Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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John D. Whitfield's application for a job as a Youth Development Specialist with the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) was rejected. Whitfield alleged that the rejection was discriminatory and violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He initially challenged the decision in New York State Supreme Court through an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed. He then initiated a federal court action, which was also dismissed by the District Court on res judicata grounds. The District Court determined that the state court proceeding was a “hybrid” proceeding where Whitfield could have pursued the claims he raises in the federal action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the state court adjudicated the matter as a pure Article 78 proceeding, not as a hybrid. Therefore, the state court lacked the power to award Whitfield the full scope of relief he now seeks in this action, and the District Court erred by dismissing the amended complaint on res judicata grounds. The judgment of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Whitfield v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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The case being summarized involves two subclasses of current and former tipped employees at two New York City restaurants, who filed suit against the restaurants and their owners for violations of the New York Labor Law (NYLL) and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Prior to the trial, the parties agreed to present only the NYLL claims to the jury. The defendants appealed the partial final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ NYLL claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that because the plaintiffs’ federal claims were never formally dismissed, and the partial final judgment did not contain a disposition as to the federal claims, the matter had to be remanded to the district court. The purpose of the remand was to allow the district court to clarify the record as to the status of the FLSA claims. The court concluded that the lack of clarity concerning the FLSA claims impaired its ability to review the defendants’ challenges, leading to questions about the validity of the district court’s judgment certifying the appeal. The mandate was issued forthwith, with jurisdiction restored to the panel without the need for a new notice of appeal if, within thirty days, either party informed the court by letter that the district court had supplemented the record to clarify the status of the FLSA claims. View "Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the plaintiff, Cindy L. Moll, who made allegations of gender-based discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer of her job site, and discriminatory or retaliatory termination of her employment against her former employer, Telesector Resources Group Inc., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law. She also claimed she was paid less than her male co-workers for similar work, violating Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York initially granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated parts of the district court's judgment and remanded for trial.Regarding the hostile work environment claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals noted the district court's failure to take all the circumstances into account and to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.In relation to the retaliatory transfer claim, the Court of Appeals held that the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the transfer of the plaintiff's job site to Syracuse was not an adverse employment action and found that the district court ignored evidence that could support a finding of causation.As for the discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment claim, the Court of Appeals found that the district court did not adhere to the summary judgment principles. It concluded that the record revealed genuine issues as to all of the elements of the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's decision to transfer her job site to Syracuse violated Title VII's prohibition against retaliation.Finally, concerning the Equal Pay Act claim, the Court of Appeals held that there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried. It pointed out that the district court failed to adequately account for the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of some of the plaintiff's other claims but vacated the judgment as to the claims of hostile work environment, retaliatory transfer, discriminatory or retaliatory termination of employment, and the Equal Pay Act claim as to one of the plaintiff's identified comparators. The case was remanded for trial. View "Moll v. Telesector" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Dr. Misty Blanchette Porter, had been a staff physician at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (DHMC) since 1996. She specialized in reproductive medicine and was highly regarded in her field. In November 2015, Dr. Porter developed a medical condition that required her to take a medical leave of absence and subsequently work reduced hours. In 2017, DHMC decided to close the Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility Division (REI) where Dr. Porter worked and terminate her employment. Dr. Porter claimed that her termination was due to her disability and her whistleblowing activity, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the laws of Vermont and New Hampshire.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to DHMC. The court found that there was direct evidence that the decision to terminate Dr. Porter's employment was based, in whole or in part, on her disability. The court also found that a jury could reasonably infer that Dr. Edward Merrens, the chief decision-maker in the termination, was aware of Dr. Porter's whistleblowing activity. The case was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center" on Justia Law

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In the dispute between fashion designer and social media influencer Hayley Paige Gutman and her former employer, JLM Couture, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the preliminary injunction and contempt order issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The lower court had awarded JLM control of two social media accounts previously managed by Gutman and enforced a five-year restrictive covenant that prohibited Gutman from identifying herself as a designer of certain goods. The court also held Gutman in civil contempt for posts on Instagram that it deemed as marketing, violating an earlier version of the preliminary injunction.The Court of Appeals dismissed Gutman's appeal from the contempt order due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. It affirmed the district court's refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction based on the law of the case. However, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order that modified its preliminary injunction. The court found fault in the lower court's determination of the ownership of the disputed social media accounts and its failure to evaluate the reasonableness of the five-year noncompete restraint on Gutman. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. View "JLM Couture, Inc. v. Gutman" on Justia Law

