Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture on the basis that her testimony regarding an alleged forced abortion was insufficient to carry her burden of proof and she failed to produce reasonably available corroborative testimony from her husband, an undocumented immigrant. The principal issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that petitioner failed to provide reasonably available corroborating evidence to support her claim. The court held that the IJ's determination that petitioner's testimony was insufficient by itself to meet her burden of proof was supported by substantial evidence; the IJ's determination that petitioner's husband was available to provide corroborating testimony was reasonable; and the IJ's consequent conclusion that petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof, despite providing arguably credible testimony, was reasonable. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner was convicted in New York for promoting prostitution in the third degree and subsequently sought review of the BIA's order declining to reconsider whether she had been convicted of an aggravated felony and dismissing her appeal from an order of removal. Petitioner argued that her offense did not constitute an aggravated felony because New York law defined "prostitution" more broadly than federal law did for the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(K)(i). The court held that because N.Y. Penal Law 230.25(1) punished conduct that did not involve a "prostitution business" as the term prostitution was used in the INA, petitioner's conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony. Thus, the BIA erred in finding petitioner removable. The court also held that because petitioner was not removable, the court need not address her challenge to the agency's denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.

Petitioners, citizens of Columbia,entered the United States in September 2001, as nonimmigrant visitors. On May 7, 2002, they filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied the application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The BIA again ruled against the petitioners.The Second Circuit again vacated and remanded. The petitioners sought $9,690.00 in attorney’s fees and $751.04 in costs incurred in connection with the petitions for review After holding that he Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). applies to petitions for review from the BIA, the Second Circuit granted the award. The BIA position was without substantial justification; the BIA committed significant errors of law and fact that prejudiced the case by grounding its disposition of the claims on a material misquotation of death threat and inadequate consideration under the CAT.

The New York State Department of Education and related defendants appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to vacate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff where the district court had awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) after he successfully challenged on equal protection grounds New York State Education Law 6704(6), which restricted professional veterinarian licenses to United States citizens and aliens who were lawful permanent residents of the United States. The Department appealed the district court's ruling and while the appeal was pending, the United States granted plaintiff permanent legal resident status, which meant that section 6704(6) no longer precluded him from obtaining the license. Accordingly, a panel of the court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the judgment. The Department then moved to vacate the fee award. The court agreed with the district court that because the judgment in plaintiff's favor, though later vacated, had brought a judicially-sanctioned, material alteration of the parties' legal relationship that had not been reversed on the merits, plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

Plaintiffs appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs argued that the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), and in particular 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(3), entitled Duo Cen, an alien who aged out of eligibility for an immigrant visa as a derivative beneficiary to his grandfather's 1994 priority date for his mother's 2008 family-sponsored petition for Duo Cen. The court held that section 1153(h)(3) did not entitle an alien to retain the priority date of an aged-out family preference petition if the aged-out family preference petition could not be "converted to [an] appropriate category." Therefore, because plaintiffs have specified no "appropriate category" to which Duo Cen's grandfather's petition could be converted, section 1153(h)(3) did not entitle him to retain the 1994 priority date from his grandfather's petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of immigration fraud and sentenced to 51 months imprisonment. At issue was under what circumstances did the exclusion of the public from a courtroom during voir dire violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court held that, although the district court's exclusion of defendant's brother and girlfriend during voir dire failed to meet the four-factor test set forth in Waller v. Georgia, and now Presley v. Georgia, the exclusion was too trivial to implicate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court also held that Presley did not alter the "triviality exception" to the public trial guarantee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner brought this mandamus action to compel USCIS to make a determination on the merits of her I-212 application, alleging that USCIS denied her application in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed petitioner's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5), and in the alternative, petitioner's claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that petitioner was indirectly challenging her reinstated order of removal and accordingly, the court held that section 1252(a)(5)'s jurisdictional bar applied equally to preclude such an indirect challenge. Therefore, because the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint, the court did not reach her remaining arguments.

Petitioner sought review of a final order of removal, issued after a determination that he was ineligible for a "hardship waiver" of the requirements for filing a joint petition with his citizen spouse to lift the conditions on his residency. At issue was whether the agency erred as a matter of law by placing upon petitioner the burden of establishing that his qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith; whether the wrong standard was applied for assessing eligibility for a hardship waiver; and whether an erroneous assessment was made in weighing the evidence. The court held that the allocation of the burden of proof was proper where it was consistent with the applicable statutory structure and intent; that the agency articulated the proper legal standard for demonstrating a good faith marriage where the immigration judge's consideration of the course of the relationship after the wedding, in order to ascertain an alien's intent at the time he entered his marriage, was entitled to deference; and that the agency properly determined that petitioner was ineligible for the relief he sought where the amount of weight to be accorded any particular fact raised no question of law and was not within the court's jurisdiction to review the agency's determination. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner, a native of Jamaica, sought review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the decision of an immigration judge denying his motion to terminate the removal proceedings brought against him, after his criminal convictions, on the grounds that he had not derived U.S. citizenship through the naturalization of his father. At issue was whether petitioner had been "legitimated" under Jamaican law within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(c)(1) even though his parents never married, with the result that he had obtained derivative citizenship as a consequence of the naturalization of his father. The court remained unsure as to the precise definition the BIA had adopted for determining whether a "child" had been "legitimated" under the law of a particular jurisdiction for purposes of section 1101(c)(1). The court was also unclear as to the legal and/or logical basis for the BIA's interpretation. Accordingly, the court remanded to the BIA to address these two issues and the petition for review was granted.