Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Internet Law
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Peter Ricci, a Teamsters member since 1983, refused to endorse Union President Doyle in 2002. For the next 10 years, Ricci claims, he suffered retaliation. He was fired from jobs he should have kept; he was not placed in jobs he should have gotten; and generally disfavored, even as compared with members with less seniority. In 2012, members of the Union distributed newsletters containing statements about the Riccis. Those newsletters were also published on a website hosted on GoDaddy’s web servers. The Riccis claim that GoDaddy refused to investigate Ricci’s complaints. In the Ricci’s pro se defamation and retaliation suit, the district court dismissed all claims against GoDaddy and federal claims against the Union. The Second Circuit affirmed. GoDaddy is immune from the defamation claims under the Communications Decency Act of 1996: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), and “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The labor claims were barred by the NLRA’s six‐ month statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. 160(b). View "Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456" on Justia Law

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This case arose when plaintiff filed a defamation action against defendants based on statements that they made in an online petition and press release. The district court dismissed the action. The court reserved decision and certified the following questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Does a hyperlink to source material about judicial proceedings in an online petition suffice for purposes of applying the common law fair report privilege? and (2) Did Nevada’s anti-strategic litigation against public participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.653-41.670, as that statute was in effect prior to the most recent amendments in 2013, cover speech that seeks to influence an election but that is not addressed to a government agency? View "Adelson v. Harris" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, an association of authors and several individual authors, filed suit against Google alleging that it committed copyright infringement through the Library Project of its "Google Books" search tool by scanning and indexing more than 20 million books and making available for public display "snippets" of most books upon a user's search. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's grant of class certification. The court believed that the resolution of Google's fair use defense in the first instance would necessarily inform and perhaps moot the court's analysis of many class certification issues and that holding the issue of certification in abeyance until Google's fair use defense has been resolved would not prejudice the interests of either party. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider the fair use issues. View "The Authors Guild Inc., et al. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

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Two groups of plaintiffs, holders of copyrights in programs broadcast on network television, filed copyright infringement actions against Aereo. Aereo enabled its subscribers to watch broadcast television programs over the internet for a monthly fee. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction barring Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still airing, claiming that those transmissions infringed their exclusive right to publicly perform their works. The district court denied the motion and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that Aereo's transmissions of unique copies of broadcast television programs created at its users' request and transmitted while the programs were still airing on broadcast television were not "public performances" of plaintiffs' copyrighted works under Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. As such, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they were likely to prevail on the merits on this claim in their copyright infringement action. Nor have they demonstrated serious questions as to the merits and a balance of hardships that tipped decidedly in their favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion. View "WNET v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. At issue was whether a court in Connecticut could properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant who, while domiciled and working in Canada, was alleged to have accessed a computer server located in Connecticut to misappropriate confidential information belonging to her employer. The court held that Connecticut district court had long-arm jurisdiction over defendant; defendant had sufficient minimum contacts in Connecticut; and the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on behalf of themselves and similarly situated plaintiffs, alleging, inter alia, that defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices through unauthorized enrollment practices known as "post transaction marketing" and "data pass." At issue was whether plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their dispute with defendants as a consequence of an arbitration provision that defendants asserted was part of a contract between the parties. The court concluded that despite some limited availability of the arbitration provision to plaintiffs, they were not bound to arbitrate this dispute. In regards to the email at issue, under the contract law of Connecticut or California - either of which could apply to this dispute - the email did not provide sufficient notice to plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in defendants' service. In regards to the hyperlink at issue, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the argument that plaintiffs were on notice of the arbitration provision through the hyperlink by failing to raise it in the district court. View "Schnabel et al. v. Trilegiant Corp. et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, producers and owners of copyrighted television programming, sued defendants for streaming plaintiffs' copyrighted television programming over the Internet live and without their consent. The court, applying Chevron analysis, held that: (1) the statutory text was ambiguous as to whether defendant, a service that retransmitted television programming over the Internet, was entitled to a compulsory license under section 111 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 111; (2) the statute's legislative history, development, and purpose indicated that Congress did not intend for section 111 licenses to extend to Internet retransmissions; (3) the Copyright Office's interpretation of section 111 - that Internet retransmissions services did not constitute cable systems under section 111 - aligned with Congress' intent and was reasonable; and (4) accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding irreparable harm; in balancing the hardships; and considering the public interest. View "WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2 and was sentenced to 151 months, for participation in an advance-fee scheme, in which the victim is persuaded to pay a sum of money up front in order to receive a larger sum of money at a later. The district court concluded, based in part on email exchanges, that he was a manager or supervisor of at least one other participant in the scheme, and that the overall criminal activity involved five or more participants. The Second Circuit affirmed. Courts may rely on unique email addresses in assessing a defendant’s role in a scheme and calculating the number of participants for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Diamreyan" on Justia Law

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Defendant, a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs & Co., appealed his conviction for stealing and transferring proprietary computer source code of Goldman's high frequency trading system in violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832. Defendant argued, inter alia, that his conduct did not constitute an offense under either statute because: (1) the source code was not a "stolen" "good" within the meaning of the NSPA, and (2) the source code was not "related" to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA. The court agreed and concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense under either the NSPA or the EEA, and that the indictment was therefore legally insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Aleynikov" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants on all claims of direct and secondary copyright infringement based on a finding that defendants were entitled to safe harbor protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512. The court held that, although the district court correctly held that the section 512(c) safe harbor required knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity, the court vacated the order granting summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find that YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its website. The court further held that the district court erred by interpreting the "right and ability to control" infringing activity to require "item-specific" knowledge. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's holding that three of the challenged YouTube software functions fell within the safe harbor for infringement that occurred "by reason of" storage at the direction of the user, and remanded for further fact-finding with respect to a fourth software function. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Viacom International, Inc., et al. v. Youtube, Inc., et al.; The Football Assoc. Premier League Ltd., et al. v. Tur, et al." on Justia Law