Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
by
Dr. Sari Edelman, a female rheumatologist, was employed by the New York University (NYU) hospital system. After nearly five years of employment without disciplinary issues, she had disputes with Joseph Antonik and David Kaplan regarding her office space. Edelman claimed that Antonik used a gender-based slur and behaved aggressively, and that Kaplan's subsequent handling of the issue was discriminatory. She lodged complaints with NYU human resources, alleging gender discrimination and hostile behavior. Her employment contract was not renewed the following year, leading to her termination.Edelman sued various NYU entities and individual employees, asserting claims under the federal and New York Equal Pay Acts, Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted partial judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in favor of some defendants and dismissed certain claims. The jury found in favor of Edelman on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik, awarding her $700,000 in damages, but found for the defendants on all other claims. The District Court later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the defendants, vacating the jury's verdict in favor of Edelman.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts in Edelman's favor on her retaliation claims against NYU and Antonik. The court vacated the District Court's grant of JNOV for these claims and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. The court also vacated the District Court's decision granting JMOL in favor of Kaplan on the retaliation claim and remanded for a new trial on that claim. The judgment on the remaining claims was affirmed. View "Edelman v. NYU Langone Health System" on Justia Law

by
Nakul Karkare, a surgeon affiliated with AA Medical, P.C., brought an action against the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 580 (the Union) to recover unpaid benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Karkare, holding a power of attorney for Patient JN, claimed the Union failed to fully reimburse AA Medical for surgical services provided to Patient JN, a beneficiary under the Union’s self-funded insurance plan. The Union reimbursed only $1,095.92 of the $153,579.94 billed by AA Medical.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the complaint sua sponte, concluding that a power of attorney did not permit Karkare to maintain an ERISA cause of action on behalf of Patient JN, as it was distinct from an assignment of claim. Karkare did not provide proof of a valid assignment but argued that the power of attorney was sufficient. The district court disagreed and dismissed the complaint, later denying Karkare’s motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Karkare lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to bring the action. The court determined that Karkare was suing in his own name and not on behalf of Patient JN, despite holding a power of attorney. The court held that a power of attorney does not confer Article III standing to file suit in the attorney-in-fact’s own name. However, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether Patient JN should be permitted to be substituted into the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Karkare v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Board of Trustees of a multiemployer pension plan primarily benefitting unionized bakery drivers in New York City, which applied for Special Financial Assistance (SFA) in 2022. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) denied the application, citing the plan's termination in 2016 as a disqualifying factor. The Fund, asserting it was in "critical and declining status," sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the PBGC, agreeing that the plan's termination made it ineligible for SFA. The court also concluded that a terminated plan could not be restored under ERISA, thus affirming the PBGC's denial of the Fund's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the SFA statute does not exclude plans based solely on a prior termination. The court found that the statute's reference to "critical and declining status" incorporates the definition from 29 U.S.C. § 1085(b)(6) without importing limitations from other sections. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the Fund, vacate the PBGC's denial of the SFA application, and remand to the PBGC for reconsideration. View "Bd. of Trs. of the Bakery Drivers Loc. 550 v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation" on Justia Law

by
Natasha Knox, a Black woman of Jamaican descent, worked as a customer service attendant at three Clean Rite laundromats in the Bronx from December 2018 until her termination in April 2019. She alleged that her supervisors, Cecilia Ashmeade and Kenneth Ferris, made derogatory comments about her race and national origin, and that Clean Rite failed to accommodate her disability following a thumb injury. Knox also claimed she was not paid for extra shifts worked at other locations and was wrongfully terminated after reimbursing herself for taxi fare from the cash register, which she claimed was permitted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Clean Rite, dismissing Knox’s claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination, hostile work environment, refusal to accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that Knox had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claims. Knox’s motion to strike the defendants’ answer and request for default judgment against Ashmeade and Ferris, who had failed to appear, was denied as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that Knox had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on all her claims. The court noted that evidence such as Knox’s testimony and sworn affidavit could lead a reasonable jury to find in her favor. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims. The claims against Ashmeade and Ferris were reinstated for the district court to reconsider Knox’s motion to strike their answer and for default judgment. View "Knox v. CRC Management Co." on Justia Law

by
Angel Tudor, a teacher with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), worked for Whitehall Central School District for approximately 20 years. Tudor had an accommodation allowing her to leave campus for 15-minute breaks during her prep periods to manage her PTSD symptoms. In 2016, Whitehall prohibited teachers from leaving school grounds during prep periods, leading Tudor to take medical leave. Upon her return, Whitehall provided inconsistent accommodations, which Tudor claimed were insufficient. For the 2019-20 school year, Tudor's schedule included a study hall period during which she was not guaranteed her requested break, leading her to take unauthorized breaks.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Whitehall, holding that Tudor's ability to perform her job without accommodation was fatal to her failure-to-accommodate claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court assumed Tudor had a qualifying disability but found that she could not establish the third element of her claim because she could perform her job's essential functions without accommodation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred. The appellate court held that an employee may qualify for a reasonable accommodation under the ADA even if they can perform the essential functions of their job without it. The court emphasized that the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, not just necessary ones. The judgment of the district court was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District" on Justia Law

