Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

8 U.S.C. 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula in 8 U.S.C. 1153(h)(1), which deducts processing time from the age of an F2A visa beneficiary. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that plaintiff's daughter was statutorily under 21 years old when plaintiff naturalized and thus the daughter qualifies for an immediate-relative visa. At issue in this appeal was whether the term "age" in section 1151(f)(2) incorporates the age-reduction formula set forth in section 1153(h)(1). Based on the text, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the Child Status Protection Act, the court held that it does. View "Cuthill v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner sought relief after he had been threatened and beaten by gang members and police officers who urged him to join the gang. The court concluded that petitioner's negative view of gangs does not amount to a "political opinion" within the meaning of the immigration laws, and that substantial evidence supports the BIA's decision that he has not established a likelihood of future torture if he were to be removed to El Salvador. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner argues that he was tortured in Italy when he was subjected for more than six years to solitary confinement and other restrictive conditions in Italy’s 41-bis prison regime, and that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Italy. The court concluded that the conditions petitioner alleged he faced or would face do not rise to the level of torture as that term is used under the CAT and its implementing regulations at 8 C.F.R. 1208.18. In this case, although the court recognized that petitioner developed various persisting mental ailments while in 41-bis detention, the court cannot agree that he faced severe mental pain and suffering of the kind envisioned in section 1208.18(a)(4)(ii) View "Gallina v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

After NYLAG sought access to non-precedential "unpublished opinions" issued by the BIA in immigrant cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the district court dismissed the case and concluded that FOIA's remedial provision does not authorize district courts to order agencies to make records publicly available. NYLAG seeks disclosure of these opinions, which are not routinely made available to the public, in order to aid in its representation of low-income clients in removal and asylum proceedings.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that FOIA's remedial provision authorizes the relief NYLAG seeks. The court explained that FOIA's text, read in light of its history and purpose, empowers district courts to order agencies to comply with their affirmative disclosure obligations under 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2), including the obligation to make certain documents publicly available. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "New York Legal Assistance Group v. Board of Immigration Appeals" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to petitioner, who was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention of noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings. The habeas petition challenged the procedures employed in petitioner's bond hearings, which required him to prove, to the satisfaction of an immigration judge, that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.The court held that the district court correctly granted the petition where petitioner was denied due process because he was incarcerated for fifteen months (with no end in sight) while the Government at no point justified his incarceration. The district court also provided the correct remedy by ordering a new bond hearing in which the Government bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was either a danger or a flight risk. View "Velasco Lopez v. Decker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the government defendants in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action brought by plaintiff, seeking documents related to the revocation of his visa.The court held that the contested documents were properly withheld under FOIA Exemption 3, and specifically INA 222(f), because they pertain to the issuance and refusal of a visa. Furthermore, officials properly invoked Exemption 3 to withhold revocation documents as they are related to visa issuances and refusals. Finally, plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the records are needed by a court "in the interest of the ends of justice," and the discretionary release of records under 8 U.S.C. 1202(f)(1) provides no basis for disclosure in this FOIA action. For the reasons set forth in a separate summary order addressing FOIA Exemption 5 filed simultaneously with this opinion, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Spadaro v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the Board's conclusion that Aleutian violated certain statutory and regulatory requirements governing the H-1B temporary foreign worker program, and order requiring Aleutian to pay back wages to two Program workers.The court held that agency regulations duly promulgated under the statute unambiguously require H-1B employers to make wage payments in "prorated installments," "no less often than monthly." Therefore, the court concluded that an employer's failure to satisfy this requirement constitutes a failure to comply with the Immigration and Nationality Act's overall "required wage obligation"—a conclusion that supports DOL's award of back wages to Employee Gangjee.The court declined to adopt the proposed limitations on DOL's investigatory authority by holding that DOL's investigation into an H-1B Program complaint may not exceed the specific allegations of misconduct made in that complaint. Rather, the court affirmed DOL's authority to investigate Aleutian's compliance with the H-1B Program's wage requirement as to Employee Horn, as well as to Gangjee. The court stated that such an inquiry was reasonably within the scope of DOL's investigative authority into the allegations made in Gangjee's complaint and is lawfully contemplated by Program regulations. View "Aleutian Capital Partners v. Pizzella" on Justia Law

After the government removed petitioner from the United Stated, the removal mooted the government's appeal of the district court's order directing the government to release petitioner from immigration detention. The government now moves to dismiss the appeal as moot and requests vacatur of the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d), a regulation that the government had invoked to detain petitioner. Petitioner opposes the government's request for vacatur and separately requests vacatur of the Second Circuit's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal.The Second Circuit held that because the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) could have legal consequences in future litigation between the parties, those decisions should be vacated so that "the rights of all parties are preserved." However, this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal does not warrant vacatur because it does not have legal consequences for the parties. The court held that a decision concerning a stay is not a final adjudication on the merits of an appeal and lacks preclusive effect. Therefore, the court denied petitioner's motion to vacate this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, granted the government's motion to vacate the district court's decisions related to section 241.14(d), dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded with instructions to dismiss petitioner's challenge to his detention as moot. View "Hassoun v. Searls" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's 2018 decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA found that petitioner was convicted of "sexual abuse of a minor" based on his 2010 New York state conviction under New York Penal Law 130.65(3) for sexual abuse in the first degree.The Second Circuit rejected petitioner's contention that section 130.65(3) criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" covers. The court held that, because a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65(3) requires both that the victim be under the age of eleven and that the perpetrator's contact with the victim be "for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire," the state statute reaches no farther than the crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" as set forth in section 101(a)(43)(A) and construed by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. Therefore, a conviction under the state statute is an aggravated felony under the INA. View "Rodriguez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal of petitioner to the Dominican Republic. The court held that a conviction under New York Penal Law 165.50 is categorically an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). The court deferred to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous term "including" in "including receipt of stolen property" in section 1101(a)(43)(G). Under that interpretation, "'receipt of stolen property' is a distinct aggravated felony independent of theft and the property received need not have been stolen by means of 'theft' as generically defined." The court also determined that an intent to deprive is inherent in the requirement that an offender "knowingly" possesses stolen property. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. View "Santana v. Barr" on Justia Law