Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court granting respondent's motion to quash subpoenas issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782. Petitioner sought assistance from the district court to order discovery from three non-parties for use in a securities fraud action he filed in Germany. The district court allowed the discovery and the relevant subpoenas were issued. However, before any discovery was produced, respondent moved to vacate that order and quash the subpoenas. The district court granted the motion and ruled that the requested discovery could not be "for use" in the German tribunal because it was unlikely to be admitted in the foreign jurisdiction. The court reversed the order, concluding that the "for use" requirement was not limited to the actual receipt of materials into evidence in the foreign proceeding.

Plaintiffs appealed a decision and order of the district court granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants, LCB and AmEx. Plaintiffs, all Israeli residents, were allegedly injured or their family members killed or injured, by rockets fired by Hizballah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, into northern Israel in July and August 2006. Plaintiffs asserted that Israeli law governed their negligence claim while AmEx maintained that New York law governed. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' negligence claim against AmEx, evaluating the claim under New York state law. Because the court concluded that New York law would apply even if a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdiction existed because New York had the greatest interest in the litigation, and that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim against AmEx under New York law, the judgment of the district court insofar as it was in favor of AmEx was affirmed.

Following about 30 years of oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon, Ecuadorians brought a variety of claims against the company and obtained judgment in Ecuador. Chevron, a potential judgment-debtor, brought action under New York’s Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5301-5309, which allows judgment-creditors to enforce foreign judgments in New York courts, seeking a global anti-enforcement injunction against the Ecuadorians and their attorney to prohibit attempts to enforce the allegedly-fraudulent judgment entered by the Ecuadorian court. The district court granted the injunction. The Second Circuit reversed, vacating the injunction. The Recognition Act does not grant putative judgment-debtors a cause of action to challenge foreign judgments before enforcement of those judgments is sought. Judgment-debtors can challenge a foreign judgment’s validity under the Act only defensively, in response to an attempted enforcement.

Petitioner, wanted in his native Greece on charges related to the kidnapping and murder of a minor, was certified extraditable after a hearing in the district court, notwithstanding certain arguments he made regarding Greece's compliance, vel non, with its own criminal procedure. This appeal required the court to clarify the proper role of a district court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging an extradition order. The court held that the district court erred by placing the burden of proof in the habeas proceeding on the United States rather than on petitioner and by engaging in an improper inquiry into Greece's compliance with its own laws. The court reaffirmed that a court considering an extradition request - or a petition for habeas corpus seeking collateral review of an extradition order - could review the demanding government's compliance with its own laws only insofar as it was necessary to ensure that the provisions of the federal extradition statute and relevant extradition treaty have been met. The court further held that petitioner had not carried his burden of proving that the requirements of the treaty were met. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the writ, and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to enter a certificate of extraditability and order of commitment.

This was an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion to dismiss a suit seeking confirmation of an international arbitration award. Appellant contended that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens (FNC) in favor of an action in the courts of Peru. The court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition, concluding that the underlying claim arose from a contract executed in Peru, by a corporation then claiming to be a Peruvian domiciliary against an entity that appeared to be an instrumentality of the Peruvian government, with respect to work to be done in Peru, and the public factor of permitting Peru to apply its cap statute to the disbursement of governmental funds to satisfy the award tipped the FNC balance decisively against the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq., and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his conspiring with others in a scheme to illegally purchase SOCAR, a state-owned oil company, by bribing the Azerbaijani president and other officials. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding overt acts, conscious avoidance, insufficiency of the mens rea charge, and proposed bad faith instructions; the district court did not err in allowing his conviction on the false statements count to stand because it was supported by sufficient evidence; and the district court did not err in not permitting testimony by the vice president for investments at Columbia University, not permitting cross-examination of Thomas Farrell, and permitting a portion of a certain memorandum referencing a conversation as a prior consistent statement. The court examined the remainder of defendant's arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.

Plaintiff, in his role as executor of the estate and personal representative of his wife, who perished in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as in his individual capacity, filed suit alleging claims that arose from the events of that day, of assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, wrongful death, and violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333. Defendant subsequently appealed from an order denying without prejudice its motion to vacate entry of default and to dismiss the complaint. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's suit was properly considered under the noncommercial tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity provided by 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(5). Because factual issues persisted with respect to whether the Taliban's actions in allegedly agreeing to facilitate the September 11th attacks were properly considered to be the action of Afghanistan and as to whether any such actions were "discretionary" under section 1605(a)(5)(A), the court remanded the case for jurisdictional discovery as requested by Afghanistan in the district court.

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of (1) conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR) and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; (2) violating the ITR; (3) operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and (4) two counts of making false statements in response to government subpoenas. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in several respects when instructing the jury on the conspiracy, ITR, and money-transmitting counts; defendant was entitled to a new trial on the false statement counts because the government constructively amended the indictment; the government committed misconduct in its rebuttal summation, which he claimed necessitated a new trial on all counts; and defendant should be resentenced because the district court miscalculated the applicable offense level. The court reversed Count One to the extent it alleged a violation of the ITR as an overt act and vacated and remanded to the extent it was based on the money-transmission violation as an overt act; reversed Count Two; vacated and remanded Count Three; and affirmed Counts Four and Five.

Defendants appealed their convictions for conspiring to kill U.S. officers, to acquire and export anti-aircraft missiles, and to provide material support to a known terrorist organization. Two defendants were additionally convicted of money laundering and conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The court held that the United States had federal subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute defendants; the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a hearing on certain issues; because the court concluded that defendants' proffered evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404 and that the district court did not commit manifest error by excluding it under Rule 403, defendants' evidentiary challenge to the exclusion was rejected; defendants' remaining challenges were rejected and their convictions were affirmed under 18 U.S.C. 2332(g); the district court's jury instruction was correct and that 18 U.S.C. 2339B did not violate the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding that no proof was required that a defendant intended his aid to support the terrorist activity of a terrorist group; and one defendant's insufficiency challenge was rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs Debbie and Max Walters appealed from a district court judgment that dismissed their petition for the issuance of a turnover order. In 1990, the Walters' thirteen-year-old son was killed on a hunting trip with his father when a Chinese-manufactured rifle the boy carried allegedly misfired. The Walters sued China and several entities allegedly controlled by China in the U.S. District Court on theories of products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with the manufacture of the rifle. The Walters eventually won a $10 million default judgment, and sought to enforce it by collecting China's assets in the possession of the respondent banks, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., Bank of China, Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the district court dismissed the petition with prejudice. Without filing a new petition, the Walters argued on appeal that the Banks lacked standing to assert foreign sovereign immunity on behalf of China, and that China waived any immunity by its conduct underlying the default judgment and by its failure to appear. Upon review of the submitted briefs and the applicable legal authority, the Second Circuit found Plaintiffs' arguments were without merit, and affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss their case.