by
Three former employees of Amazon filed a class action complaint seeking payment for straight-time and overtime wages under Connecticut’s wage laws for time spent undergoing mandatory security screenings after clocking out. The employees argued that this time should be compensable under state law. Amazon required employees to pass through security screenings when exiting the secured area of their fulfillment centers, but not upon entry. The screenings involved metal detectors and varied based on the personal belongings employees carried. Employees were not compensated for the time spent in these screenings.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of Amazon, dismissing the employees' complaint. The court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, which held that time spent in mandatory security screenings is not compensable under federal law. The employees appealed the decision and moved to certify a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Connecticut’s wage laws to their case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the question of whether Connecticut’s wage laws require compensation for time spent in mandatory security screenings is unresolved. The court decided to certify this question to the Connecticut Supreme Court for a definitive resolution. Additionally, the court asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to address whether a de minimis exception applies to such compensable time and, if so, what amount of time is considered de minimis. The Second Circuit reserved its decision and dismissed the employees' motion to certify as moot, pending the Connecticut Supreme Court's response. View "Del Rio v. Amazon.com.DECE, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Xerox Corporation filed a petition under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for injunctive and declaratory relief against Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United (the Union). After the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Xerox and the Union expired, Xerox terminated retiree benefits. The Union argued that Xerox could not unilaterally terminate vested benefits and sought to enforce the expired agreement’s arbitration provision. Xerox sought to stay and enjoin arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York granted Xerox’s petition, concluding that the Union’s grievance was not arbitrable under the expired CBA. The district court reasoned that the Union failed to identify language in the agreement that could be understood to have promised vested benefits beyond the agreement’s expiration. Additionally, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents barred an interpretation that benefits had vested.On appeal, the Union argued that the district court erred. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the Union. The appellate court found that the Union identified language that could be reasonably understood as guaranteeing benefits beyond the contract’s expiration or as constituting deferred compensation. Furthermore, the reservation-of-rights clause in plan documents did not conclusively bar an interpretation that benefits had vested. To discern the parties’ intent, the appropriate trier of fact would need to consult extrinsic evidence.Accordingly, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Xerox Corporation v. Local 14A, Rochester Regional Joint Board, Xerographic Division Workers United" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, CompassCare, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA), and First Bible Baptist Church, challenged the constitutionality of New York Labor Law Section 203-e, which prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s or a dependent’s reproductive health decision making. They argued that the law infringed on their First Amendment rights of expressive association, speech, and religion, and that the Notice Provision, which required employers issuing employee handbooks to include information about employees' rights under the Act, compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Plaintiffs' claims related to expressive association, speech, free exercise, religious autonomy, and vagueness. However, it permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Act’s Notice Provision. The case was then influenced by the Second Circuit's decision in Slattery v. Hochul, which held that an employer might have an associational-rights claim if the Act forces the employer to employ individuals acting against the organization’s mission.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It vacated the District Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ expressive-association claim, the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs regarding the Notice Provision, and the permanent injunction. The Court remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether any Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an associational-rights claim under the precedent set by Slattery. The Court held that the Act’s Notice Provision is subject to rational basis review and is reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of employees regarding their statutory rights. It also affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims. View "CompassCare v. Hochul" on Justia Law

by
A dental hygienist brought claims for sex discrimination, retaliation, and negligence against her former employer and supervisors. She alleged that her supervisor made repeated sexual advances and harassed her throughout her employment. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claims and allowed the other claims to proceed to trial. A jury awarded the plaintiff $575,000 in emotional distress damages and $2 million in punitive damages. However, the district court granted a motion for a new trial, finding the damages excessive and indicative of unfair prejudice. In the second trial, the court precluded certain evidence, and the jury awarded the plaintiff only $1 in nominal damages.The plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, the order granting a new trial, and the evidentiary rulings. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the retaliation claims, agreeing that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as required for such claims. The court also upheld the district court’s decision to grant a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the determination that the jury’s damages award was excessive and indicative of prejudice. Additionally, the court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of the plaintiff’s psychiatric records, portions of a coworker’s deposition testimony, and an anonymous fax.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in any of its challenged rulings and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Qorrolli v. Metropolitan Dental Associates" on Justia Law

by
Participants in Deloitte LLP’s 401(k) retirement plan filed a class action lawsuit against the plan fiduciaries, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by allowing excessive administrative and recordkeeping fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the fees were higher than those of comparable plans and that the fiduciaries failed to obtain lower fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the fees were excessive relative to the services provided. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint, deeming it futile as the proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies in the original complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible inference that the defendants breached their duty of prudence. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not adequately compare the services provided by the plan to those of the comparator plans, nor did they provide context to show that the fees were excessive. The court also upheld the dismissal of the derivative claim for failure to monitor, as it was dependent on the primary claim of breach of fiduciary duty. View "Singh v. Deloitte LLP" on Justia Law