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In the case involving the Restaurant Law Center and the New York State Restaurant Association against the City of New York and the Commissioner of the City’s Department of Consumer and Worker Protection, the plaintiffs challenged a New York City law prohibiting the wrongful discharge of fast-food restaurant employees. The plaintiffs argued that the law was preempted by federal law and violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The appellate court concluded that the city's Wrongful Discharge Law did not violate federal law nor the United States Constitution.The court held that New York’s Wrongful Discharge Law was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it established minimum labor standards that regulated the substance, rather than the process, of labor negotiations. The court also held that the law did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which acts as a safeguard against economic protectionism. The court found that the law did not discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face, in its purpose, or in its practical effect. View "Restaurant Law Center v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff class participates in “403(b)” retirement plans administered by Cornell University (“Cornell”). Plaintiffs brought this suit against Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries alleging a number of breaches of their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Plaintiffs appealed from entry of judgment in Defendants’ favor on all but one claim, which was settled by the parties. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged: (1) the dismissal of their claim that Cornell entered into a “prohibited transaction” by paying the plans’ recordkeepers unreasonable compensation, (2) the “parsing” of a single count alleging a breach of fiduciary duty into separate sub-claims at the motion to dismiss stage, (3) the award of summary judgment against Plaintiffs for failure to show loss on their claim that Defendants breached their duty of prudence by failing to monitor and control recordkeeping costs, and (4) the award of summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims that Cornell breached its duty of prudence by failing to remove underperforming investment options and by offering higher-cost retail share classes of mutual funds, rather than lower-cost institutional shares.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ prohibited transactions claim and certain duty-of-prudence allegations for failure to state a claim and did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining duty-of-prudence claims. In so doing, the court held as a matter of first impression that to state a claim for a prohibited transaction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 1106(a)(1)(C), it is not enough to allege that a fiduciary caused the plan to compensate a service provider for its services. View "Cunningham v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

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This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

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Catholic Health System of Long Island (“CHS”) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion to dismiss a qui tam action brought by a former employee (“Relator”) on behalf of the United States and the State of New York under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”), and the New York False Claims Act (“NYFCA”). According to Relator, CHS and certain of its affiliates falsely certified their compliance with federal law, in violation of the FCA and NYFCA, when they submitted Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims without disclosing their ongoing violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1320a-7b(a)(4) (the “Benefits Conversion Statute”). After the Department of Justice and the New York Attorney General declined to intervene in the suit, the district court denied CHS’s motion to dismiss these claims but granted its motion to certify an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) on the grounds that the case presented an issue of first impression.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court held that the Benefits Conversion Statute is not violated where, as here, the recipient of a reimbursement payment is under no obligation to utilize the funds in any particular way, Relator has failed to plead an FCA or NYFCA claim. The court explained that because the Medicare and Medicaid payments at issue here were reimbursements for services already provided, with no forward-looking conditions that they be used in any particular way, Defendants’ alleged conduct did not violate the Benefits Conversion Statute. Relator’s claims based on section 1320a-7b(a)(4) therefore fail as a matter of law. View "U.S. ex rel. Quartararo v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island Inc." on Justia Law

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The Plaintiffs, former employees of a high-end fashion retailer in New York, allege that their regularly scheduled workweek included more than forty hours per week of work. Plaintiffs claim that they were entitled to an overtime premium under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law, and that their employer misclassified them as managerial employees and failed to pay them an overtime premium. The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims for failure to allege the specific number of hours they worked. It then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.   The Second Circuit vacated. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint adequately states a claim under the FLSA because it alleges that their regularly scheduled workweek exceeded forty hours of work and that the Plaintiffs were denied overtime as a result of being misclassified as managers. The court explained that various Plaintiffs have necessarily plausibly pleaded similar, if not identical, allegations about their regular schedule. In context, the individualized facts giving rise to each Plaintiff’s action – namely, when each Plaintiff worked the regular schedule at issue – are adequately and specifically alleged. View "Abbott v. Comme Des Garcons, Ltd." on Justia Law