for filing a joint petition with his citizen spouse to lift the conditions on his residency. At issue was whether the agency erred as a matter of law by placing upon petitioner the burden of establishing that his qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith; whether the wrong standard was applied for assessing eligibility for a hardship waiver; and whether an erroneous assessment was made in weighing the evidence. The court held that the allocation of the burden of proof was proper where it was consistent with the applicable statutory structure and intent; that the agency articulated the proper legal standard for demonstrating a good faith marriage where the immigration judge's consideration of the course of the relationship after the wedding, in order to ascertain an alien's intent at the time he entered his marriage, was entitled to deference; and that the agency properly determined that petitioner was ineligible for the relief he sought where the amount of weight to be accorded any particular fact raised no question of law and was not within the court's jurisdiction to review the agency's determination. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a native of Jamaica, sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the decision of an immigration judge denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings brought against him, after his criminal convictions, on the grounds that he had not derived U.S. citizenship through the naturalization of his father. At issue was whether petitioner had been "legitimated" under Jamaican law within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(c)(1) even though his parents never married, with the result that he had obtained derivative citizenship as a consequence of the naturalization of his father. The court remained unsure as to the precise definition the BIA had adopted for determining whether a "child" had been "legitimated" under the law of a particular jurisdiction for purposes of section 1101(c)(1). The court was also unclear as to the legal and/or logical basis for the BIA's interpretation. Accordingly, the court remanded to the BIA to address these two issues and the petition for review was granted.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Brazil, sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") which dismissed his appeal of an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision ordering his removal and denied his motion for remand or continuance. At issue was whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's request for a continuance. The court held that to the extent the BIA denied petitioner's request for a continuance on the basis that it lacked the authority to grant the continuance, the denial constituted legal error where IJs have broad discretionary authority to grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown and where IJs and the BIA had jurisdiction over motions for continuances in removal proceedings where they already had jurisdiction in light of Matter of Hashmi. The court also held that the BIA failed to provide a rational explanation for its ruling when it failed to evaluate the merits of granting or denying petitioner a continuance based on the specific facts on the record and therefore, on remand, the BIA should either follow the Hashmi factors or explain why application of those factors was inappropriate.

Petitioners, citizens of Guatemala, petitioned for review of removal orders that became final after the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed their appeals from decisions of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") that found each man removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA. At issue was whether the BIA erred in concluding that petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status where their release on "conditional parole" under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the INA did not satisfy the "paroled in the United States" requirement of section 245(a). The court held that the requirement that an alien be "paroled into the United States" in order to seek adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) was not satisfied by the alien's release on "conditional parole" under section 1226(a)(2)(B). The court also held that petitioners were correctly ordered removed under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) where they were present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and therefore, petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment status under section 1255(a) despite having been released on conditional parole under section 1226(a)(2)(B).

Defendant appealed a judgment following a plea of guilty to illegal reentry into the United States after he was deported to the Dominican Republic when he finished serving his prison sentence for first degree manslaughter. At issue was whether defendant's sentence of 42 months' imprisonment was substantively unreasonable where the defendant claimed that the district court's sentence was unduly harsh in view of the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and where the 16-level Guideline enhancement applicable to re-entrants with certain prior convictions was not based on review of past sentencing practices and empirical studies, was overly harsh, and was greater than necessary in view of fast track programs. The court held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the nature and circumstances of his offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court also held that the 16-level Guideline enhancement was not substantively unreasonable where defendant's claims were without merit, the sentence was not unreasonably harsh when it reflected the serious nature of offenses, and where sentences in fast-track districts could not be compared with sentences in non-fast-track districts in order to demonstrate that the latter were longer than necessary.