Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

National Union appealed from the district court's award of consequential damages to plaintiffs, following a jury trial, for National Union's breach of its duty to defendant plaintiffs in a securities arbitration. At issue was whether consequential damages, which were traditionally available for breach of contract claims, were also available for a claim of breach of a duty to defend an insured under Connecticut law, and if so, whether they could include damages for harm to reputation and loss of income. Absent a precedential decision from the Connecticut courts, the court certified the two issues. View "Ryan v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins." on Justia Law

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment. View "Liranzo v. United States " on Justia Law

Krist claimed that defendant, a New York City restaurant, discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities in violation of of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189; New York State Executive Law 290-301; and New York City Administrative Code 8-101 to 8-703 by attempting to restrict her access and that of her service dog to the restaurant and by verbally harassing her on account of her disability and use of the service dog. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ADA imposes a code of civility and that the trial court erroneously imposed a requirement that plaintiff prove intentional discrimination. View "Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a seaman, contracted lymphoma and sued his former employer, a tugboat operator, seeking maintenance and cure. The doctrine of maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship. Undisputed evidence established that the seaman had lymphoma during his maritime service, but the disease did not present any symptoms at all until after his service. The district court granted summary judgment for the tugboat operator. The Second Circuit reversed. Because the seaman’s illness indisputably occurred during his service, he is entitled to maintenance and cure regardless of when he began to show symptoms. View "Messier v. Bouchard Transp." on Justia Law

Brault applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2007, claiming that he became disabled in 2006 because of nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical spine injury he sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested an administrative hearing. Brault’s counsel asserted a Daubert-like objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, contending it was unreliable. The ALJ never directly responded to the objections, but issued a ruling which relied on the VE’s testimony, agreed that positions existed in the eight DOT positions the VE had identified at the numbers the VE had given, and denied Brault’s application for benefits. The district court affirmed the denial. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge was not required to state expressly his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s challenged testimony.View "Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were awarded a judgment in August 2006 in a state-court negligence action against TFD, one of whose buses had struck a vehicle operated by one of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint seeking a judgment declaring that defendant Lancer, an insurer of TFD, was obligated to pay each plaintiff $5 million or more in satisfaction of the essentially unpaid Negligence Action Judgment, and ordering Lancer to pay those amounts. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint on the ground that the relevant insurance overage was limited to interstate trips and that the TFD bus trip that resulted in the injury at issue was a trip wholly within New York State. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "Lyons v. Lancer Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The owners of each of the three vessels involved in the collision at issue appealed the district court's allocation of liability. In addition, the owners of the M/V Clary contended that they were entitled to limit their liability under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 30505, and the manager of that vessel asserted that the district court erred in finding it liable for the collision under common law. The court found no error in the district court's allocation of liability. The court found, however, clear error in the district court's determination that the Clary Owners were not entitled to limit their liability. The court declined to address the Clary manager's argument that liability was limited because the argument was not raised. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part.

Plaintiffs appealed a decision and order of the district court granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants, LCB and AmEx. Plaintiffs, all Israeli residents, were allegedly injured or their family members killed or injured, by rockets fired by Hizballah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, into northern Israel in July and August 2006. Plaintiffs asserted that Israeli law governed their negligence claim while AmEx maintained that New York law governed. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' negligence claim against AmEx, evaluating the claim under New York state law. Because the court concluded that New York law would apply even if a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdiction existed because New York had the greatest interest in the litigation, and that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim against AmEx under New York law, the judgment of the district court insofar as it was in favor of AmEx was affirmed.

This cross-appeal arose out of the trial and retrial of plaintiff's claim against his former employer and his supervisor for tortious interference with a job offer from another firm. Upon retrial, the second jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded substantive monetary damages. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial where the verdict, predicated almost entirely on the jury's assessment of credibility, could not be said to have been either egregious or a serious miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the order of the district court, vacated the judgment entered on the basis of the second verdict, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate the first verdict and to enter judgment in defendant's favor in accordance with that verdict.

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase.